NPCI ask banks to stop Aadhaar-based payments through UPI and IMPS
The National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) has asked banks to discontinue Aadhar-based payments through the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Immediate Payment System (IMPS) channels. Pay to Aadhaar is an additional functionality in UPI and IMPS where the payer can transfer funds to the beneficiary using Aadhaar number. Separately, NPCI also asked banks to stop giving cashbacks on using Bharat Interface for Money (BHIM) to all users, except new ones. 
 
Quoting a 17 July 2018 circular issued by NPCI to banks, a report from Financial Express says (https://www.financialexpress.com/money/discontinue-aadhaar-based-payments-through-upi-and-imps-npci-tells-banks/1251410/), “Aadhaar number is a sensitive information and the revised framework about its usage in the payment landscape is still evolving. With this background, we proposed removal of ‘Pay to Aadhaar’ functionality in both UPI and IMPS before the steering committee (meeting held on 5 July 2018). The proposal of removing the Aadhaar number functionality was approved by the steering committee.”
 
From 31 August 2018, the 'Pay to Aadhaar' function would be removed from both UPI and IMPS. “All member banks should remove this functionality both as remitter and beneficiary. Also, all interfaces currently offering this functionality, such as UPI apps and third-party apps, should remove this option from their respective apps by 31 August 2018,” the circular from NPCI says.
 
The steering committee for UPI and IMPS has 18 bank and non-bank payment players. This includes State Bank of India (SBI), HDFC Bank, Citibank, Maharashtra Gramin Bank, One Mobikwik Systems and Paytm Payments Bank, among others. 
 
In a separate circular, NPCI has asked banks to restrict cashbacks on using BHIM to new users only. In addition, it has removed incentives for merchants accepting UPI payments from 1 July 2018. 
 
In April 2018, the government launched a scheme entailing cashbacks of up to Rs750 per month for users of BHIM app. Merchants who accepted payments through any UPI app were entitled to a maximum cashback of Rs1,000 per month. They were entitled to receive a cashback worth 10% of the value of each transaction, subject to a cap of Rs50 per transaction.
 
In a notification dated 17 July 2018, NPCI said that following a review of the incentive scheme, the Ministry for Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) has decided to scale it back significantly, another report from the newspaper says
 
For IMPS, there are 364 members banks while for UPI, there are 101 banks registered with NPCI. There are 53.17 crore Aadhaar numbers mapped in the NPCI's Aadhaar based payment system.
 
An Aadhaar number becomes a financial address when an Aadhaar is “seeded” into a table called the “NPCI mapper” by anyone linking the Aadhaar to a bank account. This mapper is a directory of Aadhaar numbers and Institution Identification Number (IIN) numbers used for the purpose of routing transactions to the destination banks. The IIN is a unique 6-digit number issued by NPCI to any participating bank. 
 
If you or anyone else link your Aadhaar with another bank account, the NPCI mapper is overwritten with the new banks’ IIN. Money transferred to an Aadhaar number using the AEPS gets transferred to the bank account linked to the Aadhaar number at the branch recognised by the IIN.
 
This idea of a mapper, as used by NPCI’s AEPS, does not allow for instructions from sender about the account to deposit money, but relies on periodic update of IIN in the NPCI’s table mapping Aadhaar numbers from banks. This mapping is volatile because multiple banks periodically update the Aadhaar numbers linked with accounts held by them. Neither the banks, the NPCI nor you have control on where you would like your payments to go.  
 
According to Dr Anupam Saraph, a renowned expert in governance of complex systems, money launderers exploit this volatility to make money transfers untraceable. "A money launderer can transfer money to an account linked to an alternate IIN and then re-seed the NPCI’s mapper with the original IIN for the Aadhaar number, completely wiping out any trace of money to the alternate IIN. Like transactions of bearer shares in Panama, such money transfers becomes no different from a hawala transaction between real parties who remain anonymous or benami."
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COMMENTS

Hemant Chitale

12 months ago

What is NPCI doing about the mapper ? Does it maintain a history of updates to the mapper ? Does it allow multiple bank accounts with priority levels / monetary limits to be associated with the same Aadhaar number ?

