Aadhaar: Govt Tries To Push Commercial Use of the UID through Amendment Despite Ban by SC
The Central government's doublespeak on Aadhaar, the 12-digit unique biometrics-linked identification number, continues. Despite the five-judge constitutional bench of Supreme Court barring the use of Aadhaar for commercial purposes, the government is amending several laws like the Aadhaar Act, Indian Telegraph Act and Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) to bring back the validity of mandating or using Aadhaar for various purposes. On Wednesday, Ravi Shankar Prasad, minister of law and justice, introduced Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act 2018, in the Lok Sabha.   
 
After passing the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits, and Services) Act as a Money Bill, by claiming that Aadhaar enables welfare, the government enabled rampant commercial use of citizens' data. Now, when the Supreme Court has reined in Aadhaar by striking down Section 57 of the 2016 Act, which permitted the use of Aadhaar by private entities, the government is amending laws to again allow private, commercial use of citizens' Aadhaar-related data, says Rethink Aadhaar in a statement.
 
The government has introduced in the Lok Sabha the Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2018. There are serious concerns with this Bill as it violates Supreme Court orders as well as citizens' fundamental rights:
 
1. The Bill Is in Contravention of SC judgement - The Supreme Court, in its judgement dated 26 September 2018 in Justice KS Puttaswamy vs Union of India (the Aadhaar judgment) in WP Civil No. 494 of 2012 explicitly prohibited use of Aadhaar by private parties by declaring Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, as unconstitutional. This section provided grounds for Aadhaar-based authentication by private entities as well. The present Bill proposes amendments to the Aadhaar Act, Telegraph Act and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, which will circumvent the SC judgment, and allow the continued use of Aadhaar-based e-KYC authentication by private entities for mobile and banking services, respectively. 
 
1. The Bill may allow private entities to continue to hold Aadhaar data in disregard of SC judgment- After the SC judgment, private entities are no longer allowed to maintain any Aadhaar-related data records whatsoever. While the petitioners have been trying to push for compliance on this, the government's latest move may encourage the continued collection of citizens' data through use of Aadhaar-based authentication violating the protections laid down by the Supreme Court.
 
1. Privacy and security concerns in Aadhaar remain unaddressed - When private entities were allowed use of Aadhaar-based e-KYC, there were several reports of fraudulent transactions and scamming of citizens' personal data as well as their money. There is no indication that either the finance ministry or the UIDAI has attempted to address these security lapses in the Aadhaar ecosystem. Allowing and encouraging use of Aadhaar-based authentication by private entities will result in further scams and theft.
 
1. Bill lacks any stakeholder consultation - The Government has not undertaken a public consultation on the proposed amendments to the various laws. Any Bill on the issue of Aadhaar should not be merely rubber-stamped by Parliament; any proposed amendment must be fairly and thoroughly studied by the appropriate Parliamentary Standing Committee as well.
 
1. Government can try to bypass Rajya Sabha again - The Rajya Sabha, in March 2016, had voted to curtail private sector Aadhaar usage when it debated the original Aadhaar Act. However, the government over-rode Upper House's farsighted warnings through the Money Bill route. In the SC judgement, Justice DY Chandrachud termed this a "fraud on the Constitution." The government may once again take the Money Bill route to bulldoze these amendments through Parliament despite the fact that the proposed amendments do not confirm to constitutional requirements of a Money Bill. 
 
With these concerns, Rethink Aadhaar, and other citizens and agencies concerned with the rampant expansion and function creep of Aadhaar, have placed following demands before Members of Parliament.
 
  1. Oppose the introduction of the Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2018, in Lok Sabha by MPs across political parties.
  2. Undertake a thorough and transparent public consultation on the Bill and the amendments and introduce any Aadhaar-related legislation in Parliament only after such a consultation
  3.  If the Bill is still introduced, then it immediately be sent to the appropriate Parliamentary Standing Committee for legislative scrutiny and review.
  4. Stop constitutional fraud undermining the Rajya Sabha of allowing this overbroad Amendment Bill to be certified as a Money Bill.
  5. Introduction of a strong, people-centric Personal Data Protection Bill, after adequate public consultation instead as the top priority of the Union Government. Thus far, a Privacy and Data Protection Bill has not even been presented in Parliament, whereas the Supreme Court had accepted assurances from the government that the concerns raised in the Aadhaar matters vis-a-vis data security and informational privacy would be adequately addressed by a soon-to-be-passed data protection law. 
 
