The reduced drafts available due to lack of dredging in the Hooghly River Port system there for all to see, and the recent mishandling of the growth of ports and dredging on the Malabar coast is making matters worse
 

The recent face-off between Cochin Port Trust and Mercator bringing all channel and related deepening dredging in Kochi Harbour to a grinding halt drives yet another nail into the economic security of India with far-reaching consequences well beyond just the Arabian Sea that land-bound policy makers in Delhi do not seem to want to understand.
 

Last Friday, the Union government-controlled Cochin Port served a notice to Mercator giving the Mumbai-based firm 14 days to resume work. If Cochin Port Trust terminates Mercator’s contract, it will have to find another contractor to complete the rest of the work. While Cochin Port said that Mercator could not complete half of the targeted work even a year after it started. On the other hand, Mercator claimed that it has already done three to four times that quantity (of 2 million cubic metres) and spent more than the contract value already.

What is the real reason behind this specific episode as well as the larger issue on a national basis is what this short essay tries to bring out.

1) Specifically in context with Kochi Harbour, the realities, issues, difficulties and problems in trying to deepen the channel as well as waters around the berths have long been known, and the lack of tangible benefits render this an exercise in futility. This has been known for over two decades, and not just because of the report from Cochin Refineries/Kochi Refineries/BPCL, either.

2) Globally, for more than a few very sensible reasons, operational cargo ports now move away from the traditional habitats which supported their evolution in the first case. Those who do not learn from this simple truth are destined to see their cities collapse in due course. The expansion or formation of a new deep-water port in Kerala should have been at any other location—not Kochi. The reasons are—environmental as far as the existing habitats are concerned, deeper natural options available, easier rail and road connectivity, total fresh start and better accountability without going into legacy problems.

3) Further specifically in context with the way dredging is being done at Kochi Harbour—and I have first-hand knowledge on this—the issue here is more to do with faulty procedures followed down the line and total lack of operational supervision by the Cochin Port Trust. I could write a book on the subject—but very briefly, the same sub-contractors, the same dredgers and the same people on those dredgers do a wonderful job at some other locations in India (both private and public sector) but here off Kochi, the odds are stacked against anybody succeeding. Could it be because the existing powers that be don't want dredging to succeed off Kochi?

3) So why would some vested interests not want Kochi to grow, or even retain existing levels, as a major port? Good question—and to understand that, one has to also understand the politics behind why said vested interests are more keen to see UAE and Sri Lankan ports go from strength to strength. Look deeper behind the private player involved, look at the way politics in Kerala moves, and the answers on why the odds are stacked against Kochi being a major player as a port are clear to see—but it is the people of India who keep footing the bill.

4) On the larger issue of national importance—Kochi is home to some extremely important Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard, satellite monitoring, as well as other national security assets. Their access to the open sea is being hindered due to the existing situation being worsened. The shipyard and now the new terminals have created problems for the naval airbase near the harbour. Placing a private terminal right in the middle of all this, where security clearance has been and continues to be an issue, is like placing the consular office of an enemy country in the middle of a military ops room.

What could be a possible solution in the present scenario, given that so much has already been spent?

To answer that, a basic understanding of dredging would help, as well as going back to the point already raised—the same dredging assets perform brilliantly elsewhere.

In this particular case, the Cochin Port Trust sub-contracted dredging on the basis of a target depth to be achieved and also provided a time-line. In an ideal world, a sub-contractor does a due diligence, re-checks the data provided to agree on a starting point (datum), bids for the work, the winner/winners reach an agreement with the authorities, and then completes the task. Surveys are conducted with all relevant parties present, along with independent third-party surveyors, and the payments are made.

Till a few years ago, the reality of this depended on the checks and balances as well as personal integrities of the people from the ports. Of course, in some cases, there was blatant cheating. Siltation will happen. Nature will be the easiest entity to blame, and there will always be a convenient storm, typhoon, cyclone or tsunami, after which the whole cycle starts again.But some interesting changes have taken place:

1) The typical dredging scams could not be carried out with private ports, which is one reason you do not read about dredging or channel depth problems with private ports in India. They know how to get their money’s worth.
2) Scientific methods to perform independent surveys using fairly low-cost sonar equipment mounted on simple boats or even satellite information on real depths dredged is now easily available—especially to third parties tasked with re-confirming work done.
3) Some public sector ports have honest managements. Some don’t. Kochi’s maritime authorities and Cochin Port Trust have shown their true colours in the Enrica Lexie episode—do you expect anything better in dredging?

At the end of the day, however, it is the tax-payer who suffers. Seaports in other states like Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh continue to race ahead, Tamil Nadu is not far behind.

In the specific case of Kochi, however, it is the importance of the maritime defence aspect which needs to be re-considered. The earlier dredging in Kochi is brought under the Indian Navy, the better—after all, the same dredgers and same people onboard have done a wonderful job at Seabird-I, Karwar.

(Veeresh Malik had a long career in the Merchant Navy, which he left in 1983. He has qualifications in ship-broking and chartering, loves to travel, and has been in print and electronic media for over two decades. After starting and selling a couple of companies, is now back to his first love-writing.)