This partnership allows Thomas Cook to offer travel insurance and other general insurance products from Bajaj Allianz to its vast customer base, across the country
Thomas Cook India Ltd has entered into a tie up through its subsidiary company 'Thomas Cook Insurance Services (India) Ltd' as a corporate agent of Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Ltd. This partnership allows Thomas Cook to offer travel insurance and other general insurance products from Bajaj Allianz to its vast customer base, across the country.
Madhavan Menon, managing director, Thomas Cook India Ltd said, "We are proud to be associated with Bajaj Allianz, and our tie up will enable us offer a truly diverse range of customer-centric insurance products—customised and bundled travel insurance, motor insurance, health insurance and other general insurance products (both retail and corporate) to our customers countrywide. This association also gives our customers access to superior customer and claim settlement service that Bajaj Allianz is known for."
Union KBC is launching a small and mid-cap fund. Such stocks are by nature very volatile and perform well when the economy is in a growth mode. Wrong timing can erode returns over the short and medium term
Union KBC has recently filed an offer document with the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to launch an open-ended equity scheme—Union KBC Small and Mid Cap Fund. The scheme would invest 75%-100% of its assets in equity and equity-related instruments predominantly of small- and mid-sized companies. The remaining would be invested in debt and money market instruments. The performance of the scheme would be benchmarked against the BSE Mid-cap index.
Should you invest in such a scheme? Let us look at the recent past. How have similar funds performed in the past one year and three-year periods? Almost all the funds have done better than their benchmarks in both the periods. The Sensex has fallen by nearly 18% in the last one year and has given a return of 21% annually over the last three years.
But it is only during an extended market rally that small- and mid-cap stocks perform really well. The moment the market’s fortunes takes a turn for the worse, these very stocks are beaten down the most—irrespective of their fundamental strengths. Returns of funds which invest in such stocks are hence very volatile. Any signs of weakness in the markets should be enough to throw these funds out of gear.
And this has been proven in the past. In FY09-10, when the Sensex grew by 70%, from 10,000 to 17,000, such schemes with a similar investment objective performed really well. Birla Sunlife Small and Midcap Fund gave a return of 141% and DSP BlackRock Small and Midcap Fund followed closely with a return of 139%; their index—CNX Midcap—returned 126%. But in the calendar year 2008 when the Sensex crashed to half its value, in the same period the CNX Midcap index fell by 59%. Funds like Birla Sunlife Small and Midcap Fund and DSP BlackRock Small and Midcap Fund fell by 61% and 58%, respectively.
So, one has to be aware of the risks associated with such investments. If your timing is not right, your investment would get decimated. The best time to buy such schemes is when the market is at its bottom. Even though we may not be at the bottom, we are close. Of course, since one may never know when we are at the market bottom, the best way to invest would be by investing systematically in this fund. This will lower the average cost of your investment.
Three years have passed by since the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack in which the country's three most brilliant police officers, Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte and Vijay Salaskar were killed. Despite Mr Kamte's wife Vinita establishing through call log records procured under the RTI Act, the negligence of the Police Control Room which clearly led to the unfortunate tragedy, no action has been taken against those guilty for it
Call log records procured from the Mumbai Police under the RTI Act proved that negligence in communication by the Control Room to officers on Ground Zero at Cama Hospital on the Mumbai terror night of 26 November 2008, led to the unfortunate loss of lives of India's three brilliant police officers—Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte and Vijay Salaskar. Vinita Kamte, wife of Late Ashok Kamte, who established this fact, was made to run from pillar to post to procure vital information from Mumbai Police under the RTI Act. An account worth rewinding three years after the terror attack as it reflects the tenacity of an individual to challenge a government system interested only in cover-ups. It also establishes that come what may, the government will support its officers who showed no sense of duty during such circumstances, for allegedly its own vested interest. It also, at the same time, reminds one of the immense powers of the RTI Act. It will also serve as an inspiration to others who are treated with contempt by the government in maintaining secrecy of information which is rightly the affected citizen’s! It also proves that you must have a dogged determination to pursue your RTI application and not expect replies to fall into your lap, at the first go.
Why did Vinita Kamte invoke the RTI Act?
Because, after her husband, Ashok Kamte, additional commissioner, eastern region, Mumbai was killed along with anti-terrorist squad chief Hemant Karkare and encounter specialist Vijay Salaskar, the press statements given by the Mumbai Police and the state government implied they foolishly came together and died, without giving a fight. The popular statements being: “We don’t know how they went together'”, “they met there fortuitously (by chance) (as stated by the superficial Ram Pradhan Committee Report, too)” and “they did not understand the gravity of the situation.”'