“We hope that our elected representatives will bear due vigilance and not allow our fundamental rights to be encroached by such ill thought-out legislation. We urge members of the press to join us in ensuring that the government takes a democratic route for all Aadhaar-related legislation, i.e. undertaking a thorough public consultation and review by a Parliamentary Standing Committee,” the statement says.
Like this story? Get our top stories by email.

User

COMMENTS

Deepak Narain

2 weeks ago

Only the government is right. All others are fools. And they wish to be reelected.

SuchindranathAiyerS

2 weeks ago

The BJP will be in the opposition in the 2019 Loka Sabha for several reasons* , but, will the Mahagathbandhan repeal these acts? I doubt it, After all, almost all the BJP's policies have been UPA (Congress) policies

A few key points that make Modi Sarkar out to be a Congress Sarkar (which was rejected in 2014) in disguise include:

(1) Profligate Pay and Perks Hikes to Netas, Babus, Cops and Milards;

(2) Attempts to financially crush the lower middle class by lowering interest rates, attempting to tax EPF etc. while fanning the flames of inflation through economic mismanagement, profligacy and corruption;

(3) Atrocities Act to circumvent a rare Supreme Court judgement that actually upholds the near extinct notion of “equity” in India,

(4) Championing corruption by criminalizing the victims of extortion while granting immunity to Govt extortionists, retrospective (i.e. Pranab Mukerjee type) law exempting political parties from Foreign Currency Regulation Act; exempting lawyers from GST to facilitate bribery of Judges, election bonds to formalize/legalize political corruption;

(5) Pampering and appeasing Moslems, Dalits etc,

(6) Criticising Gau Rakshaks and otherwise persecuting the much persecuted and maligned “Hindoos”,

(7) Banks under the Mahdi-Jet Lee Sarkar extorted 50, 000 Crores from you and me in unjustifiable charges such as minimum balance etc.:

(8) The absurd, stupid and vicious way in which Demonetization, GST, Aadhar and other Tax matters have been handled.

(9) Doing nothing at all about any of its election promises but, instead, pursuing all the policies of the rejected opposition. For example, the very first law made by the BJP was the Congress Bill to send Neta-Babus abroad with family and friends for medical treatment at my expense, while ordinary, Non Governmental Indians are denied proper medical services and even proper Doctors who are, nowadays, all created, not by merit or competence, but by caste and bribes!

In 2014, in very many constituencies, the BJP won thanks to marginal vote swings created by a coagulation of Savarna sentiment and the lower middle classes (Internationally,"Poor"). This then is the constituency that has requited the BJP's betrayal, along with all those others who hoped for change in 2014.

Aadhaar Judgement: Petitioners Send Legal Notices to DoT, TRAI, RBI & UIDAI for Non-compliance with the Supreme Court Order
Petitioners, irked by the non-compliance of the Supreme Court order on Aadhaar, have sent legal notices to department of telecommunications (DoT), the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), the ministry of communications, Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
 
In their representations, Dr Kalyani Menon Sen and Nachiket Udupa have asked DoT, TRAI, ministry of communications, and UIDAI to take immediate action to suspend Aadhaar-based mobile subscriber verification and also delete all subscriber information obtained through Aadhaar-based e-know-your-customer (eKYC). They have also asked that the agencies direct the various telecom service providers to provide subscribers a full account of the data collected. Further, the petitioners demanded that adequate compensation be paid to subscribers for unlawful collection of data.
 
Dr Sen, in a separate notice to RBI, has demanded that RBI direct banks to cease Aadhaar-based e-KYC for bank accounts, shut down all Aadhaar-enabled payment systems (AePS), and halt the seeding of Aadhaar numbers against bank accounts or any other databases. In addition, the letter demands that any Aadhaar details, including the Aadhaar number, and demographic details collected from citizens be deleted in a timely manner that is duly communicated to the public. 
 
It has been over three months since the Supreme Court gave its judgement on Aadhaar. The judgment struck down Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act as unconstitutional. This Section allowed banks, mobile service providers and other private entities to use Aadhaar-based authentication.
 