Health Ministry says Aadhaar is desirable and not must for Ayushman Bharat
After facing backlash from media and expert on mandating Aadhaar for availing the Ayushman Bharat -National Health Protection Mission (ABNHPM) scheme, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) has gone on the backfoot. In a clarification, the Ministry said use of Aadhaar in Ayushman Bharat is 'desirable' and not a 'must'. However, for beneficiary identification, the process flow shared by the Ministry still mandates Aadhaar for availing next treatment. 
 
In a statement, Union Health Minister JP Nadda confirmed “we will provide services to all eligible beneficiaries with or without Aadhaar.”
 
"Notification of the Ayushman Bharat – National Health Protection Mission being issued by MoHFW under Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act, merely enables the implementation agencies to ask for the beneficiary Aadhaar number to authenticate their identity. In order to authenticate the identity of beneficiaries accurately, the use of Aadhaar number is preferable, but it is not a 'must'. There shall be no denial of benefit for want of Aadhaar number," the Ministry clarified.  
 
According to the Health Ministry, the draft notification of Ayushman Bharat also provides for exception handling mechanism, like production of alternate identification mechanisms such as Ration Card, Voter ID Card, and MGNREGA Card, as mentioned in the notification, in case the beneficiary does not have an Aadhaar number. In addition, it also makes the implementation agencies accountable for setting up of Aadhaar enrolment centres for the beneficiaries who are not yet enrolled for Aadhaar, at convenient locations.
 
ABNHPM guidelines on beneficiary identification clearly state that beneficiaries can bring Aadhaar or any other valid government IDs decided by the State if they do not have an Aadhaar, it added.
 
In a report, the Economic Times  had said that Aadhaar is a must for Ayushman Bharat and those who want to avail the scheme must apply for the Aadhaar number by March 2019. Quoting, Indu Bhushan, Chief Executive of Ayushman Bharat, the report says, “Any notification to this effect would be aspirational at this point of time. We have very clearly given other options (for patients without Aadhaar cards). Those without Aadhaar can show their ration card or voter ID card upon their first visit, following which they would be expected to enrol for Aadhaar.” 
 
However, the process flow shared by the Ministry for beneficiary identification still mandates feeding of Aadhaar number. This process flow is titled as Guidelines for Pradhan Mantri Rashtriya Swasthya Suraksha Mission (PMRSSM).
 
Where the resident does not have Aadhaar, the process flow asks for a declaration form with a caveat “…either an Aadhaar enrolment slip or Aadhaar will be required to avail next treatment.” It also says, “…the hospital should provide a list of closest enrolment centres to the patient”.
 
 
In addition, for a family member, under the PMRSSM scheme, Aadhaar “will be primary identity document that has to be produced”, the guidelines say.
 
It says, “When the beneficiary comes to a contact point, the QR code on the Aadhaar card is scanned (or an e-KYC is performed) to capture all the details of the Aadhaar. A demographic authentication is performed with UIDAI to ensure the information captured is authentic. A live photograph of the member is taken to be printed on the e-card. If the PMRSSM family member does not have an Aadhaar card and the contact point is a location where no treatment is provided, the operator will inform the beneficiary that he is eligible and can get treatment only once without an Aadhaar or an Aadhaar enrolment slip. They may be requested to apply for an Aadhaar as quickly as possible.”
 
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Aadhaar: The big fat lie of UIDAI's 'missing person found' propaganda
A 5-Judge Constitution Bench at the Supreme Court will soon decide the validity of Aadhaar; but some of the myths created by the organisation that has foisted this biometric identity on people continue to be busted. Over the years, one has observed that reports touting the 'benefits' of Aadhaar appear in the media, curiously coinciding with court hearing dates. The most popular of these are the lost-and-found stories.
 
The Aadhaar-successes are no different. The biometrics in the Aadhaar apparently help the authorities re-unite lost family members.  But is this really happening? And is Aadhaar the magic tool that will put an end to Bollywood’s favourite story line of siblings lost and separated on trains, or fairs or parted from their parents, because a quick scan in a Aadhaar database will find anybody anywhere?  The truth is vastly different. 
 
