Terming recent amendments to the Right to Information (RTI) Act as a grave threat to democratic accountability, citizen empowerment, and constitutional rights, justice Ajit Prakash (AP) Shah, former chief justice of Delhi High Court (HC) and ex-chairman of the law commission of India, has called for the immediate repeal of recent amendments.
Justice Shah, in a powerful open letter addressed to attorney general R Venkataramani, demanded the immediate repealing of Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, which amends Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. "It must be explicitly clarified within the DPDP Act that the RTI Act applies with full force. This clarity is essential to prevent any future misinterpretation that might undermine the RTI Act's effectiveness."
Justice Shah’s letter, dated 28 July 2025, criticises the amendments introduced through the DPDP Act, which, he argues, 'dismantle the RTI Act’s core purpose' by introducing vague and sweeping exemptions under the guise of protecting personal data. His concerns stem from reports that the Union ministry of electronics and information technology (MeitY) has sought the attorney general’s legal opinion on whether the DPDP Act overrides the RTI Act.
Calling the RTI Act a globally respected 'sunshine law' that codifies the fundamental right to information under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution, justice Shah warned that recent amendments—particularly to Section 8(1)(j)—represent a dangerous rollback of hard-fought gains in transparency. In particular, the DPDP Act eliminates the 'public interest override' and broadens the definition of 'personal information' to such an extent that it could be used to withhold a vast array of public data previously available under the RTI framework.
According to justice Shah, the revised Section 8(1)(j) allows public authorities to deny information merely by classifying it as 'personal', regardless of whether it pertains to public activity or serves a larger public interest. Even more concerning is the deletion of the proviso to Section 8(1), which earlier ensured that any information accessible to Parliament or state legislatures would also be accessible to ordinary citizens. Justice Shah calls this deletion 'alarming for democracy', arguing that it establishes a dangerous information hierarchy between elected representatives and the public.
He also notes the ripple effect on Section 4 of the RTI Act, which mandates proactive, suo motu disclosures by public authorities. He believes these proactive disclosures will now be severely curtailed due to the expansive definition of 'personal data' in the DPDP Act, which lacks a public interest exception. Details about public officials, government spending, decision-making processes, and welfare beneficiaries may now be shielded from public scrutiny, he warns.
Drawing from his role as co-author of the 2012 'Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy', justice Shah recalls that the committee had explicitly recommended that privacy laws must not dilute the RTI Act. The DPDP Act’s current framework, he asserts, runs contrary to this foundational principle and disrupts the complementarity between transparency and privacy.
The letter frames the amendments as not just poor policy but as constitutionally vulnerable on several fronts. Justice Shah outlines a range of legal questions that may arise from these changes, including whether the amendments violate the proportionality test set out in landmark privacy rulings such as justice KS Puttaswamy vs Union of India.
He also argues that the removal of the public interest override contradicts the Supreme Court’s repeated stance that privacy, though fundamental, is not absolute and must be balanced with public interest, particularly in the context of holding public officials accountable.
Justice Shah’s critique is also deeply rooted in constitutional law. He points out that the original Section 8(1)(j) was carefully worded to allow denial of information only if it had no connection to public activity and would result in an unwarranted invasion of privacy. It also enabled disclosure if it served the larger public interest. By contrast, the amended version allows blanket denial of any information deemed 'personal', without room for nuanced evaluation.
The implications, he warns, are far-reaching. For journalists, the amendment poses a chilling effect, with fears that the DPDP Act could be misused to criminalise basic reporting, including naming individuals or capturing images in public interest stories. The penalty provisions—up to Rs250 crore or Rs500 crore—further intimidate the press, he argues.
Justice Shah also highlights how the changes will hobble grassroots transparency efforts such as social audits of welfare schemes. These audits rely on information about beneficiaries and public expenditures, often considered personal data. He cites past successes in uncovering ration fraud and ghost beneficiaries through RTI queries, achievements that he fears will now be impossible under the amended framework.
Calling the amendments a 'blanket ban' that fails to meet the proportionality, necessity, and balancing tests established in constitutional jurisprudence, justice Shah argues that they impose unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to information. He warns that the legal grounds for challenge are strong and that the changes threaten to roll back two decades of gains in transparency, democratic oversight, and citizen engagement.
One of the most scathing critiques in the letter is reserved for the deletion of the proviso to Section 8(1), which had embodied the idea that if information is not denied to Parliament, it should not be denied to citizens either. Justice Shah calls this deletion 'symbolic and substantive', arguing that it erodes the principle of popular sovereignty and suggests that the government is primarily accountable to legislatures rather than directly to the public.
He also warns that the broad and undefined scope of 'personal information' under the DPDP Act, combined with the removal of the public interest override, will lead to arbitrary and excessive denials by public information officers. This, he says, fundamentally alters the RTI Act’s presumption in favour of disclosure and creates fertile ground for opacity and corruption.
In his concluding remarks, justice Shah makes two urgent appeals. First, that Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act—which amends Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act—be repealed without delay. Second, the law should be amended to explicitly state that the RTI Act continues to apply with full force, ensuring that transparency remains a cornerstone of India’s democratic structure.
The open letter, also copied to the Union ministers for law & justice and MeitY, comes at a crucial juncture in India’s evolving data protection and transparency regime. As the attorney general weighs his legal opinion on the matter, justice Shah’s intervention raises the constitutional stakes and calls for a re-examination of how privacy and transparency must be balanced—not by blanket exclusions but by careful, case-by-case adjudication in the public interest.
Here is the letter sent by justice AP Shah to the attorney general...