Here is what the Supreme Court has stated about use of Aadhaar by private entities, in its 26th September judgement on Aadhaar…
 
Page 560-561:
 
“(h) Insofar as Section 57 in the present form is concerned, it is susceptible to misuse inasmuch as:
 
a) It can be used for establishing the identity of an individual ‘for any purpose’. We read down this provision to mean that such a purpose has to be backed by law. Further, whenever any such “law” is made, it would be subject to judicial scrutiny. 
 
b) Such purpose is not limited pursuant to any law alone but can be done pursuant to ‘any contract to this effect’ as well. This is clearly impermissible as a contractual provision is not backed by a law and, therefore, first requirement of proportionality test is not met. 
 
c) Apart from authorising the State, even ‘any body corporate or person’ is authorised to avail authentication services, which can be on the basis of purported agreement between an individual and such body corporate or person.
 
Even if we presume that legislature did not intend so, the impact of the aforesaid features would be to enable commercial exploitation of an individual biometric and demographic information by the private entities. 
 
Thus, this part of the provision, which enables body corporate and individuals also to seek authentication, that too on the basis of a contract between the individual and such body corporate or person, would impinge upon the right to privacy of such individuals. This part of the section, thus, is declared unconstitutional.” 
 
Since the judgment, any use of Aadhaar for mobile, bank accounts, or by private entities has become automatically illegal. 
 
While citizens are waiting for full compliance with the Supreme Court's judgment in the Aadhaar matters, two of the petitioners have sent letters to the appropriate authorities demanding immediate compliance. 
 
You may also want to read…
 
 
 
Like this story? Get our top stories by email.

User

COMMENTS

Bits Singh

2 weeks ago

Banks still are demanding aadhar card, private companies asking aadhar from customers or employees. Its really sad that the judgement has no effect om them. Unless and until punitive action is taken against them they may continue to break the judgement.

Arvind BaagDe

2 weeks ago

When s c. Can't lement it's orders either the defaulters should hanged or the honourable judges who passed orders should resigned.

Sri Ram

2 weeks ago

Private financial institutions win again, kudos to master, visa and their concerted campaign to derail and defang AADHAR. We need a people's referendum and NDA consensus to overturn SC on their shortsighted approach..

kashyap joshipura

2 weeks ago

UIDAI should discontinue its advertisements in various relates to Aadhar enrolments centre and the process of changing details in Aadhar. It should not use public money for its own publicity. .Aadhar Agencies should be directed to vacate the space, given by various Banks and other offices in their premises. UIDAI should also disclose quarterly expenditure incurred for Aadhar related publicity.

Benami Voters and Laundering Elections with Aadhaar
The use of Aadhaar by governments fits the classical definition of electoral malpractice as it constitutes manipulation of electoral processes and outcomes so as to substitute personal or partisan benefit for the public interest. Such malpractice threatens the integrity of an election as it is extensive, systematic and decisive.
 
Electoral Malpractice
Sarah Birch, author of Electoral Malpractice, defines electoral malpractice as the manipulation of electoral processes and outcomes so as to substitute personal or partisan benefit for the public interest.
 
Does the Aadhaar linkage to the voter ID or the use of Aadhaar to deliver subsidy, benefits and services constitute electoral malpractice?
 
The then chief election commissioner, OP Rawat, does not appear to have asked this question when he declared in March 2018 that 32 crore Aadhaar numbers had been already linked to voter ID cards
 
The government has been insisting that Aadhaar is necessary to target subsidies, benefits, and services and do direct benefit transfers to beneficiaries since the creation of Aadhaar in 2009. 
 
The web portals of the chief electoral officer of various states have been providing voters the ablity to link Aadhaar to Voter IDs. The Election Commission has also been linking Aadhaar numbers to voters ID in different states through a process of seeding Aadhaar numbers from other databases. At least, till November 2017, Aadhaar could be linked to voters' ID cards.
 
(Figure 1 Linking of Aadhaar number with Voter ID)
 
Benami Voters and Voter Exclusion
Electoral rolls are revised under Rule 25 or corrected under Rule 26 of the Registration of Electors Rules,1960.  The process allows for filing of claims for inclusion and objections to the inclusion of anyone under Rule 13. 
 
It also allows for the inclusion of persons inadvertently omitted (Rule 21) and deletion of persons who have died, or are not residents in the constituency, or not entitled to be registered (Rule 21A). This process is meant to ensure each person on the rolls is a real person and a genuine voter.
 
