Had Adam Gondvi (1947-2011) been alive, he would say, “In your executive, legislative, judicial and editorial files, Aadhaar number online database may appear rosy, but this data is fake, this is filish.”  

 

In his book Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (1909), Prof Friedrich Nietzsche, the 19th-century German philosopher, cautioned, “He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.” 

 

Pranab Mukherjee was a minister of state in charge of the department of revenue and banking, Union ministry of finance during the Emergency (25 June 1975- 21 March 1977) who was the force behind the repression across the states. He was summoned by the justice JC Shah-led judicial inquiry commission as a witness and subsequently ordered to be prosecuted for refusal to take the oath and refusal to answer questions under Sections 178 and 179 of the Indian Penal Code. The commission’s interim report recorded that, based on totally extraneous considerations, Mr Mukherjee had sent a secret note on 24 June 1976, to the then-prime minister regarding the appointment of TR Varadachary as chairman of State Bank of India with effect from 1 July 1976 till 28 February 1977, which was approved, without statutorily required consultation with the governor of the Reserve Bank of India. It recorded how on 24 July 1975, he was involved in deciding the detention and imprisonment of the likes of Gayatri Devi under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA), 1974 as a 'security prisoner'. 

 

Mr Mukherjee seemed to be addicted to 'totally extraneous considerations' even in his later years.  It was these considerations which made him announce, "The setting up of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is a major step in improving governance with regard to delivery of public services” in his 2009-10 Union Budget speech, as finance minister (FM). He added: “This project is very close to my heart. I am happy to note that this project also marks the beginning of an era where the top private sector talent in India steps forward to take the responsibility for implementing projects of vital national importance. The UIDAI will set up an online database with identity and biometric details of Indian residents and provide enrolment and verification services across the country. The first set of unique identity numbers will be rolled out in 12 to 18 months. I have proposed a provision of ₹120 crore for this project." In his Budget speech, he introduced Nandan Nilekani as “the top private sector talent in India” on 16 February 2009, even before the board of directors of Infosys Technologies Ltd, an IT-services firm accepted Mr Nilekani's resignation on 25 June 2009, which became effective from 9 July 2009.  Later, Mr Nilekani disclosed that he was in the process of building a coalition of the willing to outwit the coalition of those who are unwilling to accept the biometric digital ID database scheme. The studied silence of the ruling and opposition parties on the issue reveals who is part of his coalition. UID/Aadhaar number online database unfolded without a statute during 2009-2014. The report of the task force for the preparation of a policy document on identity and access management constituted on 31 October 2006 reveals that the online database project was already underway. Mr Mukherjee and Mr Nilekani ensured its publicity and marketing to hide the true intent of the national population register (NPR) of the Union ministry of home affairs, which was/is admittedly collated with the UID/Aadhaar number online database 'as per approved strategy'.     

 

Notably, as president of India, Mr Mukherjee was invited in 2018 by the RSS as the chief guest at the graduation ceremony of its fresh recruits. Although several stalwarts of the RSS too had/have serious misgivings about the Aadhaar number online database project, the Union government has widened its implementation contrary to the Supreme Court’s directions.

 

Amid the ongoing Pranabisation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the 739-page-long Economic Survey 2025-26 tabled in Parliament on 29 January 2026 by the BJP-led government, directly mentions unique identity (UID)/Aadhaar number on 15 occasions and refers to 'digital' on 372 occasions. It is the same BJP which fought against the UID)/Aadhaar number, a monstrous idea which was planted in the mind of the high command of the Indian National Congress by Mr Mukherjee as FM at the behest of his donors. The same idea was planted in the mind of the current prime minister (PM) by FM Arun Jaitely, apparently at the behest of his donors. In his speeches on Aadhaar from 2013 and 2014 while on his election campaign, he opposed Aadhaar. In September 2013, at a BJP ‘youth conference’ rally in Trichy, he mocked Aadhaar, calling it a ‘jadi buti’ or a medicinal herb to cure all of India’s problems. He alluded that money spent on Aadhaar benefited vested interests. 

 

Notably, as Gujarat’s chief minister, he had written to the Congress government over the past three years, raising serious concerns about national security with regard to Aadhaar. In April 2014, at a ‘Bharat Vijay’ rally in Bengaluru, he attacked the then-UIDAI chairman Mr Nilekani because lakhs and crores of taxpayer money had been sunk into the Aadhaar scheme. On 8 April 2014, he wrote about unaddressed national security questions that emerge from the Aadhaar scheme. The Hindu Business Line disclosed on 15 January 2018 that prior to the U-turn of the PM, there was a closed door meeting of the current PM, the then-FM Mr Jaitley and Mr Nilekani, a follower of Mr Mukherjee and a subordinate of Montek Singh Ahluwalia, the deputy chairman of the now-defunct Planning Commission of India in late-June 2014 that saved the Aadhaar number online database, a bottomless digital basket. It was retained unmindful of the fact that the electoral mandate in Bangalore in particular and across the country was against this database.

