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No beating about the bush.
The democratic mandate, which the non-Congress parties are likely to get, is against a regime that surrendered the interests of Indians on the dictates of imperial powers the way many African countries and Asian countries like UAE and Pakistan have done
Like Ivory Coast, a civil war can happen in India too because of biometric and electronic identification. All the international agencies, which are involved in promotion of unique identification (UID) through Planning Commission, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Election Commission of India (EC), residential addresses and land titles in India were involved there as well. Likes of LK Advani, P Chidambram, Nandan Nilekani, Sam Pitroda and C Chandramouli have been advocating national identity cards as if “everyday forms of identity surveillance” is natural and rational.
How is it that when heads of states are put under round the clock surveillance by colonial and imperial powers it is deemed an assault on national sovereignty but when a national government undertakes the same over their masters, the citizens, it becomes natural and rational.
A communication titled ‘Biometrics Stir the Pot in the UAE’ dated 22 November 2003, sent by some unidentified US official from Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Group Destinations Arab Israeli Collective, Secretary of State, US and Dubai, UAE and to undecipherable location named ‘RUCNFSC CFSC SA COLLECTIVE’ merits attention. This communication was brought to light by Wikileaks. Its import can be appreciated only if its following text is read:
“The Public Affairs and Consular Section in Abu Dhabi hosted a Press Briefing on the fingerprinting of NIV applicants at the US Embassy. In addition, Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) and Consular Chief briefed the Director of Consular Affairs at the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on the new Fingerprinting Procedures at the Embassy. Newspapers published accurate, informational stories and the Director of Consular Affairs expressed his understanding. Although one UAE official has refused to be fingerprinted saying he was being treated like a "Criminal," the UAE's majority Third-Country Nationals (TCN) are taking it all in stride, already subject to fingerprinting and retinal scans by the UAE and Emirate-level Governments.”NIV stands for Non-Immigrant Visas (NIV).
This reporting of UAE’s response to fingerprinting and retinal scans sounds like the reaction of different ministries of Government of India and Indian media, most of whom like their UAE’s counterparts did “accurate, informational stories.” But unlike the one official in UAE, who refused to be fingerprinted, in India, one did not learn about any civil servant who refused to enroll for biometric identification in the pronounced manner.
The communication further revealed that a foreign team installed fingerprinting collection devices on 23 October 2003 at the interview windows in conjunction with the consular section's routine computer upgrade schedule. After the installation, the consular section began collecting fingerprints from the required NIV applicants on 2 November 2003.
It is noteworthy that US embassy officials are reporting even the work of plumbers of fingerprint machines and installation of biometric devices to Secretary of State and their intelligence allies in Arab States, Israel to undecodable locations. Do Indian officials, senior political leaders and concerned citizens realize its import?
The Wikileaked communication informs that journalists and photographers from all UAE’s English and Arabic dailies were called for briefing them “about the new biometric collection procedures” so that public is informed about it. This communication informs: “journalists focused primarily on the appropriateness of fingerprinting and questioned whether or not the fingerprinting was focused on Arab and Muslim audiences. Vice Consul responded that this was not the case, and, as reassurance, showed journalists the stacks of old computers the Orkand team has just finished replacing with new Pentium IV systems. (Comment: we recommend other posts do the same if possible, as this seemed convincing to the journalists present.)”
It goes on report that following this briefing to media, on 6 November 2003, journalists published stories based on the information provided to them including “the implementation of fingerprinting solely based on routine maintenance schedules and mentioning Frankfurt, Brussels, San Salvador, and Guatemala City as the first Fingerprinting Posts.”
This shows how journalists are/ were taken for a ride because they were made to believe that it was just a routine case of replacing old equipments with new equipments. It appears that the same tactics has been replicated in India in the matter of Aadhaar, National Population Register (NPR) and other places where biometric identification is being made mandatory.
On 9 November 2003, there was a meeting with the Director of Consular Affairs at the UAE‘s MFA, where in the Director expressed “his understanding of the need to move towards biometrics to enhance the security of the United States. He briefly commented on the retinal scans in place at UAE ports of entry for certain categories of visitors to the UAE, in particular workers from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. He expressed satisfaction that fingerprinting did not apply to A- 1 and A-2 visa categories.”
It is clear yet again that the biometric devices are getting installed not because of any domestic compulsion of the Asian or African countries but because countries like US want it installed. This also demonstrates that those wielding diplomatic and official immunity do not hesitate to barter away their citizens’ rights if their temporary individual rights and privileges remain intact.
