Coronavirus Triggers Need To Use SMART RegTech Tools by Central Banking Supervisors
It becomes evident that in all the past financial crisis situations, central banks (most often the regulators and supervisors) were extremely ill-prepared for the impending crisis. Of course, while their incoherent responses added in a great measure to the uncertainty and panic in the financial system, a major problem was that early warning signals were either not there or, at best, not clearly discernible. Sometimes, these early warning signals were available but ignored and shrouded in conflicts of interest that were at play. This happened, in particular, because of the seamless exchange of people from the financial services industry to the regulatory domain and vice versa, through what is commonly called the revolving door and reverse revolving door phenomenon. 
 
In effect, we had what can be called regulatory and supervisory failure coupled with a serious breakdown in accountability and ethics, right from the grass-roots level to the corporate boardrooms, and regulators and supervisors, who (all) sat and watched as Icarus continued to fly high. In turn, this had an impact not just as disastrous financial consequences, but it also led to a serious erosion of trust in the financial system and all of its constituents, including regulators and supervisors, by the public at large (including customers, depositors, investors, end users and others). 
 
Take the Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services (IL&FS) case that created havoc in 2018, for instance. The concerned central bank is reported to have flagged the issue of negative net worth of the holding company as long as three years ago—yet they themselves did not act for a good solid three years, by which time much of the damage had been done. 
 
Wonder why the central bank did not act on time in the IL&FS case? Given IL&FS’s huge size and enormous outreach, it was the government of India that decided to supersede the IL&FS board and salvage the company. I truly commend the government of India for its action because the concerned financial service regulator was still playing a wait and watch game. 
 
Having set the context, we can safely argue that, as compared to the past financial crisis situation (e.g., the US subprime of 2007-08), today’s institutions are larger and riskier.
 
Therefore, we can no longer afford to have regulatory and supervisory failure. Part of the problem is that with the burgeoning growth of institutions and their portfolios, as well as clients, the information coming to the regulators and supervisors is what I would call information overload. The larger the bulk in compliance reporting, the lesser the chance of spotting exceptions and the greater the chance of mismanagement or fraud, leading to a full-blown financial crisis. 
 
That is exactly the case with IL&FS and may be the concerned central bank could not spot all the undesirable happenings among the maze of information flowing from IL&FS—perhaps it was this that prevented them from acting and maybe there were conflicts of interest too. Imagine, if IL&FS had been allowed to collapse, what would have happened? With consolidated debt in excess of Rs1,064 billion as on 31 March 2018 and almost 25% of this debt being in short-term borrowings, I shudder to think about the number of institutions that would have been affected. 
 
If only the central bank had taken concrete steps when the negative net worth had been spotted three years prior to 2018, the IL&FS situation may not have deteriorated to the extent it did in September 2018, when it and its subsidiaries defaulted to SIDBI on their repayment. With so many powerful people on the board of the IL&FS, it could have been easily possible for IL&FS to reach out to the regulator and stall for more time. But that is a mere supposition and stream of thought that needs to be thoroughly investigated by the government of India. 
 
Coming back to the main point, the maze of information flowing from IL&FS may have overwhelmed the concerned central bank and prevented it from acting.  
 
The larger point here is that, with many more institutions today and a lot of information flowing in, off-site supervision will become an even more difficult task. And the advent of COVID-19 makes central banks less able to use on-site supervision and so, they have to rely almost entirely on off-site supervision. Given this situation, off-site supervision will become a very difficult job. Therefore, what can central banks do? 
 
They can use smart RegTech tools that will help them pick up early warning signals about impending crisis situations in the financial services sector, and information on the key aspects that caused the past financial crisis in the first place—things like whether the compensation policy is rewarding the quick deal (short-term) when the risks are medium or long term, or whether conflicts of interest are causing a financial institution (and other stakeholders) to go rogue, or what the real (hidden) leverage of a financial institution is, after taking into account all aspects such as off balance sheet items, etc. All of these are applicable to the 2018 IL&FS case, the 2018 PNB scam, the 2007-08 US subprime and the 2010 Indian microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh (AP). 
 