 

The reference to jadi buti of Pranab-era by BJP is akin to 'the pill of Murti-Bing', a narcotic mentioned in The Captive Mind (1953), a Polish non-fiction book by Nobel laureate Czesław Miłosz.   Indian citizens were/are facing an invasion of the digital ID cartel masquerading as the Aadhaar ID number and suffering civil death and natural death. But as soon as jadi buti and 'the pill of Murti-Bing' were administered by the international and domestic donors of the parties, the legislators, ministers, officers of the executive and judiciary, and editors became so elated that they started celebrating Aadhaar ID-based digital colonisation and became complicit in naturalising cyber totalitarianism, imperialism and instrumentarianism, which erodes democracy from within. 

 

Is it a coincidence that Aadhaar number-based digital emergency architecture started unfolding in the backdrop of the observations of Henry Kissinger (1923-2023) in his book World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History (2014)? Kissinger pointed out that 'Cyberspace has colonised the physical space and, at least in major urban centres, is beginning to merge with it.' Wittingly or unwittingly, the homo digitals, the proponents and supporters of the UID/Aadhaar number online database, who too like human beings and reside in urban centres, appear to have adopted the role of the fifth columnists. 

 

Nicholas Negroponte, the author of Being Digital (1995), predicted that 'Like a mothball, which goes from solid to gas directly, I expect the nation State to evaporate without first going into a gooey, inoperative mess, before some global cyber State commands the cyber ether.' He added: “Without question, the role of the nation state will change dramatically and there will be no room for nationalism than there is for smallpox.” Aren’t homo digitals working to ensure the evaporation of the State in pursuance of the 604-page-long Global Redesign Initiative Report (2010) of the World Economic Forum like Communists who wanted the State to wither away? How is it that the features of the Techno-Feudal State are becoming a mirror image of the Orwellian Communist State? 

 

The Economic Survey 2008-2009 of the Pranab-era reads: "These IDs will form the base of a multi-application smart cards (MASC) system that can be used to empower the poor and ensure that they get the full benefits of all programmes such as NREGA, PDS, publically provided education, skill development, health services, social security (to personal at special risk) and fertiliser subsidy." It added: "A household ID could be created simultaneously or in parallel by linking it to a set of UIDs of individuals constituting the household." The ground reality is that the UID/Aadhaar number online database has disempowered the poor and deprived them of the full benefits of programmes such as NREGA, PDS, education, skill development, health services, social security and fertiliser subsidy because of the rampant failure of biometric technology, which is admittedly 'inherently fallible'. 

 

Out of the 15 claims in the Economic Survey 2025-2026, the first reference claims that economy-wide adoption of public digital infrastructure, including Aadhaar number, Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Goods and Services Tax Network (GSTN), has reduced transaction and compliance costs.  

 

The fact is that the requirement of the UID/Aadhaar number has increased transaction costs. The effort required to access existing benefits has increased manifold in terms of longer waits or repeated trips for authentication, or trips to different places that either support online transactions or distribute other welfare benefits. Infrastructural constraints have increased turnaround time for each disbursement. The fingerprints of up to 15% are never authenticated at all. A report from 4G Identity Solutions, a supplier and consultant of the UIDAI, had pointed out that about 15% of Indians may fail to enrol because of unreadable fingerprints. Indians above 60 years and young children below 12 years have difficulty enrolling in a fingerprinting system. UIDAI’s Proof of Concept (PoC) studies published in 2012 revealed that fingerprint-based authentication of large populations poses enormous risks of exclusion. CAG’s audit report dated April 2022 on the functioning of UIDAI reads: “The fingerprint authentication transaction success rate remained a cause of dissatisfaction among the users due to biometric authentication failures.” It underlined that UIDAI did not penalise deficient biometric service-providers (BSPs), despite shortcomings in their services. Wrong decisions by the biometric solutions have led to issues of multiple Aadhaars to the same resident or denial of Aadhaar to a genuine applicant. Wrong outcomes of authentication transactions have resulted either in a genuine person not getting the intended benefit or a wrong person availing the undue benefit. 

 

As to the misleading claim about reduction in compliance cost, CAG’s audit report dated April 2022 states that “UIDAI had not established any measures /systems to confirm that the entities involved adhered to procedures and was largely dependent on audit reports submitted to them. They had not independently conducted any verification of compliance with the process to derive a satisfactory assurance.” The audit report shows that all the files of UIDAI are not being submitted to CAG for auditing. No independent auditing is happening. 

 

As to UPI, which was launched by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) in 2016 on top of UID/Aadhaar number, the economic survey feigned ignorance about three major service disruptions on 26 March 2025 which lasted between 30 minutes to three hours, 2 April 2025 disruption which affected transaction success rates across platforms and 12 April 2025 disruption which lasted four to five hours. It revealed the vulnerability of UPI  which powers 20 billion transactions a month, more payments than credit and debit cards combined in India. 