 
Here are some facts. The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), which has tagged Indian residents with a number, has repeatedly told the Courts that it can only provide a 'Yes' or 'No' answer to any query on Aadhaar. It also stated that all biometrics and demographic information of Aadhaar holders is never shared with anyone. UIDAI even went up to the Supreme Court to oppose efforts by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to seek access to its biometric database for investigation in a criminal case. Under these circumstances, how anyone can claim that a ‘lost’ person was united with his/her family by using Aadhaar?
 
Biometrics do not provide demographic details, so how is this possible? There are three big holes in this propaganda. One, biometrics of a person keep change every three years. So a perfect match can only happen if the person is recently lost and not in case of long lost persons. Forget about persons missing for years, the biometric authentication of UIDAI's chief executive Ajay Bhushan Pandey also failed, as per his submission to the Supreme Court in the Aadhaar hearings.
 
Documents submitted before the five-judge Constitutional Bench, list the attempts at Aadhaar authentication by Mr Pandey. There was only one attempt out of 26 attempts to use biometric authentication. And that failed! 
 
Secondly, UIDAI itself conducted a proof of the concept trial of the Aadhaar project between March and June 2010. With regard to the false positive identification error rate (i.e. FPIR)— the proportion of identification transactions by users not enrolled in the system, in which an identifier is returned - the UIDAI said, "We will look at the point where the FPIR (i.e. the possibility that a person is mistaken to be a different person) is 0.0025%". This means, for every 1-lakh comparisons, there would be two and a half false positives. On a large scale, it means for a population of over 120 crore, there would be 18 lakh crore false positives, or, for every single Indian resident there would be 15,000 false positives!  (Click to see the calculations).
 
According to JT D'Souza, who analysed the pilot study conducted by the UIDAI, given the well-known lacunae in our infrastructure and massive demographics, biometrics as an ID will be a guaranteed failure and result in denial of service. He said, "The sum of false acceptance rate and false rejection rate (EER) reveals only part of the problem, which is rejection or acceptance within a short duration of enrolment. The bigger problem is ageing, including health and environment factors, which causes sufficient change to make biometrics completely unusable and requires very frequent re-enrolment."
 
While examining this issue in 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) in the US found that only two properly designed studies of latent fingerprint analysis had been conducted. These both found the rate of false matches (known as 'false positives') to be very high: 1 in 18 and 1 in 30.There is still no scientific basis for concluding that a specific person must have left a fingerprint, or even for estimating the number of people who might be the source of a print. 
 
Lastly, experts around the world have been raising doubts on the scientific validity of biometrics, especially fingerprint analysis for investigation. A 2017 research report by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) states, courtroom testimony and reports stating or even those implying that fingerprints collected from a crime scene belong to a single person are indefensible and lack scientific foundation. “We have concluded that latent print examiners should avoid claiming that they can associate a latent print with a single source and should particularly avoid claiming or implying that they can do so infallibly, with 100% accuracy,” the report says.
 
No wonder, when the CBI tried to get access to Aadhaar database, UIDAI fought vigorously. Not for the sake of keeping its database safe from the hands of the investigation agency, but not to let the truth of biometric failures out in the open.
 
UIDAI went to the Supreme Court to deny access to CBI to the Aadhaar database. In its judgement in 2014, the apex court held that UIDAI was restrained from transferring anyone’s biometric information with an Aadhaar number to any other agency without such person’s consent in writing.
 
This case was related CBI's probe into a rape case of a seven-year old child, which had taken place in a school washroom. All the investigation agency could found from the crime scene was some fingerprints, which it shared with UIDAI asking them to help in identifying and tracing the person/s. UIDAI rejected the request stating that it would violate privacy of the person (this was before the Supreme Court unanimously passed judgement on Right to Privacy). 
 
CBI then sent a CD containing the fingerprints requesting UIDAI to compare them with its Aadhaar database. UIDAI, however, claimed that it did not have the requisite technology to parse through all the biometric information it held to run the comparison process. The Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court, then directed the Director General of the Central Forensic and Scientific Laboratory to appoint an expert along with any other expert UIDAI itself suggested to ascertain the competence of Aadhaar database. UIDAI then filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court against the interim order of the HC.
 
