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No beating about the bush.
Unable to expand through a combination of advertising and selling through national distributors, the fund house is empanelling smaller distributors now
Fidelity Fund Management Private Ltd, the US fund management major which launched its India operations in 2005, was so far following a pan-India distribution model by selling mutual funds through national distributors like banks. It is now trying to woo smaller intermediaries to expand its distribution network and to garner a larger pie of assets under management (AUM).
Earlier, Fidelity was only empanelling national distributors who could funnel Rs100 crore of AUM. A fund house may follow an ‘aggregation model’ wherein it ties up with national distributors who have a large distribution network of their own. This is a more cost-effective model for asset management companies (AMCs), wherein they don’t have to spend on resources like commercial office space, employees, etc. The AMC may cough up a higher commission to the national distributors for their services.
“As an advisor we are supposed to sell all mutual funds which are doing well for our customers. It’s a major business issue for us. We approached Fidelity for an agency several times, but it said that it would not empanel IFAs (independent financial analysts),” said Ramesh Bhatt, a Chennai-based IFA.
“This might be the case because Fidelity doesn’t want to operate with so many distributors across the country. In the UK, an intermediary needs to make a declaration every six months. An intermediary himself needs to follow all those rules. In India if you have an ARN number then you can get empanelled with any AMC,” said a top official from a leading fund house.
According to AMFI (Association of Mutual Funds in India) data, Fidelity had an average AUM of Rs7,683.90 crore as on March 2010, compared to Rs6,172.90 crore for the corresponding month last year. “Earlier I was told that they would not empanel me. I had to contact officials in Delhi. They gave me a special approval,” said Vivek Rege, MD, VR Wealthy Advisors Pvt Ltd.
Why has the company now decided to change its strategy? “They spent crores on advertising and brand building and now they find it difficult to get retail business. Brand recall does not guarantee business from customers,” said a Mumbai-based IFA, preferring anonymity.
According to sources, Suraj Kaeley, director (sales & business development) of Fidelity is trying to expand the company’s India network. Mr Kaeley, was earlier associated with Franklin Templeton Investments and Metlife India Insurance Company Ltd.
Earlier, small intermediaries who were not empanelled with Fidelity were routing their products through other large brokers. According to sources, Fidelity now carries out a stringent check on the intermediary’s bank details & creditworthiness, and investigates involvement in any litigation before empanelment.
Today, a spokesperson from Fidelity told Moneylife: "As part of Fidelity's plans to build a long-term business here, broad-basing our distribution capability has always been a key element. To that end, we have been expanding our distribution footprint by regularly empanelling distributors over the last five years since we started business and continue to do so."
The Unilever CEO believes that HUL is still the lion in several categories. He is living in his own world. Over the past decade, HUL has repeatedly tried and failed in a large number of new businesses, which makes it look like an also-ran
A few days back, the chief executive officer of Unilever, Paul Polman, visited India and talked about the growth plans of Hindustan Unilever (HUL). The most surprising fact was he said that product innovation is the key growth factor for HUL and that it would double its turnover.
Fortunately, while Mr Polman has clearly articulated his target, he has refrained from specifying by when this target would be reached. This is because the CEO was really talking through his hat when he was talking about doubling the turnover.
Take a look at what the performance of HUL has been over the past decade, when the Indian market has conferred huge profits to Indian companies and multinationals. Its net sales in 1999 were Rs10,142 crore. By 2005, it was still around Rs10,982.35 crore and last year it reported net sales of Rs20,623 crore. In effect, HUL took a whole decade to double its turnover—a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 7% in a country where inflation is at least 7% on an average and is sometimes in double digits. Inflation-adjusted HUL has not grown at all. Of course, HUL has demerged divisions and that is why net sales have been down, but it has also acquired businesses during this period
Now, take a look at what a company like Nestle has done over this period. Its net sales in 1999 were Rs1,543.90 crore. This jumped to Rs Rs5,149 crore in 2009—a CAGR of 13%.
There is something so fundamentally wrong with the business of HUL that the Unilever CEO should be talking about a drastic strategy of energising growth and not vaguely dreaming of doubling turnover. After all, successive Unilever chiefs and heads of HUL have talked about various initiatives that have sounded as clever as its advertising—without delivering much to either the topline or bottomline. For instance, a few years back, we suddenly heard that HUL had restructured its portfolio into “power brands” without the slighest of understanding that it was really selling commodity products.
If it tried to raise its prices even the slighest, these “power brands” would be out of the market because Indian products from Godrej, Emami, Jyothi Laboratories and Dabur were snapping at its heels.
The fact is, unlike almost all multinational companies, HUL is living in a world of its own. For instance, what explains its tired effort at producing ever more brand extensions? HUL thinks that consumers would be happily buying another round of soaps and shampoos centered around Dove— Dry Therapy Shampoo, Dove Daily Therapy Shampoo, Dove Hair Fall Therapy Shampoo, etc. backed by an advertising blitzkrieg. Consumers are simply put off and tired.