 

Notably, NPCI is a National Information Utility (NIU), a private company with a public purpose like Goods and Services Tax Network (GSTN). In September 2024, GSTN released an advisory on biometric-based Aadhaar authentication and document verification. Notably, Rule 8 of the CGST Rules, 2017 was amended to provide that an applicant can be identified on the common portal, based on data analysis and risk parameters for biometric-based Aadhaar authentication and taking a photograph of the applicant along with the verification of the original copy of the documents uploaded with the application. This functionality was developed by GSTN.  Initially, it was rolled out in Bihar, Delhi, Karnataka, and Punjab. GSTN was formed to provide a common and shared IT infrastructure and services to the stakeholders for the implementation of GST with effect from 1 July 2017. CAG’s audit report concluded: “GSTN failed in ensuring that the basic validations, as mandated by law and other applicable provisions, were properly built into the system and these were included only after being pointed out by CAG audit.” It found GSTN’s reply to be 'untenable from system design perspective'. 

 

Notably, GSTN was created pursuant to the recommendations of the Nilekani-headed technology advisory group on unique projects (TAGUP)  under the finance ministry during Mr Mukherjee’s tenure as FM.   

 

The CAG's Report No. 16 of 2023 debunks the claim about a reduction in transaction and compliance costs.  For instance, the department of posts (DoP), Union ministry of communication failed to segregate the financial assistance received from UIDAI on Aadhaar related services between its own revenue and Goods and Services Tax (GST) component which resulted in non/short-payment of GST amounting to ₹9 crore for the period from May 2018 to July 2022.  Notably, DoP had signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with UIDAI for implementing the UID/Aadhaar project in September 2010 and began to act as a registrar. From July 2017 onwards, Aadhaar enrollment and updating facilities were set up in various post offices under different postal circles across the country. It also failed to issue instructions to its subordinate offices to pay the GST on a reverse charge basis on the commission paid to its sales force for the procurement of Postal Life Insurance/ Rural Postal Life Insurance policies which resulted in non/short-payment of GST amounting to ₹42.48 crore during the period from 2018-19 to 2021-22. On financial incentives received on Aadhaar services from UIDAI, DoP failed to issue any instructions to its subordinate offices regarding payment of GST in both cases. This resulted in non/short payment of the GST amounting to ₹51.4811 crore. The government’s reply while accepting the findings of CAG stated in August 2022 that the financial assistance released by UIDAI to registrars towards Aadhaar generation is inclusive of GST at the rate of 18% effective from 1 July 2017. And GST was required to be calculated on the gross amount of assistance, and not on the net amount of assistance. CAG’s audit report also revealed that BSNL procured 6,000 Aadhaar enrolment kits (AEKs) during 2018-19 worth ₹77.88 crore. Out of them, 3,941 kits remained non-operational till December 2022. This resulted in the blockade of government funds of ₹51.15 crore. UIDAI had decided in September 2018 to give financial assistance to state governments or state-controlled agencies including BSNL to set up Aadhaar enrollment and updating facilities in all the customer service centres of BSNL by 15 October 2018. UIDAI’s guidelines of September 2018 for assistance towards information and communication technology infrastructure for AEKs stated that capital expenditure for procurement and deployment of AEKs would be provided by UIDAI. A scrutiny of records at BSNL revealed that UIDAI had not specified the period within which the installation of the AEKs was to be completed. Out of 6,000 AEKs procured by BSNL in March 2019, only 2,059 kits were installed in 28 circles. The remaining 3,941 kits were not installed. These remained non-operational as of December 2022. BSNL also lost the warranty benefit of three years on uninstalled kits. It was seen that in 14 circles, out of 483 operational kits in ten circles, 209 AEKs recorded zero transactions. Although BSNL made significant claims regarding the revenue potential of AEKs to UIDAI while demanding funds for 6,000 AEKs, its subsequent lack of action as evidenced by the lackadaisical approach to the AEKs utilisation, resulted not only in the blockage of funds of ₹51.15 crore but also in the consequential loss of revenue generation opportunity for BSNL. 

 

The second reference claims that “‘Aadhaar-enabled services’ have expanded access to financial services, particularly in rural and underserved areas.” 

 

Making  'services' including any provision, facility, utility, or any other assistance provided in any form to the citizens conditional on Aadhaar registration, subordinates citizens’ right to enrolment in a biometric database.  This coerces citizens to ‘trade’ data for 'services'. Making Aadhaar a precondition for accessing social welfare results in the denial of basic services to those excluded. The fact is that the most vulnerable sections from urban, rural and underserved areas of our country are lost in a digital labyrinth and are facing civil death and financial death.

 

The third reference claims that registered intermediaries are permitted to use the ‘e-KYC Setu System’ of the National Payments  Corporation of India as an alternative to Aadhaar-based e-KYC authentication to facilitate SEBI-registered stock brokers in undertaking securities market-related activities in GIFT-IFSC under a separate business unit, the requirement of obtaining specific SEBI approval has been removed. 

 

It is noteworthy that, till date, no explanations have been given about how mandatory linking of every bank account will eradicate/ reduce the problems of 'money laundering' and 'black money'. There are alternative methods of KYC that the banks can undertake. So far, the Union government has failed to explain why linking of Aadhaar is imperative. RBI’s Master Direction (KYC Direction, 2016) NoDBR.AML.BC No. 81/14.01.001/2015-16 allowed using alternatives to Aadhaar to open bank accounts. 