In its order on 24 March 2014, the apex court stayed interim order passed by the Bombay HC for appointment of an expert. The SC also restrained the UIDAI from sharing any biometric information in its database without the consent of the owner of such data in writing.        
 
Now consider reports of Aadhaar helping people re-uniting with own family. Mr Pandey, CEO of UIDAI told Global Conference on Cyberspace (GCCS) 2017 in November last year that as many as 500 missing children have been traced over past few months through Aadhaar. He said this happened in instances where a child found in an orphanage underwent Aadhaar enrolment and it was found that his/her 12-digit biometric identifier had already been made! Looks like a classic Bollywood script where siblings were united through a locket or mark on body! 
 
Later in February 2018, Mr Pandey repeated his propaganda in his keynote address at the 21st National Conference on e-governance held at the Hyderabad. He claimed, “Aadhaar is being used to trace and unite missing children with their loved ones. Bollywood’s favourite script of two long-lost brothers reuniting after 20 years will no longer be relevant. Bollywood directors will have to look for other ideas henceforth!” 
 
Someone needs to inform Mr Pandey about the infamous arrest of Brandon Mayfield, an American lawyer, who was wrongly linked by four fingerprint experts to the 2004 Madrid train bombing. Mr Mayfield was arrested and detained for two weeks before investigators realised that Ouhnane Daoud from Algeria, was the real source of the fingerprints.
 
A review report from the US Department of Justice on Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s handling of the Mayfield case, states, “…the Mayfield case illustrates a particular hazard of the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) computer program. IAFIS is designed to find candidate fingerprints having the most minutiae arrangements similar to the encoded minutiae from the latent print. These candidates should include the correct match of the print (if it is in the FBI database), but will also include the closed possible non-matches. In this case, the true source of the print was not in the IAFIS database, but the computer found an unusually close non-match. The enormous size of the IAFIS database and the power of the IAFIS program can find a confusingly similar candidate print. The Mayfield case demonstrates the need for particular care in conducting latent fingerprint examinations involving IAFIS candidates because of the elevated danger of encountering a close non-match”.
 
As on 2012, IAFIS houses fingerprints and criminal histories of seven crore subjects in the criminal master file, 3.1 crore civil prints and fingerprints from 73,000 known and suspected terrorists processed by the US or by international law enforcement agencies, says a report from the FBI. 
 
For the sake of comparison, UIDAI’s Aadhaar database contains records of over 121 crore Indian residents. This includes fingerprints of 10 fingers, iris scans of both eyes and demographic details of Aadhaar holders. If IAFIS with its limited database find it difficult to match biometrics, how UIDAI is able to match such an extra-ordinary feat to uniting missing persons should make biometric researchers and experts from across the world hang in their heads in shame! But they are simply ignoring UIDAI’s big claims of 100% matching of biometrics with a single individual. May be they are jealous of UIDAI’s big achievement!  
 
While most examiners no longer claim the 100% accuracy of a fingerprint analysis, they are using moderating terms like examiners can ‘identify’ or are ‘practically certain of’ as the source of a latent print during court testimony and reports.
 
However, Mr Pandey and the UIDAI seems to be certain about 100% matching skills of its Aadhaar database. May be the CBI should now go in appeal to get access to Aadhaar database for investigation in criminal cases!
 
According to AAAS report, at present there is no adequate scientific basis for to measure 100% accuracy and establish validity of latent fingerprint examinations.
 
“There is no basis for estimating the number of individuals who might be the source of a particular latent print.  Hence, a latent print examiner has no more basis for concluding that the pool of possible sources is probably limited to a single person than for concluding it is certainly limited to a single person,” the report concludes.
 
May be Mr Pandey and UIDAI can teach all researchers across the world how to accurately match individual fingerprint from among a huge database of over a billion Indian residents, who have Aadhaar! 
 