This cable from US embassy in UAE records that “public reaction to the initiation of fingerprinting of NIV applicants has been mixed. The UAE population is more disturbed by the prospect of fingerprinting than the UAE's majority TCN population. Consular staff have not received complaints from TCN applicants, who have their fingerprints taken for residence visas and IDs by federal and emirate-level governments. Certain TCNs are also subject to retinal scans at UAE airports.” The TCN population refers to Third-Country Nationals. A TCN is an employee who is not a citizen of the home or host countries.
It reads “Reaction by UAE nationals, on the other hand, remains mixed. The vast majority of UAE national student and tourist visa applicants have complied quietly and calmy when requested for their fingerprints. The prospect for turmoil with government officials and prominent UAE nationals, however, remains to be seen. One UAE senior university administrator official, the subject of a Class A Visa referral, refused to come to the embassy and told pas staff that he "would not be treated like a criminal." This reaction only stresses the continuing need to inform applicants that biometric capture capability not only enhances national border security to the benefit of US citizens and permanent residents, but increases the safety and security of visitors to the United States as well.” The communication reveals that promoters of biometric devices were expecting some “turmoil” but as things unfolded they were happy to witness unquestioned obedience of government officials and prominent UAE nationals like in India.
A secret cable, which was created on 17 December 2009 and Wikileaked on the 23 April 2011 revealed that like in UAE, the US’ State Department is deeply curious about UID, India's biometric data based identification program. It asked its embassy in India to provide information about the progress or status of the Indian biometric ID card's development and deployment and wished to know “India's strategic plan for utilizing biometric ID card technology in the military, law enforcement, and private sectors.”
It sought to know as to which government agencies will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the national ID card biometric collection strategy, how do authorities plan to utilise the biometric ID card at India's borders, ports, and airports, which foreign countries and/or corporations are assisting in the development of the ID card, which biometric systems (i.e. fingerprints, facial recognition, iris scan, etc.) will be incorporated into the card, what prompted development of the ID card, which company is providing the biometric collection devices, storage, and matching database equipment, which organizations/agencies within India will have access to information gathered by the biometric ID card collection devices, what systems, databases, or portals will the named biometric ID card collection devices in India communicate with, will the ID card be accepted for passport applications, what types of anti-fraud measures do Indian authorities plan to incorporate in the issuance process and what security features are planned for the ID card, will the card be International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) compliant and will it use any encryption and any efforts to "spoof" or defeat biometric enrollment, such as fingerprint alteration.
The cable asked these questions but it prefaced it with few observations. It reads: “Washington analysts read with keen interest recent press reports about a proposed biometric national ID project in India …the project has been billed at recent trade conferences as the largest biometric enrollment ever proposed and is the biggest biometric initiative anticipated in 2010. Despite promised improvements, the cards would provide, analysts are concerned the program could present a vulnerable target for regional extremist groups -- such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba -- who could obtain fraudulent Indian ID cards during the large-scale enrollment for use in travel or as breeder documents to apply for passports.”
This cable gives the impression that US agencies have been following the project from its incubation stage.
It underlined that with regard answers to the questions posed that “results of these requirements will be incorporated into a strategic assessment for senior US policymakers on the regional implications in South Asia of the biometric ID program.”
Another cable dated 4 September 2008 released by Wikileaks reveals that US Ambassador to India met with Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia on 2 September 2008 wherein the name of would be chief of UID/ Aadhaar, Nandan Nileakni figured for a Sub-group of US-India CEO Forum for educational collaboration which was to provide a report after the elections. Notably, this cable from New Delhi was sent to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council, Secretary of Defense among others. Notably, Nileakni was one of the eight members of National Knowledge Commission (NKC) headed by Sam Pitroda who advocates identification and tagging of every object in India through his Public Information Infrastructure initiative.
US Embassy’s cable for the week of 29th June to 2 July 2009 notes that the UID “project is expected to cost about Rs1,500 billion ($31.5 billion), and technological challenges in creating tamper-proof smart cards capable of handling Indian conditions are expected. According to press reports, the GoI may exclude private companies from participating due to the large amount of confidential information involved in the program. The public sector company Bharat Electronics Ltd has already issued over 120,000 smart cards under a GoI pilot project to establish a multipurpose national identity card, and is likely to be one of the key players.” It is noteworthy that eventually Indian government did not exclude private companies.