 

Regulation 2(k) of Aadhaar Authentication Regulations, 2016 states that ‘e-KYC data’ means demographic information and photograph of an Aadhaar number holder. If e-KYC includes Aadhaar number, how is the ‘e-KYC Setu System’ of the National Payments Corporation of India an alternative Aadhaar-based e-KYC authentication? KYC initiatives have failed. It is a cause of enormous inconvenience and torture. Reserve Bank of India (RBI)'s report entitled Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2024–25 acknowledges know-your-customer (KYC) lapses. 

 

It may be recalled that by an illegal and unconstitutional circular dated 23 March 2017, the department of telecommunications had directed that all licensees shall reverify the existing mobile subscribers (pre-paid and post-paid) through Aadhaar based e-KYC process. It amounted to mandatory linking of mobile connections with Aadhaar, whose requirement was not only in respect of those individuals who would be becoming mobile subscribers, but also applies to existing subscribers as well. 

 

The majority judgement of the Court observed: “We are of the opinion that not only such a circular lacks backing of a law, but it fails to meet the requirement of proportionality as well. It does not meet the ‘necessity stage’ and ‘balancing stage’ tests to check the primary menace which is in the mind of the respondent authorities. There can be other appropriate laws and less intrusive alternatives. For the misuse of such SIM cards by a handful of persons, the entire population cannot be subjected to intrusion into their private lives. It also impinges upon the voluntary nature of the Aadhaar scheme. We find it to be disproportionate and unreasonable state compulsion. It is to be borne in mind that every individual/ resident subscribing to a SIM card does not enjoy the subsidy benefit or services mentioned in Section 7 of the Act.

 

We, therefore, have no hesitation in declaring the circular dated 23 March 2017 as unconstitutional.” The same constitutional logic applies to the irrational and unconstitutional requirement of an Aadhaar number for KYC. There is nothing related to the Aadhaar number online database which is not painful and unconstitutional.  

 

The fourth reference claims that the way forward for India's pension ecosystem lies in the expansion of both contributory and non-contributory schemes. At the contributory end, simplifying enrolment through Aadhaar-based authentication, enabling frictionless micro-contributions via digital payments, and synchronising pension outreach with broader financial inclusion. 

 

The claim disregarded observations by the Supreme Court in its 1448 page long judgement dated 26th  September. It recorded that services like pensions claimed under Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act have been denied because of biometric failure. Biometric infrastructure operates on a probabilistic system, which cannot be ‘one hundred percent infallible’.  Thus, the State needs to take steps to prevent the denial of benefits by adopting alternate methods for the verification of identity. This is absent at present, resulting in a violation of Articles 14 and 21. At page 391 of the majority judgement, it reads: “We also make it clear that a benefit which is earned by an individual (e.g. pension by a government employee) cannot be covered under Section 7 of the Act, as it is the right of the individual to receive such benefit.” Aadhaar-based authentication for pensions is in breach of the court’s specific direction.

 

The fifth and sixth reference claims that Aadhaar-linked point-of-sale verification, and the  Integrated Fertiliser Management System have improved transparency, logistics and control over physical flows, and Aadhaar-linked fertiliser sales at the point of purchase have contributed to real-time tracking.

 

The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of fertiliser subsidy on page 391. It is only in respect of fertiliser subsidy where authentication is required every time the fertiliser is disbursed. However, it was clarified by the Union government “that fertiliser is also given based on other documents such as Kisan Credit Card, etc.” Contrary to the clarification provided to the court, the government makes the Aadhaar number mandatory. 

 

The seventh,  eighth and ninth reference claims that food and nutrition security were strengthened by “ensuring the distribution of fortified food, enabling greater inclusiveness through Aadhaar-based deduplication and One Nation One Ration Card (ONORC) portability, expanding direct subsidy delivery via DBT, and leveraging cutting-edge digital platforms for enhanced transparency and efficiency. In FY24, ₹267.6 crore was transferred directly through DBT to over 10 lakh beneficiaries in Chandigarh, Puducherry, and parts of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, and Daman and Diu, offering choice while reducing leakages. Aadhaar seeding was achieved for 99.8% of ration cards and 98.9% of beneficiaries, ensuring no exclusion of genuine poor households. Further, 99.6% of 5.43 lakh fair price shops (FPSs) are now equipped with electric point of sale (ePoS) devices linked to Aadhaar-based biometric authentication. Over 98% of monthly foodgrain distribution is conducted through these digital transactions, significantly reducing leakages and diversion. To enhance accuracy under NFSA, inter-database integration across platforms such as the Central Board of Direct Taxes, Goods and Services Tax Network, PM-KISAN, etc., flagged 8.51 crore records for verification. Following field verification, over 2.12 crore ineligible beneficiaries have been removed by states/ UTs, improving subsidy targeting. The claim shows that it has disregarded the Supreme Court’s judgement.    

 

The tenth reference is made in the context of digital public infrastructure (DPI). It claims that the expansion of BharatNet, the deployment of 5G networks and platforms like UPI and Aadhaar, ULIP, DigiYatra, and FASTag form the essential digital backbone.