Being a senior police officer’s wife, she first directly contacted Mumbai Police
28 January 2009: She wrote a letter to the commissioner of police, Mumbai, requesting for Ashok’s call log records on both the mobile networks—Motorola and Ericsson. This would establish the communication between the Control Room and the mobile phones of Ashok Kamte.
31 January 2009: Vinita receives a reply from the Mumbai Police Commissioner stating that the joint commissioner of police has been “directed to take further necessary action in the matter”. However, Vinita waited for a month but she got no response after which she was compelled to use the RTI Act.
4 March 2009: Vinita files a RTI application with the Public Information Officers (Assistant Commissioner of Police, Co-ordination) at the Commissioner of Police office, Mumbai. She requests certified copies of call log records (wireless) in both the written form as well as audio transcripts.
4 April 2009: Quite predictably, the PIO rejects the application citing Section 8 (h) which states that information can be denied as “information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders”. The PIO had also enclosed a letter by joint CP Rakesh Maria which stated, “Please reject the information sought by Mrs Vinita Kamte under the RTI Act. The information cannot be given to her under Sec 8 (h) of the said Act.”'
29 April 2009: Vinita files first an appeal with the appellate authority, deputy commissioner of police, SM Sabade.
25 May 2009: Mr Sabade orders that the PIO was wrong in rejecting her request of call log records without applying his mind as to why he is doing so and has depended solely on Mr Maria’s letter which also does not specify the reason for rejection. He states that Mr Kamte and the other officers had laid down their lives for the country and it was wrong to reject Mrs Kamte’s request on baseless grounds. However, in his order he allowed only inspection of records and denied Photostat copies/CDs of the same. This was in total contradiction of the RTI Act which gives the right to the citizen to procure copies.
3 June 2009: Nevertheless, Vinita’s twin sister, Revati Dere who is an established advocate at the Bombay High Court and who helped Vinita immensely in analyzing the call log records went for inspection nevertheless. After keeping her waiting for quite a while, a sub inspector put before her some loose sheets which were Photostat copies of the written call log records. When Revati demanded that she would like to inspect the original call log records. She was told that they were handed over to the Ram Pradhan Committee Report. He asked them to come on 6th June by which time he will get the original documents.
8 June 2009: Revati was told that the originals were not as yet procured.
9 June 2009: Vinita wrote to the members of the Ram Pradhan Committee report requesting that, since the work of the Commission is over, could they send back the original call log records back to the Mumbai police as she would like to inspect them under RTI.
11 June 2009: Shockingly, V Balchandran, member of the Ram Pradhan Committee replied via email stating that the committee had received only the certified copies of the call log records—which meant, the Mumbai Police had not provided the original call log records to them. On the same day, Vinita wrote to the Commissioner of Police regarding this issue.
12 June 2009: Mumbai Police suddenly realizes it needs to consult its legal department over the order given by the Appellate Authority Mr Sabade in allowing inspection of call log records. Isn’t this a joke?
7 July 2009: Mr Prasad stated to Vinita that legal advice was already sought and again told Vinita she could only ‘see'’ the documents and not have Photostat copies.
20 July 2009: Vinita wrote to Mr Prasad saying that while she will go ahead and ‘see'’ the records, she reserves the right to go into second appeal to have copies.
29 and 30 July 2009: Vinita sends her representatives for inspection of call log records but they were not shown the originals. Even the audio call log records shown were dated 6th January, a month and a half after the incident, so certainly not the original recording.
4 August 2009: Vinita files a separate RTI application seeking call log records, written and audio, made to Police Control Room no 100 on the night of 26/11. Her application was rejected on 4th September on flimsy grounds. She filed the first appeal to the first appellate authority and received the same reply after several months.
21 August 2009: Vinita files a second appeal to the state chief information commissioner seeking the original copies of the call logs, both written and audio.
15 October 2009: The state chief information commissioner, Mumbai allowed her appeal and directed Mumbai Police to give her certified copies of the original call log records—written and audio—within 30 days. That’s how she finally got her information.
What was the scandalous information she got from these call log records?
So, what happened despite such hard-hitting evidence brought forward by Vinita? Nothing. Officers who showed utter negligence have been promoted. Four additional commissioners, who have survived being posted in Mumbai for 20 years or more, ran away from duty that night, as stated later by the Mumbai police commissioner, but no action has been taken against them. If it was the Army, they would have faced court martial!
Can we expect good and competent officers to come forward in case of another such terror attack? Probably not, considering the treatment given to these three officers who decided to lead in the front, rather than give it all in the hands of constables and junior police officers who were not equipped to handle AK-47s, leave alone operate them. And yet, they were criticized of ineptness, posthumously.
(Vinita Deshmukh is a senior editor, author and convener of Pune Metro Jagruti Abhiyaan. She can be reached at email@example.com.)