With regard to the National Smart Card Identification System, the wikileaked cables reveal that “Joint Secretary (Telecom) JS Deepak told Econoffs that the first meeting between Additional Secretary of Department of Telecom Subodh Kumar, Nandan Nilekani, chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) and founder of Infosys, and Indian telecom service providers was held on 24th September to discuss the roll-out of the unique identification (UID) program. Earlier this year, the GoI set up the UIDAI to implement a Unique Identification card project, which will own the database of residents along with their biometric information….Joint Secretary Deepak noted that despite the inherent challenges posed by the massive scale of this program, the introduction of UID will transform the way Indians do business in the areas of Government-to-Citizen interaction. He said the ID would be useful for a multitude of purposes, including elections, taxation, national security, and banking. Deepak, a former USAID employee responsible for global social programs, was enthusiastic about the UID's potential to greatly reduce 'leakage' in government subsidies and benefit payments, including the NREGA program, and for its ability to also transform provision of education and healthcare.” Econoffs refers to US Embassy’s Economic Office.This communication was sent from New Delhi as part of its report for week of 21st to 24 September 2009. It is noteworthy that Deepak’s credential as former employee of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been mentioned. Earlier, Bolivia and Russia have expelled USAID from their countries. In Pakistan in protest against the drone strike there Pakistani Punjab government has refused to accept US aid. Recently, Associated Press has revealed that USAID’s Chief Rajiv Shah who is reportedly considered a possible candidate for the post of US Ambassador to India supervised Cuban twitter like program- ‘ZunZuneo’-using front companies based in Cayman Islands and other places for cooking unrest there. Interestingly, the $1.6 million spent on it was channeled in the name of an unspecified project in Pakistan since 2009.
The role of Ministry of Telecom in conceptualizing or launching UID program under A Raja’s tenure as its minister merits examination.
While the background behind the operationalization of the biometric ID project reveals the opaque manner in which it took off, ramifications of launch of such projects demonstrates its true colours.
In the book, Paper Citizens, its author Kamal Sadiq records, “In Ivory Coast, a national identity card scheme was central to a national politics that slid into civil war” that began in 1999 splitting the country in two-a rebel-held north and a government-held south. In this country, national identity card scheme was introduced with the help of UN agencies to enable the exercise of franchise. A referendum in July 2000 barred presidential candidates in Ivory Coast from contesting unless both of their parents were Ivorian. This led to disqualification of Ivory Coast’s former Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara from the 2000 presidential election because his citizenship certificate and national identity card was denied until 2002. This issue became a major factor in the civil war given the fact that ruling party and opposition party held diametrically opposite views on documentary citizenship.
The insistence of documentary citizenship based on national identity card has also given birth to the business of fake identity cards, identity thefts and imposters.
Dwelling on the situation in African countries like Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Zambia, in a 2001 paper “Disenfranchising the North through the National Identity Card scheme” Ibrahim Ado-Kurawa, general editor of Weekly PYRAMID – The Magazine said, “In most of the organized world identity cards have never been election requirements” and concluded, “The ID card is a much more benign form of genocide if it gets to pass.”
The distinguishing identity of citizens and non-citizens is getting blurred because of the idea of documentary citizenship based on biometric identification being deeply planted by US and EU based security agencies and companies. This leads to creation and naturalization of 24X7 continental and transboundary surveillance on human movement that opens the possibility wherein national ID card would be a ticket to the loss of much of personal freedom and intergenerational and intra generational rights.
Non-Congress government that is all set to take charge of the national affairs will have to take a pledge that they will not be subjecting citizens to biometric surveillance through the ongoing merger of aadhaar, NPR Voter ID card and the Electronic Voting Machines. The servility of the previous regime towards agencies like US National Security Agency (NSA) and their infantile reactions in the face of evidence that the entire union cabinet was under NSA's surveillance must be remembered as one of the dark chapters of Indian history. In their abject meekness Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) did not hide even an iota of information from the NSA but it is reluctant share its correspondence with Nilekani under the Right to Information (RTI) Act.
The democratic mandate, which the non-Congress parties are going to get is against a regime that surrendered the interest of Indians on the dictates of imperial powers in the way many African countries and Asian countries like UAE and Pakistan have already done. The new government must demonstrate that structure of India’s electoral ecosystem will remain impregnable from Trojan horses of all ilk to root out the possibility of Ivory Coast like situation that gets created by colonial powers. The strategic engineering, which has set pot boiling must be cooled because as they say a spark neglected burns the house.
