An Aadhaar number-holder is an individual, not a citizen or voter of India.
Section 2 (b) of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 states that ‘Aadhaar number holder’ means ‘an individual who has been issued an Aadhaar number’ under this Act. Central identities data repository (CIDR) means a centralised database in one or more locations containing all Aadhaar numbers issued to Aadhaar number-holders along with the corresponding demographic information and biometric information of such individuals and other information related thereto. CIDR’s relationship with the database of the elector's photo identity card (EPIC) number of each voter has a history.
But after three months, the task related to ‘Unique ID for BPL families’ was assigned to the planning commission’s processes committee which was set up on 3 July 2006 to suggest the process for updation, modification, addition and deletion of data and fields from the core database to be created under the unique identification (UID) for the BPL families project. Both, the Supreme Court’s judgement on the Aadhaar number project-linked Aadhaar Act and the CAG’s audit report, refer to the role of the processes committee and the document entitled ‘Strategic Vision Unique Identification of Residents’, which was prepared at the behest of the committee but they maintained an intriguing silence about the entity that crafted it. It was Wipro Ltd that was asked by the processes committee to prepare it.
The vision statement reads: 'Creating a unique identification system of all residents in the country for efficient, transparent, reliable and effective delivery of various welfare and private services to the common person.' The cover page of the document mentions the National Institute for Smart Government (NISG), the department of information technology (now named MeitY-ministry of electronics and information technology), and Wipro Consulting. Admittedly, Wipro was the consultant for the design phase and programme management phase of the pilot UIDAI project. The Hyderabad-based NISG is a not-for-profit company incorporated in 2002 by the government of India and Nasscom. NISG aims to 'establish itself as an institution of excellence in e-governance and to leverage private sector resources through a public-private-partnership mode in establishing e-India.' But when the UK government stopped its biometric national identity cards scheme, neither Wipro nor its donors and promoters in the government examined as to why the UK did so and why this decision too is also relevant to India. The decision was announced in the British Parliament, the same legislature which passed the India Independence Act, 1947. It must be recalled that under Nandan Nilekani’s tenure, UIDAI extended 'undue favour' to Wipro Ltd. As a consequence, UIDAI incurred an avoidable expenditure of Rs4.92 crore on an annual maintenance contract, according to the
report of the CAG of India from 2016 presented to the Parliament. UIDAI also incurred a loss of Rs1.41 crore by not routing advertisements through the directorate of advertising and visual publicity.
Unmindful of manifest conflict of interest, UIDAI had entered into a contract with Wipro in May 2011 for the supply, installation and commissioning of servers, storage systems, security systems and accessories with incidental services in the data centres of the authority in Bengaluru and Delhi/ NCR at a cost of Rs134.28 crore. This is not the only case of irregularity and corruption by UIDAI. It awarded projects to several companies without issuing tenders. The parliamentary standing committee on finance in its 69th report on the ‘Demands for Grants (2013-14)’ observed, “A provision of Rs2,620 crore has been allocated in Budget Estimate (2013-14) for Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) and a major part of the budget provision for Rs1,040 crore is earmarked for ‘Enrolment Authentication and Updation’, out of which an amount of Rs1,000 crore has been earmarked under the head ‘other charges’.”
Notably, CAG’s recent audit report also refers to findings regarding Wipro Ltd. There is a reference to the Agreement with Data Centre Development Agency (DCDA), Bengaluru and Agreement with DCDA, Manesar with Wipro Ltd. CAG has remarked that “The file related to AMC part was only provided for scrutiny. The file related to the selection process of the vendor was not made available. Since the contract involved technical issues, the same was out of the scope of the Audit for scrutiny.” Had UIDAI provided the required files related to the “selection process of the vendor”, the audit report would have ensured that sunlight is indeed the best disinfectant. The foreign firms like Accenture (US), L1 Identities Solution (now Idemia) and Ernst & Young (UK) have been given access to sensitive data of present and future Indians.