And that is where the current applications of RegTech for regulation and supervision fall short—they primarily center around know your customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering (AML) and other such compliances, and this is akin to skimming the market. To realise the full potential of RegTech (especially machine and deep learning), two crucial things will have to happen. 
 
One, central banks, as well as other regulators and supervisors, will have to remove any ambiguity in rules and circulars to their constituents. The discretionary power of the regulator and supervisor will also have to go so that the rules governing the game are crystal clear and not subject to interpretation and the whims and fancies of the regulator and supervisor. 
 
Two, machine and deep learning, on their part, will have to develop the ability to discern causality (as opposed to mere correlation and association) to have greater predictive ability for regulators and supervisors. It is the fusion of deep domain knowledge of the financial sector and strong technical knowledge with regard to machine and deep learning that can lead to practical, usable regulatory and supervisory tools with enhanced predictive ability. 
 
RegTech is in its infancy and requires significant effort, from both regulators and supervisors and information technology (RegTech) firms, before greater strides can be made with regard to the use of machine and deep learning in regulation and supervision (of financial services) and to specifically achieve the objectives set out above—i.e., provide early warning signals of key aspects going wrong and periodic information on exceptions in key factors, both with a view to preempt and prevent a financial crisis. 
 
Let me give you some examples here. 
 
One aspect is the need for smart RegTech tools to isolate the impact of compensation—in financial conglomerates, investment and commercial banks and other financial institutions—in terms of whether they are rewarding the quick deal and short-term gain, without consideration of the long-term consequences. 
 
In my opinion, the tool should be able to decipher from the maze of data available whether the compensation system and incentives encouraged the big bet—right from senior management through middle to lower management levels—that, in turn, would have a ripple effect on the organizational culture in terms of enhancing needless risk taking. Learning from past crisis situations, regulators and supervisors have to be most concerned with this and RegTech would be playing a crucial and proactive role in regulation and supervision if it can help spot these trends early. 
 
The case of the 2007-08 US subprime financial crisis—where compensation systems directly led to the crisis by encouraging short-term performance with unheard of incentives and compensation, when, in reality, the risks were mostly medium- and long-term—is still fresh in our memories. Likewise, the 2018 IL&FS case—where the key management personnel got hefty compensation in 2017-18 when IL&FS had a consolidated debt in excess of Rs1,064 billion (as at March 31, 2018) and loss of Rs18.87 billion during 2017-18—is something that cannot be forgotten. The key management personnel were Ravi Parthasarathy, Hari Sankaran and Arun K Saha in 2017-18. Ravi Parthasarathy received over Rs204 million as total emoluments while Hari Sankaran and Arun K Saha received about Rs77 million and Rs69 million, respectively.
 
Smart tools from RegTech will go a long way in helping to understand compensation trends and patterns as they arise and help regulators and supervisors (read as central banks and banking supervisors) keep in check excessive risk taking by firms that leads to crisis situations. The presence of such a tool will help make regulation and supervision more effective, efficient and timely in terms of action on the ground.
 
Yet another example comes from the FCIC report: “In the years leading up to the crisis, too many financial institutions … borrowed to the hilt, leaving them vulnerable to financial distress or ruin if the value of their investments declined even modestly. For example, as of 2007, the five major investment banks—Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley—were operating with extraordinarily thin capital. By one measure, their leverage ratios were as high as 40 to 1, meaning for every $40 in assets, there was only $1 in capital to cover losses. Less than a 3% drop in asset values could wipe out a firm. To make matters worse, much of their borrowing was short-term, in the overnight market—meaning the borrowing had to be renewed each and every day. For example, at the end of 2007, Bear Stearns had $11.8 billion in equity and $383.6 billion in liabilities and was borrowing as much as $ 70 billion in the overnight market. It was the equivalent of a small business with $50,000 in equity borrowing $1.6 million, with $296,750 of that due each and every day.” 
 
The similarity of the above to the IL&FS case which came almost a decade later (in September 2018) should not be missed. Specifically, in the IL&FS case, it would be an understatement if I said that the concerned central bank in India could not spot the excessive leverage of IL&FS—its debt as on 31 March  2018 of over Rs1064 billion was layered on equity of just Rs 69 billion. If that is not excessive leverage, I wonder what is.
 
