IL&FS Top Management: Planned Enrichment through Employee Trust; Jobs and Contracts for Families
UPDATED on 15 October 2018 at 6.50pm to add more information from REDD Intelligence
 
While all eyes are on the tottering behemoth Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services (IL&FS) and its hundreds of hydra-headed subsidiaries, more and more details are coming out of the ingenious and crafty devices by which a handful of senior managers had arranged to give themselves hundreds of crores of rupees in perks and windfall gains and got contracts and employment for their relatives. 
 
One such device is the Employee Welfare Trust (EWT), which holds a 12% stake in IL&FS, making it the fourth largest shareholder of the unlisted entity. 
 
At its peak, this small group of privileged managers running the IL&FS group had lined up a massive pay-off through their holding in the IL&FS EWT. Calculated at its peak reported valuation in 2010, says GD Agarwal of REDD Intelligence, a boutique market intelligence agency, the windfall would have amounted to over Rs1,650 crore. 
 
This valuation would have only increased significantly, given that the group grew exponentially, if recklessly, over the next eight years. But the game is over now and so is this planned bonanza.  
 
On digging through mountains of documents, Mr Agarwal found out that, apart from a 12% stake in the holding company, EWT also had a stake in its power and finance subsidiaries. It held a significant 9% stake in IL&FS Securities. Here are some details:
 
  • In 2006, there was a preferential allotment to the EWT of 53 lakh shares at Rs91 each. In June 2006, IL&FS also signed an agreement to sell the shares to ADAI (Abu Dhabi Investment Authority) at Rs275, compounded at 17%pa (per annum). More about this later. 
     
  • In July 2010, The Mint reported that the EWT’s 12% stake was valued at Rs16.5 billion (or Rs1,650 crore/$222.3 million). The report said, IL&FS “was close to signing a share sale agreement with investors to raise around $400 million (Rs1,892 crore) by selling an 8% stake at Rs1,099 a share.”  
     
  • It went on to say that “some of the shares to be sold will come from employees, who will get more than a 10-fold return on the investment made in 2000.”Apparently, there were other placements in between and even employees who had bought the shares at Rs100 each were going to be able to offload them at Rs275. The Mint report said, “Money from the sale of shares from the welfare trust, estimated to be around $20 million, will be distributed to employees.”

    When asked by The Mint, a company spokesperson was defensive about this potential ‘windfall’ and had argued that, unlike technology company executives, who got stock options, “We sell a portion of the stake in the employee trust to reward employees.” There is very little information in the public domain about this trust. 
     
  • The red herring prospectus (RHP) of IL&FS Transportation Network Ltd, (ITNL) in March 2010, revealed that the EWT was allotted 15 million shares at Rs10 each on 29 September 2006. In less than three years, it sold 4.13 million shares to Bessemer India Capital Holdings II for Rs242 per share. In effect, just Rs15 crore invested in September 2006 had turned into a massive profit of Rs 363 crore in under three years, Mr Agarwal points out.

    What is intriguing here is that the share allotment was not to ITNL’s employees but to the EWT of IL&FS, an unlisted holding company which has just 134 permanent employees. More importantly, data from elsewhere suggest that there are only 10 major beneficiaries of the trust, who could be the cabal close to Ravi Parthasarathy; but the details are not known. 
     
  • The share sale agreement with ADIA on page 6 of the RHP defines ‘Specified Beneficiaries’ as follows: (It) means the 10 (ten) beneficiaries who will receive the greatest number or numbers of Section 62 shares and/or the additional shares upon distribution of the Section 62 shares and/or the additional shares by the EWT.”

    This document also notes that the  ‘Strike Price’ for sale of shares by the EWT and or specified beneficiaries shall be the aggregate of (i) Rs275 per share and (ii) a rate of return of 17% on the said Rs275 per share compounded annually on a pro rata basis from the completion date.”
 
Preferential allotment to IL&FS employee trust
 
Extraordinarily, a former employee of IL&FS insists that all employees of the group were part of the EWT. However, none of them, including those at senior levels in the company, had any knowledge of about the allocation of shares to each employee or how they were valued. He is also emphatic that the clause about 10 Specified Beneficiaries in the document referred to above was to protect ADIA’s interest. 
 