 

Although the Aadhaar number online database is emerging like an backboneless entity, the reference to Aadhaar as part of 'essential digital backbone' makes one wonder whether 'essential' includes non-civilian digital backbone like the Digital Backbone and Digital Backbone Reference Architecture of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of 32 countries like Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, Türkiye, UK and USA, includes 35 services and provides the technical means to ensure universal connectivity and data transport across all domains of operations (maritime, land, air, space and cyberspace) to share and employ data securely and effectively, to maximise information flow, increase military effectiveness and enhance political decision-making. It is transforming NATO into a data-centric alliance and enhancing military effectiveness and political decision-making. It builds on agreed activities and projects like the “Allied software for Cloud and Edge services (ACE)” initiative. Unlike the digital backbone of countries of NATO, India’s digital backbone is totally dependent and subservient to the Digital Backbone and Digital Backbone Reference Architecture of firms from NATO countries like the USA, France and UK like MongoDB, Accenture, IDEMIA and Ernst & Young. In fact, even the database of India’s armed forces is with them through UIDAI’s MoUs with all the wings of the armed forces.      

 

It is germane to note that the Supreme Court’s judgement records the concerns regarding the application of biometrics in the Aadhaar project which were discussed in 2009 by the Biometrics Standards Committee of UIDA, which was of the view that the large magnitude of the Aadhaar project raised uncertainty about the accuracy of biometrics. The strategy overview published by UIDAI in 2010 had discussed the risks associated with biometrics perceived by UIDAI itself. Under the heading of  ‘Project Risk’, the overview stated that the UID project does face certain risks in its implementation, which have to be addressed through its architecture and in the design of its incentives. It stated:

 

“1) Adoption Risks: There will have to be sufficient, early demand from residents for the UID number. Without critical mass among key demographic groups (the rural and the poor), the number will not be successful in the long term. To ensure this, the UIDAI will have to model de-duplication and authentication to be both effective and viable for participating agencies and service providers.

 

3) Enrolment Risks: The project will have to be carefully designed to address risks of low enrolment – such as creating sufficient touch points in rural areas, enabling and motivating registrars, ensuring that documentary requirements don't derail enrolment in disadvantaged communities – as well as managing difficulties in address verification, name standards, lack of information on date of birth and hard to record fingerprints.

 

4) Risks of Scale: The project will have to handle records that approach one billion in number. This creates significant risks in biometric de-duplication as well as in administration, storage, and continued expansion of infrastructure. 

 

5) Technology Risks: Technology is a key part of the UID programme, and this is the first time in the world that storage, authentication and de-duplication of biometrics are being attempted on this scale. The authority will have to address the risks carefully – by choosing the right technology in the architecture, biometrics, and data management tools; managing obsolescence and data quality; designing the transaction services model and innovating towards the best possible result. 

 

6) Privacy and Security Risks: The UIDAI will have to ensure that resident data is not shared or compromised.”

 

These admitted risks have remained unaddressed. CAG’s audit of the performance of UIDAI has revealed it. Replying to the question of Jagdambika Pal, Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Union minister of state for electronics and information technology on 22 July 2022 said, “Recommendations of the CAG‟s Audit Report No. 24 of 2021-(MeitY) on “Performance Audit on Functioning of UIDAI” have been accepted for implementation. Action taken report has been uploaded on Audit Para Monitoring System (APMS) (https://apms.nic.in/) .” By now, it is evident that the minister, who is currently the president of the Kerala unit of the BJP, misled Parliament because till date the action taken report has not been uploaded.

 

The 11th reference claims that monitoring progress towards the goal of National Education Policy (NEP) of 100% gross enrolment ratio (GER) from pre-primary to secondary education by 2030, is being enabled through APAAR (Automated Permanent Academic Account Registry) IDs, which use Aadhaar-based authentication to digitally store academic records and track student enrolment and progression across school, higher and skill education.

 

This claim ignores the court’s gnawing concerns. It has pointed out that “Technological error would result in authentication failures. The concerns raised by UIDAI ought to have been resolved before the implementation of the Aadhaar project. Poor connectivity in rural India was a major concern. The majority of the Indian population lives in rural areas. Even a small percentage of error results in a population of crores being affected. Denial of subsidies  and benefits to them due to the infirmities of biometric technology is a threat to  good governance and social parity.” It was admitted by Mr Chandrasekhar, the minister, that as of 31 May 2022, 5,98,999. Aadhaar numbers were cancelled for being duplicates. It is evident that the claim about the uniqueness of the unique identification (UID)/Aadhaar number was/is an exercise in deceptive advertising.      