And what needs to be noted is that this leverage was well disguised and hidden—in derivatives positions, in off-balance-sheet entities, through window dressing of financial reports, etc. The larger point here is that if regulators and supervisors could have had access to smart RegTech tools that would have alerted them of the IL&FS case much earlier, a lot of damage could have been avoided.  Thus, a smart tool to help unearth the (real) hidden leverage of investment banks and other financial institutions would add great value. This again is a fantastic opportunity to create smart tools for better and more effective regulation and supervision of banks and FIs. 
 
The crucial aspect of conflicts of interest, responsible for the 2007-08 US subprime crisis, is another case in point. Conflicts of interests are a major regulatory concern because where conflicts of interest exist corruption could rear its ugly head (if the conflicts of interest are not well identified in a timely manner, they cannot be managed appropriately). 
 
Here are some examples of conflicts of interest from the FCIC report with regard to the 2007-08 US subprime crisis: a) conflicts of interest among rating agencies in evaluating collateralized debt obligation (CDO) deals; b) underwriters assisting collateralized debt obligation (CDO) managers in selecting collateral; c) hedge fund managers selecting collateral from their funds to place in CDOs that they offered to other investors; d) a conflict faced by a large financial conglomerate in offering ‘liquidity puts’ that gave it huge fees in the short term but placed significant financial risk on it in the long term; and e) the settlement that the securities and exchanges commission (SEC) reached with a large investment bank, in which that firm paid $550 million to settle charges filed by the SEC, and acknowledged that disclosures made in marketing a subprime mortgage product contained incomplete (potentially misleading) information. 
 
A decade later and in a different continent (Asia) and country (India), it is strange that the five-star board of one of the largest shadow banks, IL&FS, approved huge payouts to its top three key management personnel (as noted earlier) in 2017-18—a year in which the consolidated debt of IL&FS rose to a whopping around Rs 1064 billion and the year’s losses touched about Rs 18.87 billion. One cannot understand the logic behind this and I would say that the agencies which are probing this matter should look for potential conflicts of interest across stakeholders. Again, the larger point I am making here is that the availability of a smart RegTech tool could have helped isolate these aspects as and when they occurred and helped the concerned central bank take action.    
 
In other words, this is where RegTech could provide a smart tool to help regulators and supervisors sift through all compliance and other data and themselves construct an ‘index’ of conflicts of interest—for financial conglomerates and institutions—which could serve as the basis for an effective conflicts risk governance framework. This, too, represents a chance to get analytical tools for better regulation and supervision.
 
To summarize, since COVID-19 will drastically reduce the incidence of on-site supervision of banks and FIs in the days and months to come, conversely, it should enhance greater reliance of central banks on off-site supervision. With larger-sized institutions and a whole lot of information coming in, it may be eventually very difficult for the central banking supervisors to make meaningful analysis of the data.  
 
This is where COVID-19 presents an opportunity for the creation and use of smart RegTech tools on lots of aspects, and regulators and supervisors could benefit from such smart tools for understanding issues that caused the 2007-08 US subprime financial crisis, or the 2010 Indian microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh or the 2018 financial sector crisis in India—be it the IL&FS situation or the case of fraudulent and fake letters of undertaking issued by the Punjab National Bank. 
 
In short, RegTech could provide smart tools for understanding all the issues that caused past financial crisis situations, and there are huge untapped opportunities for information technology (RegTech) firms with the resources, willingness and ability to create path-breaking applications. Thus, RegTech could help develop a large number of useful applications for central banks and other financial sector regulators and supervisors worldwide.
 
Before I sign off, I would like to quote Cassius from Julius Caesar: “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.” 
 
Just as this above quote states, all of the financial crisis situations we have encountered—whether the US subprime (2007-08) or the Indian microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh in 2010 or the Indian financial sector crisis in 2018 (e.g., the IL&FS crisis or the PNB LoU scam)—were not caused by computer models or algorithms or earthquakes or tsunamis. They were created by human action and inaction. All these crisis situations had early warning signals that the captains of the ship (i.e., the public stewards of the financial system) failed to read and act upon. Theirs was not a mere stumble but rather a huge missed step. 
 