What are the consequences of the use of Aadhaar for revision or correction of the rolls under Rule 25 or 26?
 
Section 4(3) of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 declares “An Aadhaar number, in physical or electronic form subject to authentication and other conditions, as may be specified by regulations, may be accepted as proof of identity of the Aadhaar number holder for any purpose” [emphasis mine]. 
 
It is evident that the Aadhaar may not be used as a proof of address, age, gender or relationship. It is also evident that there is no authority with which Aadhaar comes a proof of identity either. Section 9 of the Aadhaar Act declares “The Aadhaar number or the authentication thereof shall not, by itself, confer any right of, or be proof of, citizenship or domicile in respect of an Aadhaar number holder.” However, the Aadhaar is currently used as a proof of age during enrolment as a voter.
 
(Figure 2 form 6 uses Aadhaar as a Proof of Age)
 
With a view to preventing impersonation of electors and facilitating their identification at the time of poll, Rule 28(2) of the Registration of Electors Rules, requires the Election Commission to issue to every elector an ID card that is certified by the registration officer.
 
Unlike the Voter ID, that is certified by the registration officer in accordance with Rule 28(3)(d), the Aadhaar 'card' or the biometric or demographic data associated with any Aadhaar number is not certified by the UIDAI. Unlike the process of revising the electoral rolls, there is no process of revising Aadhaar database. In fact, there is no process for objecting to assigning an Aadhaar number to any combination of biometric or demographic data in the Aadhaar database. In the absence of such a process to clean the database, no verification or audit of the Aadhaar database has happened either.
 
Linking a biometric with each Aadhaar number has created impression that there has to be a unique entry of each enrolment. This is clearly not the case as the UIDAI does not have any information about the number of unique biometrics in its database. The UIDAI also indicates that it cannot retrieve a unique record with a biometric. This means that the UIDAI cannot guarantee that it has no duplicates or ghosts.
 
(Figure 3 RTI response from UIDAI indicates that Aadhaar is not unique, not certified and there is no information about the primary documents used to issue it)
 
Almost all Aadhaar numbers are supposed to have been issued on the basis of other primary documents of proof of identity and proof of address. The UIDAI however has no information about the primary ID used, making it impossible to allow the verification of the uniqueness and validity Aadhaar number by anyone who uses it.
 
Furthermore according to the Affidavit dated 30.10.2017 of UIDAI to the Supreme Court, at most 60 crore persons could have been issued an Aadhaar assuming everyone used the EPIC as one of their primary identification document. No other combination of primary identification documents allows to generate even as many Aadhaar. At least 58.64 crore Aadhaar of the 118 crore numbers issued by the UIDAI are, therefore, duplicates and ghosts. 
 
Furthermore according to the CEO of UIDAI, 48% of the Aadhaar numbers have never participated in iris or finger matching. It is evident that Aadhaar is the worlds largest database of ghosts and duplicates. The use of these ghosts and duplicates gives rise to benami or fake identities and transactions. 
 
With the dilution of KYC by the Reserve Bank of India in January 2011, it became possible to use Aadhaar as the sole basis for creating a bank account. 
 
Aadhaar has also been widely used as the means to issue other primary IDs like passports, PAN cards, instant PAN and driving licenses
 
This means that the continued use of Aadhaar can easily generate documents that serve as proof of address for Form 6 to apply for inclusion in Electoral Roll or for shifting from one constituency to another.
 
The use of Aadhaar as a proof of identity, proof of address or proof of age anywhere by the government, allows to compromise the enrolment of voters into the Electoral Rolls. It allows the inclusion of benami voters in a manner that is difficult if not impossible to weed out. 
 
The mandatory creep of voluntary Aadhaar has caused the exclusion of millions from accessing their rights. In particular millions have been deprived from birth certificates, school and college admissions, giving examinations, qualifying for interviews, getting jobs, receiving salaries, accessing healthcare, getting PAN cards, ration cards, water bills, electricity bills, gas connections, driving licenses, claiming pensions, and even a dignified burial and death certificates. This means people are even being denied not only the goods and services but also the primary identification documents that they otherwise could have, as well as their ability to enrol as a voter.
 