 

Replying to the question on whether UIDAI stands by the Supreme Court’s judgement dated 26 September 2018 on Aadhaar and providing unconditional exemption to children, Mr Chandrasekhar, the minister replied: “Since common infrastructure is used for generating Aadhaar for all age groups, it is technically not feasible to re-generate the report as on date for a legacy period for expenditure incurred for issuance of Bal Aadhaar.” To the question as to compliance with the directions of the Supreme Court in its judgment, the minister replied that “The necessary amendments have been made in the Aadhaar Act, 2016, by way of the Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019. In compliance of the aforesaid judgment, Section 3A (3) has been inserted in Aadhaar Act, 2016 vide the Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 which provides that: “(3) Notwithstanding anything in Section 7, a child shall not be denied any subsidy, benefit or service under that section in case of failure to establish his identity by undergoing authentication, or furnishing proof of possession of Aadhaar number, or in the case of a child to whom no Aadhaar has been assigned, producing an application for enrolment”. As of today, the fact is that the Aadhaar Amendment Act along with  Section 3A (3) has been repealed, indicating that UIDAI is not complying with the court’s judgement. The repeal of the Amendment Act demonstrates unequivocally that the government has reversed its act of compliance with the court’s judgement.  APAAR (Automated Permanent Academic Account Registry) IDs, which use Aadhaar-based authentication, are illegal and unconstitutional.  

 

The 12th reference claims in this context of the e-Shram portal, which serves as a national database of unorganised workers, including data on construction workers, migrant workers, gig and platform workers, street vendors, domestic workers, and agriculture workers.  As of January 2026, the portal has successfully registered over 31 crore unorganised workers. Notably, women account for 54% of total registrants. Each registrant is assigned a universal account number (UAN), which is linked to their Aadhaar and mobile number.

 

Unmindful of the political resistance against biometric attendance and biometric timekeeping in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, the USA and in several regions and sectors in India, mainstream political parties including those of socialist persuasion have maintained deafening silence. They have feigned ignorance about protests against the implementation of the biometric attendance system i.e. an attendance system. There was a protest against biometric attendance in Durgapur Steel Plant, Steel Authority of India Ltd. The management introduced the biometric attendance recording system with disciplinary actions. Hindustan Steel Workers Union, Durgapur Steel Plant have protested against “illegal and illegitimate capturing of fingerprints  of employees and implementation of “biometric attendance recording system” without any lawful authority and in violation of Article-21 of the Constitution of India and other related statutes.”

 

The Delhi University Teachers’ Association (DUTA) and Delhi University College Karamchari Union (DUCKU) have also protested against the installation and implementation of the biometric attendance system. All schools, colleges, universities and research centres under state governments and the Central government have introduced the procedure of UID/Aadhaar biometric attendance recording system and CCTV system for students, teachers and non-teaching employees. It was mandatory in both private and public institutions. The capturing of fingerprints and iris scan and CCTV is illegal and illegitimate. There have been demands for the stoppage of such initiatives which seem to pave the way for genetic determinism and legitimisation of eugenic thinking. The students and teachers and non-teaching staff were coerced to enrol for UID/Aadhaar.

 

The UID/Aadhaar enabled biometric attendance system (AEBAS) has been designed for government organisations by the government of India to improve the productivity of employees. The system authenticates attendance using the UID/Aadhaar number created. It is a cloud-based building automation system (BAS) that monitors attendance of government employees in real-time. It is claimed that the UID/Aadhaar-based attendance system provides employees with the option of easy attendance marking, without having to manually enter their UID/Aadhaar number. It is also claimed that it is “designed for long-term, uninterrupted performance with a prudent blend of aesthetics, speed, connectivity, convenience and reliability” amidst numerous uninterrupted reports of unreliability of UID/Aadhaar including academic studies pointing out the ugliness and cruelty of starvation deaths due to denial of subsidies, benefits and services.

 

The proponents of the biometric time and attendance system claim that it has brought a more precise system to measure a group or an individual’s activities and attendance. The biometric attendance machine works by capturing unique biological features of individuals such as hand or finger print, iris pattern, voice or DNA as a record for identity verification and allows individuals to perform something that individuals are obligated or authorised to do. It counts employees’ work schedule, like which employee did what, and at what time did she/he do it. It is claimed that it is a foolproof technology that ensures the accuracy of attendance and dealings with a large number of employees.

 

The claims of interested parties and corporate beneficiaries and proponents are not surprising but the meek submission of most trade unions and opposition parties is intriguing. The lesson from the rebellion of the UK’s trade against biometric employee scanning is yet to be learnt in India. In the UK, trade unions rebelled against biometric employee scanning and tracking. It is significant that a major trade union in Australia opposed plans by the government’s welfare body to start using voice biometrics in contact centres. Community and public sector unions (CPSU) resisted the introduction of biometric call monitoring and performance management software into frontline client service. The proposed monitoring included voice biometrics recording that tracks the way staff and customers talk. It is germane to note that Australia abandoned its UID/Aadhaar-like national ID project.

 

In USA, the initiative of collecting the biometric data of employees has brought forth the issue of its propriety and its conflict with labour rights and legal provisions. This has created a compulsion for the contractors to bargain with trade unions when it is clear the biometric system is likely to subject employees to additional discipline or increased oversight. The employers are generally not permitted to implement a biometric system unless union representatives agree to its use. Some states have framed legal protections for employees with respect to the use of bio¬metric technology. New York prohibits employers from requiring employees to be fingerprinted as a condition of employment. Some states have placed conditions on a private or commercial entity’s collection and use of biometric information, based on informed consent. They provide guidance on the storage and destruction of such collected data. There is a legal requirement that imposes a duty on the data collector to provide notice to individuals whenever a security breach occurs. The West Virginia federal court found that the religious views of an employee conflicted with an employer’s use of biometric technology and ruled that he was entitled to religious accommodation under federal anti-discrimination law.