Part of the problem is that the massive burgeoning growth (be it in toxic mortgages or daily/short-term borrowings secured by these mortgages, or in microfinance loans or other activity as in the case of IL&FS) left the already thin regulatory architecture stranded, as they were perhaps dealing with larger volumes of increasingly complex sets of data than before. And the situation gets compounded today because of COVID-19 which has placed great constraints on the on-site supervision of banks and FIs by central banking supervisors, who will have to almost exclusively rely on off-site supervision.  
 
Under such trying circumstances and especially, given the huge financial sector stress that COVID-19 is likely to cause, RegTech, if structured to ask the right questions and bring out the right insights, could be greatly beneficial for regulators and supervisors who are already overwhelmed by such data.
 
Without a doubt, the time is ripe now for RegTech to take the lead in facilitating better regulation and supervision of traditional and new age financial institutions worldwide. Otherwise, these financial institutions, which are perhaps at least ten times larger and ten times riskier than those present in 2007/8, could cause newer crisis situations, which in turn could set back the economies of individual countries and the world back by at least a decade. And of course, if RegTech is to facilitate effective regulation and supervision in real time, the regulatory and supervisory framework must be made accountable and free of conflicts of interest—aspects related to this are discussed in a subsequent article. 
 
(Ramesh S Arunachalam is author of 12 critically acclaimed books. His latest release in January 2020 is titled, “Powering India to Double Digit Growth: Five Key Steps To A Robust Economy”. Apart from being an author, Ramesh provides strategic advice on a wide variety of financial sector/economic development issues. He has worked on over 311 assignments with multi-laterals, governments, private sector, banks, NBFCs, regulators, supervisors, MFIs and other stakeholders in 31 countries globally in five continents and 640 districts of India during the last 31 years.)
 
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    COMMENTS

    Meenal Mamdani

    6 months ago

    Very true what you say.
    But I assume that this new regulatory technology will be quite expensive. Plus it will need knowledgeable humans to use it appropriately.
    I hope RBI and SEBI invest in this and start using it quickly.
    Another point is that it is surprising that SEBI was so unconcerned despite getting repeated questions from watchdog groups like MLFoundation.
    We know the names of the 3 top culprits at ILFS.
    Who are the persons at SEBI who repeatedly ignored these warnings? Let us have their names and see if they have been part of this revolving door army and therefore deliberately ignoring the warnings not just with this company but other companies too.

    REPLY

    rakeshpushkar

    In Reply to Meenal Mamdani 6 months ago

    Basically a long article is written on use of regtech for finding out leverage and conflict of interest. These info are already available witrh regulators.
    Wasted my time.

    rameshsa2009

    In Reply to rakeshpushkar 6 months ago

    This info, if it has been available as you say after 2008, then, why did not the regulators act and prevent crisis situations subsequently. They may be aware of some of these issues but they either have no clue on how to tackle these or have an inherent conflict of interest. I can provide many instances where the RBI/DNBC and other regulators/supervisors had valuable information on such issues but did not act at all. This is true of the 2008 global sub-prime, 2010 AP microfinance crisis, 2018 IL&FS case, 2020 Yes bank case and so on. And when I asked the RBI/DNBC staff (off the record), they said they get too much information and there is information overload . FYI sir and thanks for your kind comments

    rameshsa2009

    In Reply to Meenal Mamdani 6 months ago

    It is both RBI and SEBI. In RBI, it would be the Board of Financial Supervision (BFS, the highest body for financial supervision in India) and its different members, all of whom would be members of the RBI board. Maybe new members or those with with 1/2 months tenure can be exempted. We need to look at least 12/13 years and the period would be 2005 - September 2018. Likewise, the DNBS (Department of Non-banking supervision) and associated staff are also responsible. The RBI board would also be responsible as would the Governor and concerned DG, Concerned ED, CGMs etc

    May be Moneylife would know the names for RBI and SEBI.