Validity of Aadhaar, whether it is under the Aadhaar scheme or the Aadhaar Act, is already under challenge on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution. Various facets of Article 21 are pressed into service. First and foremost is that it violates Right to Privacy and Right to Privacy is part of Article 21 of the Constitution. Secondly, it is also argued that it violates human dignity, which is another aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution.
 
Hope the 5-Judge Bench of Supreme Court relieve citizens from the hardships of Aadhaar and save from false propaganda of UIDAI and its proponents.
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COMMENTS

Test User

10 months ago

When kid is applying for new adhar card they get error for fingerprint already exists. They check and find previous record internally. Thats how it works.

Treatle Goatfeather

1 year ago

Another myth that you have based your assumptions on: biometrics change every three years. It takes a few decades for fingerprints to change so much that a person cannot be identified entirely based on his initial prints. Iris however doesn’t change much even after decades, and as such iris scans remain reliable. Please, once again, we would request you to stick to facts which are verifiable. Why fool readers for your propaganda?

REPLY

Yogesh Sapkale

In Reply to Treatle Goatfeather 1 year ago

Would definitely reply, provided you use a real name. But do re-read views of Mr JT D'souza, an expert in biometric ID systems & design. Also check first person account shared by India's former Central Information Commissioner Shailesh Gandhi on how biometrics failed in his case https://www.moneylife.in/article/when-aadhaar-was-about-to-make-me-niradhaar/47508.html

Treatle Goatfeather

1 year ago

Yogesh, good effort. Could you please explain since when is 0.0025% equal to 2.5 times? How is 0.0025% of 120 crore population 18 *lakh* crore people? Those many people do not exist even in the whole universe! Please stick to facts rather than sensationalising your whims. If UIDAI presented a study in 2010, did all the technology used then stay static and suspended in a time warp all these years without any change or improvements?

REPLY

Yogesh Sapkale

In Reply to Treatle Goatfeather 1 year ago

Its not my finding... It is UIDAI's own study. And now it doesn't exist on their own website. It says, Oops! https://uidai.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1678.. Hope you got the message from UIDAI, "Hide & hide"...

Lakshminath Mocherla

1 year ago

You have concluded your judgement on AADHAAR and you are not expecting 5Judges to independently decide the merits or demerits of AADHAAR. THIS IS NOT JOURNALISM.

REPLY

Yogesh Sapkale

In Reply to Lakshminath Mocherla 1 year ago

Thanks for your verdict. Re-read last para in this article, which says, "Hope the 5-Judge Bench of Supreme Court relieve citizens from the hardships of Aadhaar and save from false propaganda of UIDAI and its proponents."

Prem Bajaj

1 year ago

I cannot understand the failure of even intelligent members of society to scrap aadhar, and worry about privacy issues that are negligible, and in modern environment are becoming an necessary option for government to exercise. Rather than promoting a fair revision of the Act, the rules and discipline, and such, it would be a dangerous action to scrap this option of India maintaining integrity of its citizens. Besides, as the world gets increasingly digitised in its activities, every human being, inadvertently will need to be/or get numbered eventually, if they want to prevail in any system/country.

Bhim Raju

1 year ago

It's certainly a concern that biometrics information captured undergoes change as we grow old. We should include other advance human body characteristics along with biometrics to make it full proof.

Sunil Rebello

1 year ago

PLEASE ADVISE - WHEN WILL THE 5 WISE MEN GIVE THEIR JUDGEMENT ON AADHAAR?

soidul islam

1 year ago

I'm Soidul Islam from West Bengal. Much of time I enrolled my Aadhar, but I didn't get my Aadhar number. All Everytime they rejected my application. So what I have to do for that.. please give me some advice for the.
Thanks

REPLY

Bapoo Malcolm

In Reply to soidul islam 1 year ago

Are you an Indian citizen? Do you have proof of it? Say, a passport, ration card, school or college leaving certificate from a recognised institution, electricity bill, all of long standing? Then we go further.

soidul islam

In Reply to Bapoo Malcolm 1 year ago

Yes I have all kinds of documents..

Bapoo Malcolm

1 year ago

What if I DO NOT WANT to be found by my relatives?