 

In New Zealand, the Employment Court has adjudicated on this issue in OCS Limited vs Food Workers Union Nga RingaTota Inc. & Anor WN WC 15/06 on 31 August 2006. It directed that employers will need to consult with employees and obtain their consent before introducing the system of collection of biometric data and the technology needs to be compatible with the contractual obligations of the parties. The employer must take reasonable steps to inform employees of the new measures and to obtain their consent.

 

In India, the Khan Mazdoor Karmachari Union (IFTU-Sarwahara) (Mine Workers Employee Union (IFTU-Sarwahara)) protested against this system installed by the management in the Jhanjhra, a fully mechanised mine of Eastern Coalfields Ltd, situated in Raniganj, district Burdwan in West Bengal. Despite severe protest by the workers and unions, the Jhanjhra area management implemented an anti-worker biometric attendance system i.e. an attendance system by way of biometric scanning of eyes and the whole face. 

 

While those who have accepted admittedly 'inherently fallible' biometric technology based UID/Aadhaar as a fait accompli remain occupied with the differences that arise between the contractor and the individuals whose sensitive information is being collected with regard to the requirements for consent, the length of time biometric information may be stored and protocols for its destruction, those who are convinced about its unscientific nature contend that linking of biometric UID/Aadhaar number to all services including biometric timekeeping is designed to cause civil death. Civil death is the loss of all or almost all civil rights by a person, caused by the government of a country. Now it is apparent that the denial of rights in the absence of UID/Aadhaar is an act of coercion wherein people are being compelled to share their personal, sensitive biological information; else citizens will face civil death.

 

The 13th reference claims that women’s participation rose steadily from 48% to 58.1% between FY13-14 and FY24-25, Aadhaar seeding expanded sharply, the Aadhaar-based payment system was widely adopted, and electronic wage payments became nearly universal.

 

The Times of India has reported "Women facing challenges linking Aadhaar with bank".  The exclusion due to Aadhaar number is not simply a question of poor implementation that can be administratively resolved, but stems from the very design of the Act, i.e. the use of biometric authentication as the primary method of identification. Determination of legal entitlements is contingent on a positive authentication response from the UIDAI. In "Notes from the Field: How Does Aadhaar-Enabled Welfare Delivery Exclude Women?", the author concludes: "All the stories we have looked at so far suggest how rigid service delivery infrastructure becomes when braided with technological solutions that fail to understand people’s idiosyncratic contexts....With the Aadhaar-based payments, one of the images that the state projects is that of inflexibility....In an attempt to be ‘standardised’ and ‘neutral’, the infrastructure has become so removed from local contexts, that it leaves little scope to accommodate and alter according to local needs. The service providers (who are closest to the citizens) are rendered powerless. Thus, the crux of the problem with Aadhaar-enabled welfare delivery is its inability to recognise and address people’s problems, placing the burden of claiming entitlements on the citizens as opposed to the state." 

 

Notably, the Economic Survey, 2016 had reported that authentication failures have been as high as 49% in Jharkhand and 37% in Rajasthan, recognising that “failure to identify genuine beneficiaries results in exclusion error”. The fact is that biometric technology does not guarantee 100% accuracy and is fallible, with inevitable false positives and false negatives that are design flaws of such a probabilistic system, especially because admittedly, biological attributes and biometric information also change over time. This is true even in 2026. 

 

The 14th reference claims that through the Digital India Land Records Modernisation Programme (DILRMP), digitisation of record of rights (RoRs) in rural areas has been completed to the extent of 99.8% of available land records. Registration of land and property has also been computerised to the extent of 95.73% of sub-registration offices (SROs). Unique land parcel identification number (ULPIN)/Bhu-Aadhaar has been assigned to 36.67 crore land parcels to date. Under the aegis of the DILRMP, the government introduced the ULPIN or Bhu-Aadhaar, as well as the national generic document registration system (NGDRS).

 

Following the footprints of the Pranab-era, the national land records modernisation programme (NLRMP) which was rolled out in 2008, prior to the enactment of the Aadhaar Act, on 1 April 2016, the programme was renamed as the digital India land records modernisation programme (DILRMP). Pursuing the steps of the previous era proposed in the Land Titling Bill, each land parcel is being identified with a 14-digit unique identification number called the unique land parcel identification number (ULPIN), or Bhu-Aadhaar. 

 

In March 2023, Giriraj Singh, the Union minister of rural development & Panchayati Raj claimed that “once the digitisation of land records and registration is complete, it will help mitigate the huge pendency of court cases involving land disputes. The GDP loss to the country's economy is about 1.3% due to projects being stalled over litigation involving land disputes.” It has been estimated that land disputes account for 66% of civil cases in the country. Significantly, in April 2023, the Union ministry of rural development announced that as many as 28 states and Union Territories (UTs) have already adopted the national generic document registration system (NGDRS)—a digital portal for maintaining land records. 