This is borne out by a paragraph which says: “EWT shall not and it shall ensure that the Specified Beneficiaries shall not, participate in any structuring designed primarily to avoid or in any manner vitiate the rights of ADIA and/or the Affiliate Shareholders as contained in Article 208”. 
 
It goes on to say that EWT “shall not transfer or distribute the legal or Beneficial Ownership of or interest in any equity shares to any Specified Beneficiaries” unless they have “first entered into a direct covenant in favour of ADIA” and agree to be bound by the rights of ADIA contained in the article above.
 
Since there is no information about how EWT or its trustees and IL&FS has not been answering media queries, we have no way of verifying any of this. 
 
While we, in the media, have been focused on the fat salary of Rs26.3 crore that Mr Parthasarathy snagged in FY17-18, even as his 30-year ship was sinking, this pales into insignificance compared with the potential payoff that management and select employees would have received through the EWT. Now that IL&FS has run out of borrowing options and collapsed due to the massive asset-liability mismatch, the value of these shares would be meagre.
 
An international investor, who has had some rough dealings with an IL&FS group company, says that the functioning of the EWT and how it is controlled “is a fit case for piercing the corporate veil.”  He recalls that IL&FS chairman Ravi Parthasarathy used to “push relentlessly for the EWT to have a stake in the most attractive subsidiaries. While some large shareholders resisted, others gave in.” 
 
He calls it a “Faustian bargain stuck with the shareholders: you give shares as sweat equity to EWT; in return, I’m incentivized to pay dividends (even via borrowings) to all shareholders regardless of whether the company doing well or not.”
 
Given the personal incentives involved through the EWT, it is no wonder that IL&FS kept paying dividends even when the ship was tilting. 
 
The board, led by Uday Kotak, which is meeting today, and the Serious Frauds Investigation Office (SFIO) need to investigate EWT and its activities. 
 
More Vehicles for Personal Enrichment
Another important finding, through those who have dealt with IL&FS companies, is that the EWT and salaries were not the only vehicle for personal enrichment of top executives and favoured employees. We have details, so far, of at least four of the top 10 executives at IL&FS having employed their children or sons-in-law in lucrative positions within the group with better than normal salaries and benefits. 
 
Ravi Parthasarathy’s daughter, Rhea Parthasarathy, is employed at IL&FS. Her salary is listed in the FY16-17 annual report. There is no disclosure in the latest report, although sources say she continues to work there. But this is the least significant.  
 
The son-in-law of K Ramachand is employed by the group at Dubai. Contracts to handle the interiors of the IL&FS building, running into crores of rupees, were handled by Mr Ramchand’s wife. There is now a lookout notice against him. Similarly, another top executive’s son runs a construction business that works for IL&FS. The extraction of value from cars purchased for the company’s car-pool is another story that is known to all key employees but will have to be examined by the SFIO. 
 
Informed sources also say that the lavish expenses, including luxury holidays for families, were organised and paid through foreign subsidiaries, including the one in Spain. 
 
A letter from an insider speaks of the extravagant salaries and performance benefits paid out to former secretaries, promoted to head administration, but who seem to be rewarded more for the personal work done for senior managers. 
 
What makes the analysis of the sordid state of IL&FS’s finances difficult is that disclosures are poor and, probably, falsified as well—although auditors across the group pocketed large fees. 
 
The newly appointed IL&FS board held its second meeting last week. Hopefully, the board can throw light on how it plans to deal the crisis. IL&FS has a hole of almost Rs30,000 crore in its balance sheet. Will it still attempt a bailout and postpone the problem, or will it manage to find buyers for the many viable subsidiaries, even if it is with a haircut?
 
Those who are watching the situation would like to see whether Mr Kotak, who headed a corporate governance committee last year appointed by the market regulator, manages to fix any personal accountability. After all, the IL&FS mess was caused by the top management, which ran the group as its personal fief.
 
UPDATE:
 
In a detailed analysis released on 15th October, REDD Intelligence has put out a more detailed analysis of the operations of IL&FS Employee Welfare Trust.

We are reproducing it in full:

IL&FS has 130 employees as per the FY2018 annual report, and looking at the holdings of IL&FS Employee Welfare Trust (IL&FS EWT), an investment vehicle for employees, each member should be at least a millionaire.

The total value of its holdings in four IL&FS companies was an estimated Rs25.8 billion ($350 million). The latest addition is an unknown stake in Earth Environment Management Services Ltd after an Rs1.88 billion ($25.5 million) loan write off by IL&FS Financial Services Ltd.