More seriously, Mr. Pandey has let the cat out of the bag. Aadhar is being used to track people. But the government should be careful. They who are in office today, even if they do not misuse Aadhar, a remote possibility, will have Aadhar used against them by the next dispensation. And the vicious cycle will go on; until elections are buried. It is called the Law of Unintended Consequences, and works better than Murphy's Law.

Bapoo Malcolm

1 year ago

If you will notice, or have been doing so for many months now, there is a common thread. Every story, be it finding lost family member, or arresting people with crores worth of old notes, or counterfeiters, or anything else to bolster the government's many fairy tales, NO NAME IS EVER GIVEN. If you want, check out the old news reports. Every thing but names. WHY?

Mahesh S Bhatt

1 year ago

See Nehru's Shirsana & Modi's Yogasana pictures

Truth is there is real substance with Nehru & More style with Modi.
Ulterior motive is to spoof citizens privacy rights create state machinery to harrass tax terrorise the way Politicians do against each other day in and day out and match fix REAL corrupt never gets caught

Big businessmen get 6 passports/ Some have so much money that the take citizenship of Malta( Hiranandani & surrender Indian passport)

Too many rules too little Governance greatly corrupt & lax Judiciary with greedy Cops God Bless Mahesh

Neil Sadwelkar

1 year ago

You've quoted a study from 2010. So why did the Govt then not take cognisance of this story and scrap Aadhaar right then?
Also, if fingerprints are so unreliable why has no country yet scrapped fingerprints as evidence? In fact, according to your article, the mere existence of someone's fingerprints at the scene of a crime should actually create reasonable doubt.
As per your surmise on false positives, if that person (who's fingerprints match those at a crime scene) is an Indian, then at least 15,000 other Indians could have been at the scene of a crime.
This should be grounds for acquittal of any or all the persons who's fingerprints match those found at the scene of a crime.

REPLY

Yogesh Sapkale

In Reply to Neil Sadwelkar 1 year ago

Thanks for your comment. We have been writing on all issues associated with Aadhaar since it came into existence. However, successive governments are not even listening to the Parliamentary Standing Committee.
On fingerprints, do read what is written, especially on forensic investigation. Experts across the world are casting doubts on fingerprints. That is why the big claims from UIDAI proponents needs to be checked, verified on scientific basis. If the FIPR is quite high (possibility of 15,000 Indians), then how they can claim to unit missing person with 100% accuracy. This is the question, we all should be asking to UIDAI and its Chief.

Neil Sadwelkar

In Reply to Yogesh Sapkale 1 year ago

A lot has been written on the defects of the Aadhaar system at this web site and others. I am not contradicting (nor supporting) that.

I was merely commenting that if the concept of a fingerprint (as positive identification) is so defective, then why is it even used any more in crime detection. In fact, as I've mentioned, the mere existence of one's fingerprint at the scene of a crime (if fingerprints are so susceptible to false positives) should automatically absolve and acquit any person from that crime because as the fingerprint creates reasonable doubt and indicates that s/he is one of about 15,000 persons who could have been there.

Further, when we apply for a visa, our fingerprints are taken, and when we land in that country, our fingerprints are scanned and used to confirm our identity. That (as per the logic of false positives) should also be scrapped since it could be one of 15,000 persons who could be present at that nations border.

Kisalay Somani

In Reply to Neil Sadwelkar 1 year ago

Neil, criminal cases all over the world rely on fingerprints as one of the evidences, not the only evidence. As you yourself mention, presence of fingerprints does create reasonable doubt, but it also has to be backed up by circumstantial or other evidence that proves the crime was committed by the alleged beyond reasonable doubt. Justice systems all over the world rely on "evidence beyond reasonable doubt" and I would doubt courts world over pass judgments based on "fingerprints" alone.
On your second aspect of fingerprints for visa application, I think the genuineness of the passport along with fingerprints is a good enough indicator to reduce your false positive rate than either of them being assessed alone. Laws of probability still hold - aadhaar or no aadhaar.

B. Yerram Raju

1 year ago

A very comprehensive exposure.

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