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(Gopal Krishna is member of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL), which is campaigning against surveillance technologies since 2010)
Is it just a coincidence that Tariq Malik of NADRA and Nandan Nilekani received awards at Milan ID World Congress for their similar work? Is Nilekani simply following the footprints of Malik in creating, enforcing biometric-based ID?
Electronics has become a fundamental political problem.
-Dr Ernesto “Che” Guevara in 1962
tujhe zibah karne kee khushi, mujhe marne ka shauk,
(You are happy to kill, I am fond of dying)
meri bhee marzi wahi hai, jo mere saiyaad ki hai
(My desire is the same as that of my hunter)
-Jail Note Book of Shahid-e-Azam Bhagat Singh, 1929
jin ko tha zaban pe naaz (Those proud of their eloquence)
chup hain wo zaban daraaz (Their tongues are completely silent)
chain hai samaaj me (There is tranquility in society)
bemisaal fark hai (This is an unexampled difference)
kal me aur aaj me (Between yesterday and today)
apne kharch par hain qaid (imprisoned at their own expense)
log kaid tere raaj me (people under your rule)
-Habib Jalib, a revolutionary poet from Pakistan
The Election Commission of India (ECI) has exposed the reluctance of Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to share its correspondence including the letter of resignation of Nandan Nilekani from the post of chairman of Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) under the Planning Commission. Nilekani is reported to have submitted his resignation to the Prime Minister on 13 March 2014. After the Right to Information (RTI) application in this regard was transferred by the PMO, the Commission in a letter dated 15 April 2014 responded saying that the RTI application "has been inadvertently transferred" to it and marked a copy of its reply to the Planning Commission.
It is apparent that PMO does not wish the resignation letter and the correspondence to be available in the public domain prior to the elections. It deliberately transferred the RTI application to the Election Commission as part of its delaying tactics and perhaps to save the Indian National Congress-led government from possible embarrassment.
For instance, how is engagement with Pakistani Ministry of Interior’s National Database & Registration Authority (NADRA) and Election Commission of Pakistan with French corporate conglomerate, Safran Group in India’s national interest? Notably, UIDAI’s awarding of contract to Safran Group links it to Home Ministry’s Registrar General of Citizen Registration, Census and the Election Commission.
The core issue here is the sensitivity of the exchange of letters between key authorities in the sensitive matter of electronic and biometric identification of Indians through Aadhaar, National Population Register (NPR), electoral database and Census database.
In effect, all these databases will be governed by Information Technology (IT) Act.
Notably, in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, the Parliament passed eight Bills in 17 minutes without any debate on 23 December 2008. These Bills included the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008. Its absurdity came to light when the misuse of section 66 (A) and section 79 got widely reported. Subsequent amendments and rules have made the IT Act worse, which the new government will have to look into.
If one looks for parallels in regard to emergence of biometric voter ID cards on India’s horizon, one finds that the Indian government is following the path paved by Government of Ghana, which conducted an election using biometric voter verification and registration systems in 2012. The Electoral Commission of Ghana had made a functional biometric verification machine a pre-condition for voting at all the polling stations. With this Ghana joined those countries, which use a biometric voters’ register for its election. These countries include Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Nigeria, Kenya, Soloman Islands, Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Biometric profiling is likely to be introduced in Bhutan too in the next parliamentary elections. It has been reported that biometric finger print scanners were used during the National Council Election in Bhutan’s two polling stations at Dewachen and Samtse High School in 2013.
Sierra Leone's National Electoral Commission (NEC) conducted the polls in November 2012 using biometric voter registration with the support of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Not surprisingly, Bangladesh Election Commission upgraded its biometric identification and voter registration system and consolidated over hundreds of different databases into a single database running on Oracle Exadata Database Machine X2-2. Was there a domestic demand for centralisation of the database?
Notably, NADRA developed and delivered Nigerian national identity card system for issuance of Smart ID cards to citizens.
In Nepal, the Election Commission introduced voter registration programme based biometric profiling and conducted its elections in November 2013. UNDP had provided strategic technical and operational assistance to the Election Commission in planning and conducting the election through its Electoral Support Project (ESP). The European Union, UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), Denmark and Norway provided financial support to this project.
Coincidentally, the Election Commission of Pakistan is introducing a biometric system for the elections. NADRA has implemented the Multi-Biometric National Identity Card & Multi-Biometric e-Passport solutions for Pakistan, Passport Issuing System for Kenya, Bangladesh High Security Driver’s License, and Civil Registration Management System for Sudan.