(Figure 5: Documents used as proof of address are easily generated using Aadhaar)
 
Those whose Aadhaar fails on authentication due to biometric change, technology failure or any other reason too are excluded wherever authentication will be used as required under section 8 of the Aadhaar Act. Even more serious is UIDAIs ability to deactivate Aadhaar numbers under section 23(g) of the Aadhaar Act. Deactivated Aadhaar numbers will allow automatic deletion of voters from beneficiary databases including Electoral Rolls.
 
The use of Aadhaar to discover and delete duplicate or ghost entries has also allowed the exclusion of legitimate voters by treating those without an Aadhaar or those whose Aadhaar information does not match as ghosts or duplicates. In Telangana alone, 2.2 million people were reportedly dropped from the voters rolls, after Aadhaar based “verification” was done in 2015.
 
The use of Aadhaar to onboard, modify or purify electoral rolls is both illegal, causes the inclusion benami voters and excludes millions of legitimate voters. Furthermore its use also cannot be harmonised with the requirements of the Registration of Electors Rules or rule 35 and 49 of The Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961.
 
Targeted delivery as electoral malpractice
In 2018, there was outrage across the world as Cambridge Analytica, a private company providing services to political clients, helped influence votes by targeting messages to voters based on their psychometric profiles. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg was grilled by the US Congress for enabling such psychometric profiling through the Facebook ecosystem.
 
Targeted delivery of subsidies, benefits and services is worse than targeted messaging to win elections. It is control of the electorate to ensure votes.
 
Part of the cost of providing a good or service to a beneficiary that is paid by the government is a subsidy. For 7 decades the government has delivered subsidies, benefits and services by providing beneficiaries access to subsidised food grains, cooking fuels, medicines, health services, education, seeds, fertilizer and other benefits and services. This has been accomplished by each ministry or department through its own empowering legislation that defines the beneficiaries of its subsidies and the delivery mechanisms. This is done without prejudice to the constituency or political vote of the beneficiary. 
 
In fact traditional mechanisms of delivering subsidies, benefits or services provide no means to target a voter or a constituency. This traditional process cannot target only those who vote for the ruling party and exclude those who do not vote for the ruling party. Neither can the traditional process create the illusion of delivery of subsidised goods or services as the subsidised physical good or service is made available to beneficiaries. It cannot manipulate a beneficiary list as each ministry or department’s delivery process is subject to physical verification and audits.
 
Targeted delivery, using Aadhaar, allows the inclusion or exclusion from benefits of persons from within a constituency. Linked to voter ID, it allows the inclusion or exclusion of voters. For inclusion of persons, into beneficiary lists, their Aadhaar is seeded to beneficiary lists. Such included Aadhaar numbers are not subjected to certification, verification, or audit of their real identity, qualification as beneficiary or even their receipt of the benefit. Neither the department, ministry, nor the UIDAI take any responsibility of the delivery to the rightful beneficiary anymore.
 
For exclusion of persons, from beneficiary lists, their Aadhaar is de-seeded, seeded to benami Aadhaar numbers, deactivated or its authentication is caused to fail. The UIDAI takes no responsibility to the delivery and, in fact, it is an ecosystem of private players who can decide the inclusion and exclusion of benefits.
 
(Figure 6 RTI response of the UIDAI indicating it has no role to ensure delivery of subsidies)
 
Figure 7 Department of Revenue regularising opening of bank accounts with eKYC\
 
Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT) replaces the physical delivery of benefits by money transfers, of part of the cost of providing a good or service, to a bank account assumed to be that of a beneficiary. This means there is no longer any physical verification or audit of the subsidies. Prior to dilution of KYC by the Reserve Bank these bank accounts could not be opened by Aadhaar ghosts and duplicates. After the Department of Revenue regularised eKYC as a valid process for opening bank accounts it became possible to regularise bank accounts opened merely by using Aadhaar numbers without any physical presence of the account holders.
 
Bankers across the country have disclosed, on condition of anonymity, that they have been subject to coercion by local political forces to open thousands of bank accounts in their branches solely with Aadhaar. The Jandhan accounts is one such category of bank accounts that are not verified to belong to real persons or as within the control of a beneficiary that they claim to bank. The beneficiaries receiving DBT to these bank accounts become virtual. The bank account becomes a surrogate for the beneficiary. 
 