If the Unilever CEO believes that HUL is still the lion in several categories (as he said in an interview), he is living in his own world. The fact is, over the past decade, HUL has repeatedly tried and failed in a large number of new businesses, which makes it look like an also-ran. Whether in personal care, home care products or food brands, HUL has only a string of failures to show. In 2001, it took over Modern Bread from the government and had aggressive plans to grow this business by creating a variety of baked products around flour from biscuits to spagetti. Over the years, nothing happened. Similar is the scenario with with its Annapurna Atta, which has failed to lead HUL into other successful categories.
The company tried to push its bread and atta together in the year 2002 by launching ‘branded Modern atta bread’ but this was not what the consumers wanted. During the past decade, HUL also forayed into the beauty and skincare segment using the ayurvedic platform. In last eight years, the Ayush brand has only meant large losses. Consumers’ recall of this brand is extremely poor, forget about break even. The company itself doesn’t know when this segment will be profitable.
The fact is, HUL now singularly lacks execution capability. It is still playing the 70s and 80s script of brand extensions and big nationwide ad spend. It spent Rs9,125 crore over six years from 2003—just to stay where it was. This strategy worked when Doordarshan was the only visual medium and competition was non-existent. The world has changed but HUL has not. It is not going to be easy at all to wrest back the initiative. In a highly competitive market, HUL has turned out to be slothful and unimaginative.
GMR acquired power utility InterGen, based in the Netherlands, at a transaction worth $1.10 billion in 2008. Two years later, not much financial information is available about the acquired company in the public domain
GMR Infrastructure’s overseas acquisition of InterGen NV in 2008 was touted as one of the biggest Indian overseas acquisitions, specifically in the energy sector. Two years later, when InterGen’s assets form a significant part of GMR’s power assets, not much financial information about the Netherlands-based company is available in the public domain.
GMR had acquired the 50% stake in InterGen from AIG Highstar Capital II LP, a fund owned by the American International Group. Back in 2008, according to a press release issued by GMR, the transaction was valued at $1.1 billion.
In October 2008, InterGen issued a press release on its website stating that GMR Infrastructure Limited had completed its previously-announced acquisition of a 50% interest in InterGen from AIG Highstar Capital and affiliates. The balance 50% in InterGen is held by Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan. This Canadian pension plan has held this stake in InterGen since 2005.
According to a Karvy Research note, InterGen’s total present operational capacity is around 6,254MW, of a total equity value of Rs32,226 million, thus placing GMR’s 50% stake in the power utility at a value of Rs16,113 million.
This stake in InterGen is significant considering GMR’s total operational capacity (including all its subsidiaries)—and excluding InterGen—is only around 9,087MW. The total stake value of GMR in all the assets and projects owned by it is around Rs2,68,065.40 million, including InterGen.
InterGen has 12 power plants located across the UK, the Netherlands, Mexico, Australia and the Philippines. GMR’s presence in these countries is only due to the InterGen acquisition.
Despite InterGen forming a significant asset base for the group and GMR having acquired the stake at $1.1 billion, not much information is available about the company on GMR’s website or in its annual reports.
GMR’s annual report for 2008 -09 states that the financial results of InterGen have not been considered in the consolidated results of the company pending conversions of Compulsory Convertible Debentures (CCDs).
GMR’s results for the December 2009 quarter also state that the company has given a corporate guarantee of up to a maximum of $1.38 billion to the lenders on behalf of a fellow subsidiary to enable it to raise debt for financing the InterGen acquisition.
InterGen, with its headquarters in the Netherlands, was delisted from the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2008. The ‘financial reports’ section on InterGen’s website is also locked from public view. Thus, accessing the company’s financial data is almost impossible.
According to one of the analysts tracking GMR, InterGen’s plants are operating satisfactorily, but not much data is available to state the exact operating profits of the company. An email sent to the GMR corporate communications department requesting more financial information on InterGen remained unanswered at the time of writing this article. Similarly, an email sent to InterGen was also not immediately answered.
Though InterGen’s financial information is not available in the public domain, facts and figures related to the company’s existing—and planned—capacity as well as debt can be accessed only through analyst reports.
As per the Karvy research note, InterGen has a total 8,086MW of net operational capacity (including 428MW under construction in the Netherlands). Of the 8,088MW, its net equity capacity is 6,254MW. About 70% of InterGen's capacities are sold on a long-term basis and the remaining on merchant basis.
The note further states that InterGen’s market value is around Rs1,43,546 million. The company holds debt of around Rs1,86,550 million. Given GMR’s 50% stake in Intergen, GMR’s InterGen stake is valued at Rs 71,773 million.