Notably, NADRA has won Sri Lanka ID Card project involving data collection of all eligible citizens’ biometric, biographic and digitization and creating a National Persons Registry. It has developed Biometric Refugee Registration System for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and World Bank’s Poverty Score Card/System.
Besides this “NADRA has taken proactive initiative by developing electronic voting machine (EVM) solution proposed to be placed on all polling stations across the country.”
Do Indian voters need learn to subject themselves to biometric identification by transnational intelligence companies like Pakistan’s 86 million registered voters?
It may recalled that 23 April 2010, the World Bank had launched its eTransform Initiative by signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with France and South Korea besides transnational companies like L-1 Identity Solutions, IBM, Gemalto, Pfizer and others. It was launched in the presence of Ministers of Finance and Communications from many developing countries. The World Bank is currently funding 14 projects related to e-government and e-ID around the world. These project are unfolding under the influence of international finance and not because there was a domestic need for it.
Let us ponder over few questions:-
Is it a coincident that the task of Tariq Malik of NADRA, Pakistan and those of Nandan Nilekani, C Chandramouli and VS Sampath appear similar?
Is it also a coincidence that Tariq Malik of NADRA and Nilekani were awarded in Milan, Italy based ID World Congress for their similar work? Nilekani is simply following the footprints of Malik.
Isn’t there a design behind persuading and compelling developing countries to biometrically profile their citizens?
Is it too early to infer that international bankers, UN agencies and western military alliances wish to create profiles in their biometric and electronic database for coercive use of social control measures?
Is it not true that uninformed citizens, parliamentarians and gullible government agencies are too eager to be profiled and tracked through an online database?
Would freedom fighters and framer of constitution of India have approved of mass surveillance by any national or transnational agency?
In the US, the budget for intelligence gathering in 2013 was $52.6 billion. Out of which $10.8 billion went to the National Security Agency (NSA). It is about $167 per person. Do Indians know the budget allocation for their intelligence? Why have they been kept in dark about it?
Aren’t allocations for UIDAI, NPR and National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) part of it?
Is it not clear that UN agencies, World Bank Group, transnational intelligence companies and military alliances are working in tandem to create the bio-electronic database of Indians as per their pre-determined design? Is this design structured to safeguard the interest of present and future generation of Indians?
The next government in India has the task of examining these questions and making the budget allocation for intelligence agencies public and open to legislative scrutiny. If they don’t do it, how else would the new regime be deemed different from the old one and it must explain how national security of US, France and their allies is different from that India.
Even after 52 years while India continues to maintain secrecy about its acts of omission and commission in 1962 war with China. But by now it is clear that after the defeat it felt the need of a strong indigenous electronics base for security. The Department of Electronics was set on 26 June 1970 directly under the Prime Minister in the era in which New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) was still being sought to contest one way flow of information by western media that distorted realities facing the world. It is germane to recollect the historical context in which world’s biggest electronic and biometric database of Indians is being created. Having failed in getting NWICO so far, unless the advocates of NWICO politically challenge the creation of one imperial online database in a robust manner, 21st century will unleash a new great game for takeover of national assets.
Meanwhile, it appears to be too much to expect that the lame duck PMO will share its correspondence with Nilekani who was mandated to create world biggest biometric database “as per approved strategy” along with Ministry of Home Affair (MHA)’s NPR before May 2016. PMO’s notoriety in misplacing sensitive files has given birth to understandable apprehensions in this regard. Hopefully, the new government will ensure that the PMO provides these relevant files.
The authoritarianism of electronic and biometric web is emerging as intrusive extensions of transnational powers due to complicity without any political scrutiny in the country.
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(Gopal Krishna is member of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL), which is campaigning against surveillance technologies since 2010)
The enthusiastic endorsement of illegal UIDAI and its inexplicable eagerness to merge electoral photo identity card -EPIC numbers and electoral database, with the Aadhaar biometric database that faces robust legal challenge, merits probe
“I have a file on you.”
- MK Narayanan’s routine threat to his adversaries as National Security Adviser (NSA) quoted in Sanjay Baru's book 'The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh'
“One way to ensure that the unique identification (UID) number is used by all government and private agencies is by inserting it into the birth certificate of the infant. Since the birth certificate is the original identity document, it is likely that this number will then persist as the key identifier through the individual’s various life events, such as joining school, immunizations, voting etc.”