IL&FS EWT owned 17.8 million shares (including 2.5 million shares it monetized) in IL&FS, as per company filings. These shares at the last rights offer price in September 2014 of Rs750 per share were worth Rs13.35 billion ($181 million; rights offers are generally at a discount to market value). If one were to use the Rs1,099 per share that Bay Capital paid to buy IL&FS shares as per a July 2010 Mint report, then the value of these holding was Rs19.56 billion ($265.2 million).

It is estimated that IL&FS EWT sold 2.5 million shares between September 2009 and March 2012 according to company filings. HDFC Bank also sold 1.62 million of 14.05 million shares it held in IL&FS in FY2011. These sales may be the last successful monetization of stakes in IL&FS before the company's fall from grace.

IL&FS EWT also entered into a share purchase agreement in June 2006 to sell shares to Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) at Rs275 per share. Despite the deal, it is surprising the board approved the issuance of 5.4 million shares to the IL&FS EWT at Rs85 per share, a price that was even lower than the share issuance price of Rs90 per share 18 years ago.

The 5.4 million share issue looks like a sweet deal for IL&FS EWT given that IL&FS issued 19.6 million shares in September 1994 at Rs90 per share and another 18.8 million shares in December 2001 at Rs60 per share. About 10.3 million shares under a rights issue were also issued in September 2014 at Rs750 per share.

Another interesting deal involves IL&FS Transportation (ITNL). IL&FS EWT subscribed 15 million shares of IL&FS Transportation at Rs10 per share on 29 September 2006, the same day it allotted 76 million shares to parent IL&FS at Rs45 per share. Just three months later it issued 4.16 million shares to Trinity Capital at Rs100 per share.

Within three years, IL&FS EWT sold 4.3 million shares in ITNL to Bessemer's India Fund for Rs242 per share, a whopping 24.2 times gain.

With IL&FS EWT the beneficiary of what seem to be favorable deals, the immediate question is how many beneficiaries are there at IL&FS EWT? Are they the 130 employees of IL&FS parent or does it also include employees from subsidiaries?

The share purchase agreement for the June 2006 deal between IL&FS EWT and ADIA referred to 10 specified beneficiaries, as per the share purchase agreement. However, in the absence of other information about IL&FS EWT, it is difficult to come to any solid conclusions, just more questions.
 
 
(This article has been updated with additional information)  
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COMMENTS

B. Yerram Raju

2 months ago

Credit rating institutions should be asked to explain for the ways they rated the corporate sector that took the financial system into deluge. RBI and SEBI should constitute a Committee to look into the rating mechanism and review the rating institution recognition process.

Veeresh Malik

2 months ago

Is even one person from ILFS anywhere near a lock-up or a jail?

No.

Meenu

2 months ago

Hari Sankaran's sister Deepa Sankaran was employed at a very senior level even though she had no experience in this business. She later used the IL&FS job as a stepping stone to other lucrative jobs.

S SRINIVASA RAJAN

2 months ago

It is clear that ILFS was being run by a group of gangsters and hoodlums and worse the Board kept quiet all these years. Perhaps they are again a bunch of thieves who were getting their own share of kickbacks. All these guys should be imprisoned immediately with no bail to be provided. Immediate task would be get back to India the chief looter and scamster Ravi Parthasarathi back to India. Like other Indian politicians he has taken the easy way out by getting himself admitted to hospital. Government must arrange for his immediate discharge from London hospital and getting him admitted to a prison hospital in India in case he needs any medical treatment.

Ravindra Shetye

2 months ago

It is incredible that ILFS creates 300 subsidiary companies and still the lenders do not find it odd. At least the SBI under Arundhati Bhattacharya and earlier, who was one of the major lenders that too several of these Companies. One study the new Management MUST make and publish that how many of these 300 companies were financed by each major Bank when it was obvious that all these Companies are just offshoots.

REPLY

Rajendra Ganatra

In Reply to Ravindra Shetye 2 months ago

All were dealing with "Other people's money". Huge moral hazard and agency problem which was never fixed. People should be pulled out of retirement and jailed.

jaideep shirali

2 months ago

The one and simplest question is are we going to punish anybody, or are we going to use the new Board to just brush the rot under the carpet ? It's time we recognise crime for what it is, white collar or blue collar and take severe deterrent action. Otherwise, ILFS type incidents will repeat themselves with depressing regularity.