    RegTech tools will be somewhat expensive but are really, really necessary. In today's environment, I think the Central Banks and IT companies can strike a pareto optimal deal. The key is to find a SAFE technology company without conflicts of interest because many of them are managing core banking systems and ERP's for NBFCs or investment banks and also third party service suppliers on other counts as well. Some technology company CEO's or group CEO's are also on central bank boards. That creates conflicts of interest too. Of course, staff need to be well trained in usage of these tools and they must be involved in the creation of tool itself by the IT company along with domain experts who have knowledge of spotting exceptions in finance and also technology. Thank You for your comments.

    narayansa

    In Reply to rameshsa2009 6 months ago

    Are there other countries which are using smart Regtech in the financial sector?

    rameshsa2009

    In Reply to narayansa 6 months ago

    This is still at its infancy but there is a lot of work in progress in USA, UK, South Africa and few other countries. Central banks are looking for the right technology partners

    rameshsa2009

    In Reply to rameshsa2009 6 months ago

    That is why this a great future business opportunity

    Extension Needed for FPI Investment, Compliance on Sectoral Cap and Shareholders’ Approval
    As per the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as NDI Rules) notified on 17 October 2019 by the ministry of finance (MoF) in supersession of the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Securities by Persons Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2017 (‘TISPRO’); with effect from 1 April 2020, the aggregate limit of investments by SEBI-registered Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI) is permissible up to the sectoral cap.
     
    The NDI Rules provided an opportunity to the Indian company to reduce the investment limit to a lower threshold, with the approval of the board of directors and shareholders by way of a special resolution passed before 31 March 2020.
     
    Considering the minimal time of five months provided to Indian companies coupled with the current situation of the pandemic that started impacting the economy from March 2020, it was difficult for companies to convene meetings for approval of lower investment limits.  The fate of earlier approved investment limits is also unclear. In such a situation, there is an urgent need for the ministry to consider granting a suitable extension to enable companies to comply with the requirement.
     
    Sectoral Caps for Foreign Investment
     
    The term ‘sectoral cap’ refers to the maximum amount of investment by way of investment on repatriation basis by residents outside India in capital instruments and/or investment in the capital of a limited liability partnership (LLP). The sectoral caps and other conditionalities are decided by the ministry of commerce and industry. 
     
    Automatic route means that there is no requirement to obtain approval. Government route requires approval of the respective ministry by making an application on foreign investment facilitation portal. Sectors not specified in Schedule I of NDI Rules are under 100% automatic route. A few examples are provided hereunder:
     
    Sectors under Automatic Route
     
    1. Agriculture and animal husbandry (100%)
    2. Plantation (100%)
    3. Mining of coal and lignite (100%)
    4. Manufacturing (100%)
    5. Broadcasting carriage services (100%)
     
    Sectors Entirely under Government Route
     
    1. Mining and mineral separation of titanium bearing minerals and ores (100%),
     
    2. Terrestrial broadcasting FM (49%),
     
    3. Uplinking of news & current affairs TV channels (49%),
     
    4. Uploading/ streaming of news and current affairs through digital media (26%),
     
    5. Publication of newspaper, periodicals, Indian editions of foreign magazines dealing with news and current affairs (26%).
     
    Sectors Partly under Automatic and Balance under Government Route:
    1. Defence (automatic up to 49%; government route beyond 49%),
     
    2. Air transport services [automatic up to 49% government route beyond 49% (automatic up to 100% for NRI’s and OCI’s)].
     
    Effective Date of Revised Limit
     
    The revised aggregate limits for FPI are applicable from 1 April 2020. Several companies in the past had passed resolutions to increase the aggregate limit for FPI beyond 24% by passing board resolutions and special resolutions of the members, however, all such companies did not increase the limit till the sectoral cap. 
     
    The companies were given time of less than six months to convene a general meeting and pass a resolution to reduce the limit of investment by FPI in aggregate, failing which the limit would automatically be restored at the sectoral cap. The resolutions passed earlier seem to be ineffective from 1 April 2020. 
     