- A confidential document of UIDAI titled ‘Creating a unique identity number for every resident in India’, leaked by Wikileaks on 13 Nov 2009
The proponents of world's biggest citizen identification scheme aims to converge electoral photo identity card (EPIC) numbers of electoral database, the UID/Aadhaar number database called Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) and the National Population Register (NPR). In their myopia, political parties in particular and citizens in general have failed to fathom its ramifications for voting by electors in a democracy.
A bizarre situation is emerging where citizens chose a government that was supposed to represent them but their government is undertaking the task of biometrically authenticating whether or not those it represents are indeed those who they claim to be.
In a letter dated 7 June 2011, the Director General and Mission Director of Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) wrote to Chief Election Commissioner saying, “The Election Commission of India (ECI) may also like to leverage Aadhaar infrastructure in cleaning/ updating their existing electoral data base. Aadhaar numbers issued by the UIDAI can also be included in the list of valid proof of identity (POI) and proof of address (POA) documents of the Election Commission during the polls for identity verification.”
The file notings by ECI on the UIDAI’s letter reads: “How can Aadhaar number used as proof of address”. The reply from ECI dated 17 June 2011 on the letter from UIDAI sought following information before taking any further action:
• Whether UIDAI has the provision to update the address in the database, whenever there is a change in address, to use Aadhaar number as proof of address?
• Whether any process has been defined to use Aadhaar numbers on electoral roll database?
• Whether UIDAI can include EPIC numbers in Aadhaar database?
Responding to these question, in its letter dated 11 July 2011 UIDAI wrote, “Aadhaar has the provision to update the demographic or biometric information of the resident in CIDR from time to time to ensure that the CIDR data is up-to date and accurate all the time. The tool is currently under testing and should be widely available shortly.” The CIDR stands for Central Identities Data Repository of the Aadhaar numbers. Has the “tool” promised July 2011 available now? This reply is far from the truth.
It further wrote, Aadhaar numbers can be seeded into EPIC and electoral roll databases to clean those databases and also to bring standardisation and uniformity in the Election Commission’s databases across the country. UIDAI does provide necessary technical and financial support under its information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure scheme for integration of Aadhaar number with database of concerned Ministries/ Departments to make them UID compliant. However, the process and schemes to use Aadhaar numbers for their applications are to be defined by the concerned Departments themselves.”
The notification of 28 January 2009 that set up UIDAI, provides the terms of reference (TOR) for its work. There is no reference to the collation of UID number database with electoral database in the TOR. But the TOR does refer to “collation and correlation with UID and its partner databases.” If this reference to ‘partner database’ included electoral database, the UID/ Aadhaar enrolment form never revealed it and took Indian residents for a ride.
Notably, UIDAI was constituted in pursuance of the fourth meeting of the Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) headed by the then External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherji held on 4 November 2008. Shivraj Patil, the then union home minister and A Raja, the then minister for IT and Communications, HR Bhardwaj, the then law minister and Mani Shankar Aiyar, the then panchayati raj minister, were members of the EGoM wherein Montek Singh Ahluwalia, deputy chairman of Planning Commission was an invitee.
UIDAI argued, “Aadhaar database is restricted to the name, date of birth, gender, address, facial image, ten fingerprints and iris of the resident. The data fields are based on the recommendation of the Demographic and Data field Verification Committee headed by N Vittal, former chief vigilance commissioner (CVC). Since Aadhaar database contains absolute minimum information of a resident necessary to establish identity, it is not possible to include EPIC numbers in the Aadhaar database. However, the ECI should seed Aadhaar numbers in the electoral database as clarified above.”
Prior to this KM Chandrasekhar, cabinet secretary, Government of India (GoI) wrote a letter dated 25 April, 2011 addressed to VK Bhasin, secretary, legislative department stating, “Aadhaar can be treated as a valid Proof of Identity (PoI) and Proof of Address (PoA).”
The Election Commission in its letter dated 4 March 2013 to UIDAI on the subject of “Seeding of Aadhaar number in Electoral Database” wrote that “Commission feels that it would be better that EPIC no. is collected at the time of enrollment for Aadhaar and put in the Aadhaar database…ECI has already issued instructions that Aadhaar cards can be used as alternative identity documents at polling station…It may be mentioned here that Ministry of Home Affairs has also agreed to print EPIC no. on smart card as issued by Registrar General of India…Under the circumstances, it is once again requested that EPIC no. may be made mandatory for enrollment in Aadhaar.” In its letter dated 29 October 2012, the ECI had argued that “including EPIC no. as mandatory field in UIDAI database would enable better integration between UIDAI database and electoral database, which will make Aadhaar numbers more useful.”