But both, the court and the CAG, failed to decode the ramifications of the mystery about the 14-page-long strategic vision document prepared by the private corporate entity. Disregarding this glaring fact, the Supreme Court was misled to record in its judgement dated 26 September 2018 that ‘‘The Processes Committee, on November 26, 2006, prepared a paper known as ‘Strategic Vision Unique Identification of Residents’. Based thereupon, the empowered group of ministers (e-GoM) was set up on 4 December 2006, to collate the national population register (NPR) under the Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Unique Identification Number project of the Department of Information Technology. The e-GoM was also empowered to look into the methodology and specific milestones for early and effective completion of projects and to take a final view on these projects.’’
At the fifth meeting of the e-GoM held on 27 April 2007, it was decided that the evolution of the UID database would be in three stages in principle. The committee further decided that linkage with major partner databases such as the household survey of RD and the individual state public distribution system (PDS) databases should be taken up in a phased manner. On 11 June 2007, at the final stage of the project, a presentation on the UID project was made to the then-prime minister by the cabinet secretary. The sixth meeting of the UID project was held on 15 June 2007. The committee taking the decision regarding the need for UIDAI to be created by an executive order under the aegis of the planning commission was appreciated in order to ensure a pan-departmental and neutral identity for the authority. The proposal for the creation of Central and state UIDs was approved. It is inexplicable as to why the proposal of state UIDs was shelved. The judgement records: “Department of Information Technology (DIT) was directed to work out modalities for linkage with Election Commission and initiate discussions with MoRD and PDS for linkage.” MoRD refers to the ministry of rural development.
At the meeting of e-GoM convened on 27 November 2007, 'a consensus emerged' on the point that ‘‘There is a clear need for creating an identity-related resident database, regardless of whether the database is created on a de novo collection of data or is based on an already existing data (such as the Election Commission’s Voter List).’’ The judgement has recorded that “A core group was set up to advise and further the work related to UIDAI….The core group, inter alia, decided that it was better to start with the electoral roll database of 2009 for undertaking the UIDAI project.”
After considering the recommendation of the cabinet secretary, a notification date of 28 January 2009 was constituted and notified the UIDAI as an attached office under the aegis of the planning commission. The fact that EGoM was composed of the then ministers of external affairs, home affairs, law, panchayati raj and communications and information technology and the then deputy chairman, planning commission, reveals that the Aadhaar number database project was/ is relevant to the work of these ministries besides the election commission of India.
Notably, Section 59 of the Aadhaar Act is unconstitutional inasmuch as it seeks to validate all actions undertaken by the Union government pursuant to the notification dated 28 January 2009. There was no consent, let alone informed consent obtained from individuals at the time of enrolment under the notification. Such enrolment, which has been conducted without obtaining adequate consent, is unconstitutional as it amounts to wrongful deprivation of the most intimate personal information of an individual. Indeed, taking of an individual’s biometric information without informed consent is a physical invasion of his or her bodily integrity. The collection of demographic information through private entities and without proper counselling or written informed consent is illegal and incapable of being retrospectively ratified. All these records which have been illegally obtained and created without necessary consent ought to be destroyed and cannot be said to be validated by Section 59. The Parliament cannot create a legal fiction of ‘consent’ where there was none. The executive under the Constitution of India cannot take away someone’s fundamental right and then support its action on the proposition of law that ‘retrospectively’ deems consent must have been given. Section 59 seeks to validate any action taken by the Union government alone. The action of private enrollers is not even sought to be protected. Therefore, all collections made by private entities under the January 2009 notification should be invalidated and all data collected by private entities should be destroyed.
The Court’s judgement dated 26 September 2018 recorded that “Demo-Official letter dated 25 February 2009, was sent by the secretary, planning commission to all chief secretaries of 35 states/ Union territories apprising them of their roles and responsibilities of the states/ Union territories in implementation of UIDAI, such as appointment of the state/ UT UID commissioners, logistics support and coordination with various departments and state units.” It is apparent that none of the chief secretaries of 35 states/ Union territories (UT) adopted the ‘demo-official letter’ with unquestioned obedience without flagging any of the illegitimate provisions which were later declared as unconstitutional by the court. Subsequent to the judgement of the court, none of these chief secretaries of 35 states/ Union territories and the ruling political parties in the state felt any constitutional, legal and logical compulsion to revise the MoUs they signed with the UIDAI for the implementation of the Aadhaar number project in the light of the judgement which found several provisions of the Aadhaar Act to be unconstitutional.