    Companies that Approved Investment Limit
     
    As per the list available on the RBI website, some companies like Power Grid Corporation of India, Dabur India, Titan Company, Havells India, HDFC Bank, and Ultratech Cement had approved investment limits which were over and above the permissible aggregate investment limit of 24% of paid up equity capital or paid up value of the series by way of shareholders’ approval up to, say, 30%, 35%, 40%, 49%, 60% or 74%, but below the sectoral cap.
    Some examples are as follows:
     
    1. Power Grid had approved an FPI limit up to 30% of its paid-up capital on 19 December 2018, however, after 1 April 2020 the limit has been automatically changed to 100% (i.e. as per the sectoral cap);
     
    2. Lemon Tree Hotels had approved an FPI limit up to 49% of its paid-up capital on 24 July 2017, however, after 1 April 2020 the limit has been automatically changed to 100% (i.e. as per sectoral cap);
     
    3. HDFC Life Insurance Company had approved an FPI limit up to 49% of its paid-up capital on 25 June 2019. After 1 April 2020 the limit remains the same, as the sectoral cap is limited to 49%;
     
    4. Future Lifestyles Fashions had approved an FPI limit up to 49% of its paid-up capital on 14 June 2018; however, after 1 April 2020 the limit has been automatically changed to 100% (i.e., as per the sectoral cap)
     
    In this regard, there are some companies like Health Care Global Enterprises, Prataap Snacks, and Crompton Greaves Consumer Electricals, which had approved investment limits up to the sectoral caps i.e. 100%.
     
    Role of Depositories
     
    As per the Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 (FEMA), the onus of compliance with the various foreign investment limits rests on the Indian company. However, these investments are regulated by the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and RBI as per the FEMA. This power of regulation has further been delegated by SEBI, after consultation with RBI, to the depositories on 5 April 2018. Hence, the depositories are responsible to regularly monitor foreign investment in listed Indian companies.
     
    The depositories regulate Indian companies by updating information under two heads mainly—caution list and breach list. The breach list provides data of companies which have reached the permissible sectoral limit, whereas, the caution list or red flag list provides data of companies which are within or less than 3% of the sectoral cap or aggregate FPI limits. The circular also obligates Indian companies to report changes i.e. increase/decrease of aggregate FPI/NRI limits or sectoral caps or any change in the sector of the company along with relevant documentation of the board and the shareholders’ resolution approving such change and company secretary’s certificate ensuring compliance of FEMA, 1999. This circular was made effective from 1 June, 2018. 
     
    In order to comply with the provisions of the NDI Rules that became effective from 1 April  2020, the depositories are enquiring information from respective companies as to whether any resolution for reducing the limit below the sectoral cap has been passed before 31 March  2020. If yes, then the limit approved by shareholders is taken on record for updating the information. However, if no such resolution is passed, the depositories are updating the foreign investment limits of companies as per their existing sectoral cap as on 1 April 2020.
     
    Need for Extension
     
    As mentioned earlier, the NDI Rules also provided an opportunity to Indian companies to reduce the limit below the sectoral cap before 31 March, 2020.  Given the situation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was impossible for the companies to convene meetings for this. Most of the companies had already conducted their AGMs. Hence, observing the current scenario practically, the Indian companies were required to either accept restoration of limits up to the sectoral caps which can be as high as 100% of the paid-up capital of the company or obtain approval by way of special resolution by the shareholders by specifically calling an EGM/postal ballot. In this regard, we also observe that the companies that had approved lower limits of investment for FPIs shall stand ineffective.
     
    The ministry of finance should consider amending NDI Rules to grant a suitable extension in order to enable companies to take up the resolution in the ensuing AGMs. 
     
    (CS Vinita Nair is partner at Vinod Kothari & Co, while Smriti Wadehra works as assistant manager in the corporate law division of the firm.)
     
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    SEBI to Cut by 50% Broker Turnover Fees and Filing Fees for Issuers from June
    In its continuing efforts to help market participants to tide over challenges due to corona virus (COVID19), market regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has decided to reduce broker turnover fees and filing fees on offer documents for public issue, rights issue and buyback of shares.
     
    "The broker turnover fee will be reduced to 50% of the existing fee structure for the period June 2020 to March 2021. The benefit of the above reduction in fees will automatically be passed on to the investors as well." the market regulator says in a statement.
     
    SEBI says, "Filing fees on offer documents for public issue, rights issue and buyback of shares will be reduced to 50% of the existing fee structure. This will be effective for documents filed from 1st June to 31 December 2020."
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