This enthusiastic endorsement of illegal UIDAI’s database and its inexplicable eagerness to merge EPIC no. and electoral database with a database that faces robust legal challenge merits probe.
In a letter dated 16 April 2012, RK Singh, the then secretary, ministry of home affairs (MHA) wrote to Dr SY Quraishi, the then Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), with reference to latter’s letter dated 4 April 2012 “regarding inclusion of Electoral Photo Identity Card -EPIC number in the Aadhaar database.”
The secretary, MHA wrote, “The Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India is in the process of creating the National Population Register (NPR) in the country. The NPR, when completed will be a register of all usual residents of the country, which would have the Aadhaar number besides the demographic and biometric data. The Government is also considering a proposal to issue Resident Identity (smart) Cards to all usual residents above the age of 18 years. The scheme is already making good progress and is likely to be completed in the next two years.”
The combination of the office of Census Commissioner and RGI creates a legal conflict of interest that is required to be examined because Census Act requires that data of residents of India has to be kept confidential. But RGI created under Citizenship Act admittedly puts the data in public domain. Besides this MHA has also feigned ignorance about the illegality of biometric data collection under NPR, a fact pointed out by BJP’s Prime Ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi. The then secretary of MHA is now fighting parliamentary election on BJP’s ticket.
At that time, the secretary, MHA also wrote, “As a part of the process of creating the NPR, the EPIC number is also being collected. This would enable mapping of the Aadhaar number to the EPIC number right from the beginning…Once the mapping is completed, there could be a lot of synergy between the EPIC and NPR databases.”
He pointed out that “while the registration under the NPR is mandatory under the provisions of the Citizenship Act 1955, the production of EPIC Card during the NPR enrolment and capturing the EPIC number is being done on a voluntary basis from the residents. There are, therefore, gaps in the collection of the numbers. The gap can easily be bridged as the Authorities notified for the creation of the NPR are the same as those notified under the Electoral Law and if necessary instructions are issued by the Election Commission, they could easily ensure a complete coverage.”
It is intriguing as to how Election Commission has failed to comprehend the adverse consequences of such convergence. There is nothing in public domain to suggest that implications of such merger have been examined.
The then secretary, MHA informed the CEC that there is mutual agreement between the MHA’s RGI and ECI that “there is a considerable potential to synchronise the two databases and set up a unified platform for future updating of the same and sought CEC’s advice to take it forward. Does the Election Commission realize that synchronization of the two databases is happening as per the design of Wipro’s document and is beyond the mandate given to UIDAI and RGI?
It may recalled that one of the earliest documents that refer UIDAI is a 14-page long document titled ‘Strategic Vision: Unique Identification of Residents’ prepared by Wipro Ltd for the Planning Commission envisaged the close linkage that the UIDAI’s Aadhaar would have with the electoral database. The use of electoral database mentioned in Wipro’s document remains on the agenda of the proponents of Aadhaar.
The reply of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) dated 1 April 2014 transferring the right to information (RTI) application to Election Commission seems to indicate that linkage of UIDAI with the Commission has already been established.
In such a backdrop, PMO’s reluctance to share all the file documents and correspondence relating to Nandan Nilekani and right up to his resignation appears quite sensitive and deserves scrutiny. The attempt to undertake convergence of all the sensitive databases of Indians and Nilekani’s confidence in the irreversibility of these efforts has thrown as yet an unmet open political challenge to the opposition parties.
Is it irrelevant to observe that the letterhead of the UIDAI’s Director General reveals his personal email ID as [email protected]. The question is who authorized the UIDAI’s Director General to use Google’s email account? UIDAI does have its own email account. After relinquishing his post to join as chief secretary, government of Jharkhand, did Mr Sharma surrender his email ID to UIDAI? This email must be investigated to ascertain all the locations around the world from which it has been accessed.
The fact that one of the senior most official of UIDAI chose to receive such sensitive information on the server of Google, a private company, is a threat to national security and privacy of Indians. This company is regulated by US laws and has been working in collusion with foreign intelligence agencies. The authorities in the US, where Gmail is headquartered, can legally access the information on the server of Google without a court warrant and without any civil and criminal liability. The Indian government will remain in dark about it. In fact US’ Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) make the exchange of electronic information between Internet Service Providers and the government of US possible. The use of Gmail account demonstrates the lack of professionalism of UIDAI, which has been given the task of handling the database of the personal sensitive information of Indians. This act of omission and commission merits attention. Such gullibility of ministers and IAS officers in particular and officials in general is inexcusable.