In February 2012, the Nandan Nilekani led Task Force on an Aadhaar-Enabled Unified Payment Infrastructure pushed for money transfers to Aadhaar numbers instead of bank accounts. This replaced the process of government payments to bank accounts of beneficiaries electronically through the Reserve Bank of India’s national electronic funds transfer (NEFT) with payments to Aadhaar numbers using Aadhaar Enable Payment Systems (AEPS) created and run by a non-government private organisation the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI). According to Nilekani, who has been advising the NPCI, in violation of section 16 of the Aadhaar Act, over Rs95,000 crore were transferred (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/theres-an-orchestrated-campaign-to-malign-aadhaar-nandan-nilekani/articleshow/62453569.cms) to beneficiaries in 2017-18 using AEPS. 
 
The transfer of DBT using AEPS creates a virtual and benami beneficiaries who become untraceable. For example, in April 2017, more than 40,000 DBT transfers to persons who were not beneficiaries of part of drought relief for farmers in Karnataka took place. Similar transfers have been reported across the country. Similarly Aadhaar eKYC and Aadhaar payments allowed Rs168 crore LPG subsidy to be siphoned into 37 lakh bank accounts in Airtel Payments Bank. This enables subtle yet very large scale money laundering for election funding across the country.
 
This use of Aadhaar clearly constitutes corrupt practice under section 123(1), 123(2), 123(3), 123(6), 123(7) and 123(8) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
 
Laundering elections
The biometric and demographic data associated with Aadhaar numbers are not certified by the UIDAI as belonging to the person who is being authenticated. It has been shown repeatedly that both the biometric and demographic data associated with the Aadhaar number can be changed by both legitimate and illegitimate processes outside the control of the UIDAI or anyone relying on using them. 
 
Neither the UIDAI, nor anyone relying on Aadhaar, have any way of guaranteeing consistent, legal valid, risk free outcomes with Aadhaar. Aadhaar is a Trojan horse that allows private interests to take control the outcome of elections. 
 
It is evident that creating benami voters, excluding real ones, targeting subsidies to select voters, excluding select voters from subsidies, benefits and services, and laundering funds from the Consolidated Fund of India into benami bank accounts using untraceable money transfers are subtle and undetectable means for private interests to seek to alter the voluntary choices made by voters at the polls than to risk electoral fraud. The use of Aadhaar as a proof of identity by anyone citing section 4(3) of the Aadhaar Act is, therefore, sufficient to launder elections.
 
The use of Aadhaar by government fits the classical definition of electoral malpractice as it constitutes manipulation of electoral processes and outcomes so as to substitute personal or partisan benefit for the public interest. Such malpractice threatens the integrity of an election as it is extensive, systematic, and decisive.
 
The Election Commission of India is charged with unprecedented circumstances to exercise its powers in order to dismantle the extensive and systematic way in which the electoral mandate and the sovereignty of the people is being destroyed.
 
NOTE: This article summarises a presentation made by Dr Saraph to the Central Election Commission on 19 December 2018 on behalf Of Moneylife Foundation.
 
(Dr Anupam Saraph is a renowned expert in governance of complex systems and advises governments and businesses across the world. He can be reached @anupamsaraph.)
 
Like this story? Get our top stories by email.

User

COMMENTS

ch prakash

2 weeks ago

All criticism is OK. Please suggest alternate system which helps in creating genuine voters list containing legitimate voters which is essential for a decent democracy.

REPLY

Sumit Singh

In Reply to ch prakash 2 weeks ago

You didn't understand the main issue. The logic behind Adhaar on paper is indeed great, but it was just implemented by dumb officials who are technically illiterate who didn't do the sufficient mathematics to actually support the very purpose which it was supposed to establish i.e. make a unique id for every citizen or eligible individuals.

To make a unique id among other unique ids, the computer's software which is running the database must be configured/programmed to assign each different citizen/eligible individual a unique id and to do that it has to first know how many ids have already been assigned, so that, it 'at any cost' will not assign the same id to other person and will always assign a completely new id for the new person that has never been assigned to anyone who has already been registered. This is how it should have been doing but instead lets say the adhaar number 1234 5678 9876 has been assigned to you, this should be your unique id, but the UIDAI have created a system that it is prone to assign the same 1234 5678 9876 to other person as well. This is very dangerous situation. This is at least what I perceived when I read this article. And this may not be the only serious issue with current implementation of adhaar system.