Unmindful of the fact that the Aadhaar Act does not have any provision for an Aadhaar card, in
Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) & Ors. vs. Election Commission of India (2025), the Supreme Court’s division bench of justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi passed an
order dated 14 August 2025 referring to the unsigned receipt of Aadhaar number as an Aadhaar card. The relevant part of the order reads: “In the public notice, it shall also be expressly mentioned that the aggrieved persons may submit their claims along with a copy of their Aadhar card.”
The order also disregards the fact that ‘‘a Non-resident Indian, after his arrival in India’’ is ‘‘entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number’’ as per notification dated 20 September 2019. In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 3 of the Aadhaar Act, the Union government has made 'Non-resident Indians' (NRIs) entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number. “Non-Resident Indian” means a person who is a citizen of India holding a valid Indian passport but not a resident as defined under clause (v) of Section 2 of the Aadhaar Act. According to Section 2 (v), "resident" means "an individual
who has resided in India for a period or periods amounting in all to one hundred and eighty-two days or more in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment." It implies that the Aadhaar number is being given to both residents of India as well as to non-resident Indians. Can this electronic-biometric identifier inspire even an iota of confidence for it being used for voter identification and verification?
In such a backdrop, wittingly or unwittingly, the promotion of the Aadhaar number database is linked to the advocacy of transfer of meta data of all Indians in the supreme interest of state and non-state entities from US, France and UK in the aftermath of the audit report of the functioning of UIDAI based on statistical information 'to the extent as furnished by UIDAI'.
The court seems to have erred in accepting Aadhaar for making claims about being a voter. The court’s order states that "On instructions, it has been agreed that the election commission of India, as an interim measure,….In the public notice, it shall also be expressly mentioned that the aggrieved persons may submit their claims along with a copy of their Aadhar card." The Supreme Court’s orders of 26 September 2018 and 14 August 2025 make the mistake of referring to Aadhaar number as Aadhaar card. The former uses the term 'resident' to imply 'citizen' and vice versa. The latter seems to imply that the term 'resident' refers to 'voter' even if he/ she is a non-resident Indian.
Is it not intriguing as to why the Supreme Court was persuaded by some Aadhaar number database promoters to ignore the fact that the constitutionality of the Aadhaar Act and all four existing Aadhaar databases—person database, reference database, biometric database and verification log are pending before the seven-judge Constitution bench led by justice BR Gavai, the 52nd chief justice of India? Will the Constitution bench be able to rectify the past errors before all the present and future Indians including Union ministers, chief ministers, armed forces, legislators, judges and students are made totally vulnerable?
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(Dr Gopal Krishna is a lawyer and a researcher of philosophy and law. His current work is focused on the philosophy of digital totalitarianism and the monetisation of nature. He has appeared before the Supreme Court's Committees, Parliamentary Committees of Europe, Germany and India and UN agencies on the subject of national and international legislation. He is the co-founder of the East India Research Council (EIRC). He is the convener of the Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL) which has been campaigning for freedom from UID/Aadhaar/NPR and DNA profiling through criminal identification procedures since 2010. He had appeared before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance that questioned and trashed the biometric identification of Indians through UID/Aadhaar Number. He is an ex-Fellow, Berlin-based International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter Strategies (IRGAC). He is also the editor of www.toxicswatch.org.)
But i am not clear as what is negative part of implementing aadhar card.
Initially it was not given to nri's but later allowed, what is wrong in that?
The reader is not able to understand negative aspects and risks of issuing aadhar card.
Transactions are getting captured by tax authorities by aadhar and pan and hence government revenue leakage is reduced especially in sale of land and buildings.