Rajendra Ganatra

2 months ago

Stunning and shocking!

Astronomical share valuations of a dud company could not have been accidental. Shares prices of growth oriented companies consist of the stock price as the capitalized value of average earnings under a no-growth policy, plus the present value of growth opportunities (PVGO). PVGO of infrastructure companies cannot match that of manufacturing companies. But ITNL seemed to be a rare exception! This was stunning particularly when the IL&FS group had a consistent record distressed deals. Precipitous fall of such an extraordinary performing stock was even more stunning. So I analyzed ITNL's financial statements for FY-2009, 2010, 2014 and 2015, and found that:

1. There was no way ITNL shares could clock valuation attractive enough to justify, exit with profit by Bays Capital which had invested in 2009 at Rs. 242 per share. Why? See the figures in the table below:

Year ended March 31, 2010 2009
Total capital employed 52,599 29,628
RoCE 15.7% 8.4%
RoNW 18.5% 2.5%
Debt to EBITDA ratio 3.8 6.5

2. Granted that the investor before investing would look at the value of projects in hand, which is not captured in historical accounts, but for an astronomical Rs. 1,099 per share around the year 2010 is not credible going by the above figures and lack of any credentials of IL&FS even at that time. In FY-2010, while the PAT had zoomed to Rs. 3444 million (from Rs. 263 million in FY-2010), it was entirely stuck in receivables including “toll receivables” aggregating Rs. 4731 million. So the FY-2010 figures could not have justified astronomical valuations.

3. How could Bay’s Capital invest in the company at Rs. 242/share of face value of Rs. ten in 2009 with such modest performance? Was there a guarantee for attractive exit? Such possibility becomes evident when we see figures for FY-2014 and 2015 i.e. when Bays Capital exited. The figures below show that by 2014 itself INL was crumbling under debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 9.27. The company’s debt increased by 14.5% in FY-2015, and thereafter it was its incessant race to debt!
Rs. Million
Year ended March 31, 2015 2014
Total capital employed 252,434 224,834
RoCE 9.6% 9.3%
RoCE 9.2% 8.9%
(If short term borrowings are treated as long term, )

DER 3.82 3.86
Debt to EBITDA ratio 9.00 9.27


No institutional investors would invest in such company at such outlandish valuations, and there seems to have been quid-pro-quo between these investors and ITNL. These investors enriched the IL&FS folks through trusts and, the institutional investors presumably got decent exit at the cost of Indian investors – individual and institutional. Whose money was used by these institutional investors? The accounts seem to have been doctored to assure Bays Capital of its profitable exit provided it would enrich the so called employee trust in 2009. This seems to be a fit case for SEBI investigation for duping general investors barring the select ones!

Action on ITNL has to go beyond accounting and financial audit. It has to be subjected to FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AUDIT and investigation by SEBI to unearth the modus operandi of the group to enrich a few at the cost of others through dubious means!

A fundamental analysis with peer comparison will show that ITNL was the worst of the lot. An institution which should have set standards for efficient project formulations and corporate governance turns out to be akin to a group of hyenas mercilessly biting away a live zebra!

I hope Mr. Uday Kotak, the votary of excellence in corporate governance will take necessary steps to undo the misdeeds and the government will take deterrence action. The country will perish if such loot is tolerated!

REPLY

SURAJIT SOM

In Reply to Rajendra Ganatra 2 months ago

Yes I agree. Satyam was one-man ,one-company ghotala. This -in contrast-is effectively a criminal gang operating with devastating cunning -manipulating Company laws and eating up a prey (IL & FS) like a pack of hyenas. Cunning because Satyam did not have LIC, SBI,HDFC, ADIA etc as equity holders but this one had. And then packing with ex-IAS officers etc to act as liaison officers with the Governments -at the Centre and the States to get and then manipulate contracts !!!! Then the facade of a giant PSU (hence the AAA rating !!!!). Look at the salaries of the "directors"-twenty/thirty times that of a PSU like LIC,SBI !!!! If these guys do not go to jail, such things are surely going to be repeated.

Rajendra Ganatra

In Reply to SURAJIT SOM 2 months ago

Absolutely. That's why they are hyenas! The crime is so big, they should spend rest of their lives in jail.