In the absence of Parliamentary scrutiny institutional accountability for defections by intelligence officials like Major Rabinder Singh, a joint secretary in Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) who seem to have formally defected to US on 14 May 2004 with the help of the US Embassy in Kathmandu despite being under surveillance by R&AW’s Counter-Intelligence & Security Division (CI&S) for three months during the tenure of CD Sahay, who was the Head of R&AW, has not been fixed. The Manmohan Singh government that assumed office on 22 May 2004, dismissed Major Rabinder Singh from service under Article 311 (2) ( c ) of the Constitution of India on 5 June 2004. Indian intelligence agencies have consistently been poached by foreign intelligence agencies.
A former special secretary of the R&AW and author of “Escape to Nowhere: Story of an Espionage Agent”, Amar Bhushan says, “It’s the charter of every intelligence organisation to infiltrate and subvert other intelligence agencies.” It has now been revealed that Major Rabinder Singh could not be caught red handed because he had been transmitting the information and documents using voice over internet protocol (VoIP) meant for the delivery of voice communications and multimedia sessions over IPl networks through his laptops, which had imprints of 23,100 files. Thus, a database of 23, 100 files of R&AW has been transferred to US agencies without putting any remedial mechanism in place. Are our intelligence agencies really so naïve that they did not know that data can be transferred with VoIP? Can these agencies be trusted with the data of Indians?
Hasn’t all the data collected by Census, UIDAI, RGI and ECI been transmitted to foreign countries through companies L1 Identity Solutions, Accenture and Mongo DB?
It has now come to light from Sanjay Baru's book 'The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh' that the Prime Minister declined “to take a daily briefing from chiefs of both the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) who were told to report to the National Security Advisor (NSA)”. MK Narayanan, as NSA, claimed that he had a file on his adversaries but he and his ilk does not seem to realize that National Security Agency of US and its Five Eyes Alliance have a file on them too. It appears that the Prime Minister accepted the fait accompli of all the Indians including him being subjected to surveillance by imperial powers with collaborators giving a field day.
In the 41 page long Wikileaked document titled ‘Creating a unique identity number for every resident in India’ that declared itself to be a ‘Confidential- property of UIDAI’ states, “The Unique ID or UID will be a numeric that is unique across all 1.2 billion residents in India. The UID number will not contain intelligence. In older identity systems, it was customary to load the ID number with information related to the date of birth, as well as the location of the person. However, this makes the number susceptible to fraud and theft, and migration of the resident quickly makes location details out of date. The UID will be a random number.”
While the Election Commission, cabinet secretary, home secretary and UIDAI have accepted UID/Aadhaar as “proof of address”, this Wikileaked document reveals that making it a proof of location was not part of its conceptual design. It is a puzzle as how agencies after agencies started accepting biometric Aadhaar as proof of address?
In fact each new born infant is a suspect. There is a file being created to track and profile him for good.
Like Indian NSA’s threat to his adversaries about having a file on them, having a UID/Aadhaar number automatically creates a file of the Indian residents in question. Even infants are not spared in this scheme of things.
The confidential document reveals that from day one the Prime Minister wanted to create a file on each of “1.2 billion residents”, the division of work between MHA’s NPR and UIDAI was merely an attention diversion tactics to outwit political scrutiny. The merger of the electoral database with UID/number debunks UIDAI’s claim that UID number “will not contain intelligence” and “the location of the person.”
From these disclosures, it appears that PMO has adopted an adversarial role vis-à-vis Indians and acting beyond their legal mandate to pander to the interests of the commercial czars, non-state actors and foreign intelligence companies.
Why is India’s officialdom and political class blind to subversion of national interest by unelected officials of PMO under the leadership of Nero like Prime Minister through bartering of citizen’s databases?
In a country where, no intelligence chief or official has held accountable for the assassination of two of its Prime Ministers and for betraying nation’s secrets, can it be hoped that all those who compromised India’s data security will made liable for their treacherous acts?
Is it the case that the database scam is bigger than all the scams of Indian National Congress led Government? There is no reason for the PMO to deny information under RTI, which it admittedly is in possession of.
Post election, there is a compelling logic for setting up a High Powered Commission of Inquiry to probe the goings in the PMO and intelligence agencies that engineered and bulldozed the database project by compelling various government departments and States including Election Commission to comply with the dictates of illegal UIDAI.
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(Gopal Krishna is member of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL), which is campaigning against surveillance technologies since 2010)