Chandrakant Kane

2 weeks ago

The person to your left or right knows much more about you than Adhar card . What nonsense is people are talking about privacy

Chandrakant Kane

2 weeks ago

If some one like me is ready to share my information for my own ease what the problem to the petitioner or court in it. I will say this is the invasion on my freedom by Petitioner & court which is highly objectionable. This is nothing but harassment for me by the petitioner & Court.

Somsankar Banerjee

3 weeks ago

The article is confusing. When the author himself is saying that Aadhar can't be used to uniquely identify an individual, how the same Aadhar can be used to selectively target voters using subsidies? You need to identify the guy first whom you want to target, right?

I understand Aadhar has some issues but extending that argument to say that it can be used systematic way for electoral malpractices is probably stretching things little too far. BTW, in a country where rice/food at subsidized rate or farm loan waiver can get you votes do our political leaders need Aadhar for laundering votes?

Nanasaheb Patil

3 weeks ago

Same old wine in new bottle, Issues Author listed are already prevalent, just trying to bring Aaadhar angle in to existing issues to spoil image of Aadhar system. I am not giving clean chit to Aadhar, just questioning Author's logic to link Aadhar with already existing issues..

I am amused at how Author given clean chit on validation process for getting voter Id :) Everyone knows it's one of the most abused Id card in India, best recent example is in Karnataka one MLA candidate had more than 5000 voter Id's of his constituency in his house!!

Replacing Aadhar Biometric data to impersonate and replace existing genuine voters? Hmm dear author dont you know some goons were able to just replace photo on the voter id card recently in Karnataka election, and that is all was needed to deny the genuine voter their right :)

Denying services since there is no Aaadhar? Then what was the role of ration card earlier? Well several people have been denied LPG connection and ration for several years because they did not had a ration card even though they had all ID and address proofs :) Nobody questioned that practice with same intensity.

Ensuring uniqueness in Aadhar database might be next step, eventually it has to be done sooner or later, when Aadhar is still being rolled out imagine if Govt tries to do that now all hell will break loose.

Just demonizing something new blindly wont help, People are happily giving their biometric data to smartphones (fingerprint unlock, face recognition, YOUR LIVE LOCATION data) which are much more vulnerable to hacking. Nobody seems to be interested in debating how safe is that, singling out just Aadhar is propaganda of some section of people.

REPLY

MDT

In Reply to Nanasaheb Patil 3 weeks ago

Thanks for your comment. Request you to read more about Aadhaar https://www.moneylife.in/public-interest/aadhaar before making wild assumptions and arriving at any conclusion. FYI, Aadhaar can be given to any resident (not citizen).

Sumit Singh

3 weeks ago

This is very precious information on this article. Why is nobody else talking about it? Why is media silent over this? Having a unique ID for each citizen is the key point or minimum requirement in making a distinct entry in the database. If this whole system wasn't designed to make each entry as unique entry then the whole point of Adhaar as any type of Identity is nothing but pure fraud. If I was a Judge in Supreme Court, I would have immediately sentenced every single person working for stupid UIDAI who is responsible in creating this kind of flawed logic of so called Adhaar card to at least 30 years. These officials in UIDAI and supporting companies are basically raping every citizen in India.

Sajal Manjhi

3 weeks ago

Thank for sharing such as great information, also visit-https://www.techotn.com

Sunil

3 weeks ago

Brilliant .. I do hope the new Election Commissioner listens to the logic.

We are listening!

Solve the equation and enter in the Captcha field.
  Loading...
Close

To continue


Please
Sign Up or Sign In
with

Email
Close

To continue


Please
Sign Up or Sign In
with

Email

BUY NOW

online financial advisory
Pathbreakers
Pathbreakers 1 & Pathbreakers 2 contain deep insights, unknown facts and captivating events in the life of 51 top achievers, in their own words.
online financia advisory
The Scam
24 Year Of The Scam: The Perennial Bestseller, reads like a Thriller!
Moneylife Online Magazine
Fiercely independent and pro-consumer information on personal finance
financial magazines online
Stockletters in 3 Flavours
Outstanding research that beats mutual funds year after year
financial magazines in india
MAS: Complete Online Financial Advisory
(Includes Moneylife Online Magazine)