Carlos De Souza

In Reply to Rajendra Ganatra 2 months ago

Jail should mean a typical Indian jail with no special treatment whatsoever. But, the first thing to do, is to recover whatever money
can be recovered from the scoundrels and their heirs, benamis.

IL&FS Default Highlights Indian ABS Servicer Continuity Risk: Fitch Ratings
The risk of a counterparty's failure causing jump-to-default in Indian asset-backed security (ABS) transactions has been highlighted by the recent default of Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services (IL&FS), a large Indian non-bank financial institution (NBFI), says a ratings agency. 
 
In a release, Fitch Ratings, says, "IL&FS was not itself a counterparty to any internationally rated ABS notes, but NBFIs act as the originators and servicers for most Indian ABS transactions, including those rated by us."
 
The failure of IL&FS has significantly undermined market sentiment towards the Indian NBFI sector and their ABS issuance, the ratings agency says, adding, transaction flow has stalled and we have observed a rise in yields on the securitisation notes of NBFIs.
 
The underlying asset performance of Indian ABS pools rated by Fitch remains sound. Overall, it says, delinquencies for Fitch-rated ABS transactions have remained stable at below 1.5% on average (see chart below), but performance varies according to the originator and the underlying asset class.
 
 
Fitch has to date capped ratings on Indian ABS transactions at 'BBB-(sf)' in line with the account bank replacement rating triggers of 'BBB-'. 
 
Fitch says it typically does not assign an Indian ABS transaction a 'BBB-(sf)' rating unless its account bank has a rating of at least 'BBB-'. 
 
"The rating of the ABS is linked to that of the account bank as credit enhancement for ABS transactions in India typically comes in the form of a cash deposit with one or more financial institutions. This means that the failure of the deposit bank would wipe out the vast majority of credit enhancement available to note holders and therefore could significantly undermine a transaction's CE and its rating," Fitch added.
 
According to the ratings agency, prolonged and severe stress of a transaction's servicer can disrupt collections on the underlying assets, undermining liquidity. In such an event, a transaction's liquidity coverage is usually relied upon to avoid a direct negative impact on transaction performance, it added. 
 
Fitch says it considers mitigation of servicer continuity risk to be a critical element of structured finance ratings. It says, "All Fitch rated Indian ABS transactions have liquidity coverage of at least three months, which reflects our expectation that this length of time could be needed to replace a servicer in a stress scenario. This liquidity requirement increases in cases where we believe servicer continuity risk is particularly high or that the servicer replacement time is likely to be longer." 
 
The ratings agency feels that inadequate mitigation of servicer continuity risk might lead to a cap on the ratings of notes. 
 
Recently, Fitch says it declined to rate transactions that did not have sufficient liquidity coverage, which could have led to excessive dependence on the unrated servicer and potentially exposed senior notes to jump-to-default or severe downgrade risk upon jump-to-default of the servicer.
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GIFT-City Gujarat Needs SFIO Probe Like IL&FS, says Petitioner in Fresh Application
Dr DC Anjaria, independent director and former audit committee chairman of Gujarat International Finance Tec-City—GIFT City, had filed a fresh civil application demanding investigation of GIFT-City by Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO), as has been ordered by the NCLT (National Consumer Law Tribunal) with respect to the beleaguered parent—Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services (IL&FS). 
 
Dr Anjaria's original petition had alleged that this Rs70,000-crore GIFT-City project had virtually been gifted away to the private sector partner, IL&FS, leading to massive losses to the government and the people. He also alleged falsification in accounts, and incorrect recording of audit committee meeting at GIFT-City. The new application has also added names of fresh respondents, including a former Whole Time Member of SEBI (Securities & Exchange Board of India). 
 
In his civil application to the 2016 Writ petition No 260 of 2015 (PIL) filed last week, Dr Anjaria says, "...in view of findings of regional director, ministry of corporate affairs (MCA), Mumbai, that affairs of IL&FS and its group companies are carried out prejudicial to public interest, the affairs of GIFT-City are also required to be investigated by SFIO for two reasons. 
 
"Firstly, IL&FS has a 50% stake in GIFT-City and there it is part of the one of the group companies of IL&FS. Secondly, three senior directors on the board of GIFT-City are also part of board of directors removed by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) at Mumbai. They are Hari Sankaran, K Ramchand and Arun Saha. The presence of these three persons on the board of GIFT-City is apparently inimical to the public interest,” Dr Anjaria added.
 