 

In his book Imagining India: Ideas for the New Century (2008), Mr Nilekani refers to World Bank’s economist, Hernando de Soto's book The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (2000) to argue that the national ID system would be a big step for a perfect common land market to facilitate right to property and undoing of abolition of right to property in 1978 in order to bring down poverty! In the post-capitalist and post-socialist era, such assumptions of triumph have been found to be deeply flawed. In fact, even the title of the book sounds weird in the post-financial crisis and pandemic era of techno-feudalism.

 

Notably, Section 54 (2) m) of the NITI Aayog's Model Conclusive Land Titling Act for the states and Union Territories is touted as a model Act to provide for the establishment, administration and management of a system of title registration of immovable properties, which refers to the "use of biometric authentication including AADHAR or other identification." The governments of Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar have enacted laws in the name of maintaining land records, providing a database according to the latest government surveys, and ensuring more efficient dispute resolution mechanisms. Aren’t these initiatives aimed at creating a perfect common land market in the supreme public interest and unambiguous public purpose?

 

The 15th reference claims that the Aadhaar-based mobile application for digital life certification (DLC) of e-national social assistance programme (NSAP) pension beneficiaries was recently launched in July 2025. A total of 4.77mn (million) beneficiaries, as of 13 January 2026, have been authenticated through DLC across India. 

 

At page 391, the court’s judgement reads: “We hope that the respondents shall not unduly expand the scope of ‘subsidies, services and benefits’ thereby widening the net of Aadhaar, where it is not permitted otherwise.” Belying the hope of the court, governments, the respondents have widened the net of Aadhaar, even where it is not permitted under the Aadhaar Act.

 

Edward Snowden, the author of Permanent Record (2019) wrote: “It is the natural tendency of government to desire perfect records of private lives. History shows that no matter the laws, the result is abuse.” He added,  “I don't want to live in a society that does these sort of things ... I do not want to live in a world where everything I do and say is recorded. That is not something I am willing to support or live under.” Snowden went on a medical leave from the USA’s National Security Agency (NSA) and on 20 May 2013, took a flight to Hong Kong, China, where he spoke to Glenn Greenwald, a journalist and Laura Poitras, a film-maker, following which secret documents were published on 5 June 2013. These documents demonstrated the enormity of surveillance of some 35 heads of state and governments including India in "ongoing, daily basis". Later, The Guardian and The Washington Post had published information on PRISM, an NSA program that allows real-time information collection electronically leaked by Snowden who is critical of the digital-biometric Aadhaar number online database. It is recording and profiling every present and future Indian forever.  

 

It is crystal clear that justice AK Sikri who authored the majority judgement as part of the five-judge Constitution bench committed a grave blunder by disregarding the 547-page long unanimous judgement dated 24 August by a nine-judge Constitution bench of the Supreme Court, wherein, it echoed Snowden by making it absolutely unambiguous by saying, “….it cannot be said that a person should be profiled to the nth extent for all and sundry to know.”

 

The Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) of 12-digit biometric UID/Aadhaar numbers, the Aadhaar number online database is a failed and a highly controversial digital basket which is being bulldozed down citizen’s throat by the followers of World Bank Group and Mr Mukherjee who successfully misled present and future citizens, political parties, editors, armed forces, bureaucrats, judges, chief ministers, teachers, women and children by making them believe that this online digital biometric database was a voluntary digital number assigning program. Now, residents of India are being told that they cannot buy a train ticket without an Aadhaar number. Notably, the Kerala High Court's Division bench of chief justice Soumen Sen and justice Syam Kumar VM, on 12 March 2026, heard a petition challenging the Union government's circular mandating Aadhaar-based authentication for Tatkal bookings. The court has failed to get the Railway board to explain whether Aadhaar authentication was mandatory for Tatkal booking of tickets. 

 

Now citizens cannot marry, purchase or own property, or teach or study, open a bank account, and access hospitals without the 'voluntary' Aadhaar number even though the case regarding the unconstitutionality of the Aadhaar Act is pending. The proponents of the Aadhaar number-based digital emergency architecture are presenting a fait accompli to the Supreme Court’s seven-judge Constitution bench which seized with the matter since November 2019 but has failed to adjudicate it. As a consequence, the judges of the Supreme Court, high courts, other courts and tribunals have allowed themselves to be coerced into enrolling for an Aadhaar number even before the determination of the constitutionality of the Aadhaar Act by the Constitution bench. 

 

With regard to the Emergency, Rahul Gandhi who is emerging as one of the tallest opposition leaders in the democratic world, has admitted: “I think that was a mistake. Absolutely, that was a mistake. And my grandmother [Indira Gandhi] said as much,” while responding to a question by Prof Kaushik Basu, India’s former chief economic advisor. But he is yet to admit that digital emergency architecture introduced through the Aadhaar number online database at the instance of Mr Mukherjee was/is a mistake, which must be abandoned pursuant to the findings of CAG, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance and London School of Economics. His unpardonable failure in this regard has confused almost all the parties.       

 

Had Sophocles, the author of Antigone and Oedipus The King (496 BC-406 BC) been around, he would have wondered: Can thinking human beings, judges, legislators and editors think so wrongly?