He has also alleged that there was falsification of accounts by not recognising income against the guidance note issued by Institute of Chartered Accounts of India (ICAI) and falsification and incorrect recording of minutes of the audit committee meeting presided by him. 
 
Dr Anjaria, who originally designed the concept of GIFT City, alleges that Prof JR Varma of IIM-Ahmedabad (former whole-time member of SEBI) was appointed as independent director and as chairman of the audit committee after he was relived of his position as chairman of the audit committee. Dr Anjaria ceased to be independent director on the GIFT-City board six months later. Prof Varma is accused of having approved of the minutes of the meeting, held six months earlier and presided over by Dr Anjaria, that too when he was not even a member of the Gift-City board at that time and had not attended the meeting. He further says that the minutes were approved, despite his notice to Prof Varma, making him party to what is alleged to be “falsification and incorrect recording of the minutes book.”
 
"Ramakant Jha, the then chief executive of GIFT-City connived with Dipesh Shah, Head (IFSC & Strategy), GIFT-City and compliance officer for falsification and incorrect minutes," Dr Anjaria alleges. 
 
He says Haribhakti and Co, chartered accountant, did not recognise income from sale of development rights in spite of a guidance note issued by ICAI. Dr Anjaria says in the application, that it was incumbent upon Haribhakti and Co., as a member of ICAI to report non-compliance with guidance note by GIFT-City. The chartered accountant firm failed to discharge its duty and thus needs to be added as party respondent in the petition, he says. 
 
Taking cognizance of the massive financial debacle at IL&FS, Dr Anjaria, in a separate petition says these developments will "affect goodwill of GIFT-City project, which, in turn, will discourage international finance players and bring a great disgrace to the entire country where an IFSC of would class standards is envisaged."
 
According the petition, out of four erstwhile directors of IL&FS, who are facing a lookout notice, two of them, Hari Sankaran and K Ramchand, are presently serving on the board of GIFT-City. "Apart from this, Ramesh C Bawa, who is also facing lookout notice, was also on the board of GIFT-City as representative of IL&FS. In view of this, there is palpable apprehension that these three persons would have also mismanaged affairs of GIFT-City and there is it is necessary to issue notice to IL&FS and it should answer charge against it," the petition says.
 
Earlier, GIFT-City has failed to respond to our queries regarding Dr Anjaria’s petition and instead published an advertorial in the form of an interview in the Business Standard. The paper later published a rebuttal by Dr Anjaria.  
 
Moneylife has written to Prof JR Varma and the Gift-City management for their comments. This article will be updated with their response as and when we receive it. 
 
You may also want to read…
 
 
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COMMENTS

arun k Dasgupta

2 months ago

ILFS mess was created over a period with the support and connivance of so called eminent board members and the auditors/CA firms. Let there be a forensic audit and the role of both internal/ nominee/ independent directors and the audit firms be critically examined because it is very much possible that these people wanted to look aside and their silence/ approvals were purchased at a cost. The truth should come before the nation as these tainted directors are spreading their tentacles in many other companies and are playing with the public trust.

Liju Oommen

2 months ago

Khaunga aur apne doston ko bhi khilaunga. Legalising corruption.

Jayendhran Santhanam

2 months ago

May i know why "Weekly Moneylife Indices & Sector Trends" missing in this week? Hope there're no plans to get rid of this column

Sunil Rebello

2 months ago

THIS IS WHAT I SAID 5 DAYS AGO
.............
Sunil Rebello 5 days ago The base problem of IL&FS is the GIFT city.

We may say that IL&FS is not a PSU but it always acted as a quasi PSU.

your article: 'Former bureaucrats and executives who quit the group and attempted to expose the group have been hounded, humiliated and even arrested'

This tactic is the clear example of our present government - shoot the messenger.

This is also exemplified in their name changing spree all over the country.

Now the whole weight of government authorities - RBI NCLT SIFO CBI ED etc etc are on IL&FS head.

But do they have expert advise or are they depending on the crap advise of the present Financial & Law team.

To change some major scam - you have to first accept that there is a scam.

IL&FS was not paid by the GOI for their work, Therefore the GOI takes it over.

who will take the haircut of 80,000 Cores+. for sure it will be us tax payers

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