The FIU received five Suspicious Transaction Reports during the fiscal 2009-10, four during 2010-11 and a single case in the current fiscal (up to November), minister of state for finance Namo Narain Meena informed the Lok Sabha
New Delhi: The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the finance ministry has received information on ten suspected instances of terrorist financing using the stock exchanges in the last three financial years, reports PTI.
The FIU received five Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) during the fiscal 2009-10, four during 2010-11 and a single case in the current fiscal (up to November), minister of state for finance Namo Narain Meena said in a written reply to the Lok Sabha.
The STRs, “suspected to be linked to terrorist financing, (have been) received from intermediaries of stock market such as stockbrokers, asset management companies, etc, and disseminated to intelligence agencies by the FIU,” Mr Meena said.
He also said the STRs have been linked to money laundering. These cases will be investigated by the intelligence agencies, he said.
The FIU is the national agency responsible for receiving, analysing and disseminating information related to suspect financial transactions.
Two crucial aspects in microfinance—client origination/targeting and loan appraisal—have been neglected in favour of unprecedented growth (caused by a desire to fully commercialise microfinance and rapidly enhance access/outreach of such services) and this has resulted in the present crisis
An open letter to the right honourable Andrew Mitchell, UK International Development Secretary, on lessons from the Indian microfinance crisis
Good afternoon! I am delighted that The UK Department for International Development (DFID) is launching SAMRIDHI (a programme promoting microfinance and impact investment in India) in partnership with SIDBI in your esteemed presence (Sir) at 6pm today, the 16th December (Friday) at the British Council Division, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi. Much as I wanted
Therefore, it becomes clear that the above not-so-appropriate practices were changed only due to the 2010 crisis and herein lies the most important lesson from Indian microfinance that DFID should not ignore:
b) Likewise, on loan appraisal, the Ujjivan COCA report says:
“At present, information pertaining to income, expenses as well as indebtedness of the clients used for credit analysis is what is self reported by the clients. Given the profile of its clientele, it may not be possible for the organization to obtain documentary evidence of the income, expenses and indebtedness.” (http://www.sidbi.com/micro/COCAUjjivan.pdf, page 11)
Sir, this is the omnipresent reality in microfinance as MFIs typically work with poor clients in the informal sector. Some MFIs use tools (like housing index, asset means test, PPI tool) to estimate the income levels of the clients. But it is impossible to get the exact information from a poor household operating in the informal sector.
The only way to get a better insight on the loan absorption and repayment capacity of the clients is to invest in a long-term relationship with them. However, this requires considerable time and may not deliver the best financial results for the MFI in the short term (but from a longer term perspective, the clients will be better off and that is what ultimately matters). And, most importantly, this calls for a strict “no” to use of unauthorised agents in client origination and targeting so that a good direct relationship can be built with clients. And according to the COCA report, the only MFI that seems to have invested in such a relationship is SKDRDP:
As the COCA report says “The SHGs are required to conduct weekly meetings and undertake compulsory savings for a minimum period of three months before they become eligible to undergo the process of grading. Only SHGs receiving satisfactory performance grades are eligible for applying for loans.” (http://www.sidbi.com/micro/COCA%20SKDRDP.pdf, page 7)
Yet Sir, it is ironical the SKDRDP has received the lowest COCA score! C'est la vie!
Sir, in summary, in many MFIs that had an emphasis on rapid growth, loans were disbursed (indiscriminately) at the fastest rate possible. And greening, informal collateral and abusive collateral substitutes (Tackling informal collateral and collateral substitutes in Indian microfinance) were used to collect back the loans – primarily because the agents behaved like local level thugs. Not enough time was taken by the MFIs to really get to know the clients and to be able to assess their (true) capacity to service the debt. The case of BASIX, which is generally known as one of India’s better MFIs, amply demonstrates this. The fast growth trajectory prevalent in the Indian micro-finance industry (much of BASIX’s peer MFIs in Andhra Pradesh grew at much faster rates than BASIX, prior to 2009) perhaps pushed well intentioned organisations like BASIX (which had sound lending systems originally and I can vouch for how good it was in its early years as an NBFC) to sacrifice their proper lending methodology – that is why as the M2i report on Basix argues,
“However, it was observed that the practice of recording the existing loans of clients in not uniformly practiced across all the units. We found during client interviews that some of the clients had borrowed from other MFIs but this had not been recorded in their loan forms. In one of the units—Kamareddy in Andhra Pradesh—a random inspection of 15 loan appraisal forms revealed that none of them had a mention of any other lender. It is improbable that none of the clients would have borrowed from any other MFI in the region given the prevalence of MFIs. Also, interviews with the LSPs revealed that nearly 70% of his clients had borrowings from other MFIs.” (http://www.sidbi.com/micro/COCA%20Samruddhi.pdf, Page 12)
And this is confirmed by none other than the then CEO of BASIX, who candidly said to The Economic Times,
“That (following sound lending practices) is where we failed,” says Sajeev Viswanathan, CEO of Basix. MFIs lent liberally to individuals who didn’t have a corresponding ability to repay. The mismatch had to hurt sometime, and that’s what is happening now. ...Mr Viswanathan says MFI lending in Andhra rose from Rs5,000-Rs6,000 crore in 2009 to Rs9,000 crore this year. ” (From Microfinance: What's wrong with it, by M Rajshekhar, Economic Times, November 2010)
Sir, all of the above is fine but what then are the positives from the SIDBI-World Bank sponsored COCA reports? After having analysed eight assessments, the most positive aspect that emerges is the fact that the presence and use of unauthorised agents in Indian micro-finance has now been (officially) acknowledged and admitted. I say officially because of the COCA reports are sponsored by the SIDBI-World Bank project and that puts these findings in a different plane altogether. And M2i, SIDBI and the World Bank certainly need to be complemented for their courage to bring the (widespread?) use of agents in Indian micro-finance officially out into the open. Kudos to all of them!
A major disappointment however is the fact that those MFIs engaged in such (undesirable) practices have been rewarded with highest scores for Code of Conduct Compliance. As a result, not much value can be attached to the scores resulting from the assessments. And without question, as J Nunnally, the Psychometric Guru would argue, the COCA tool will need significant revamping for it to become a reliable and valid psychometric measure, capable of portraying ground level reality in an accurate and unbiased manner. And given that Sa-Dhan and MFIN have just released a joint code of conduct in Indian microfinance, it is only natural that they take on this task of creating an appropriate tool—one that rewards actual implementation rather than glorious intentions on paper.
Sir, coming back to the SAMRIDHI, a programme promoting microfinance and impact investment, I have tried my best to present you with relevant facts and details (in the public domain) with regard to the practice of microfinance in India. I would be very grateful if you can use your good offices to ensure that the available lessons and learning are factored into the implementation of the DFID SIDBI SAMRIDHI programme (being launched today) as well as the DFID Poorest States Inclusive Growth (PSIG) project that is to be implemented in the near future! And please be rest assured sir that your kind intervention will not only enable millions of low income people in India to have a better quality life but also be an integral part of the inclusive growth story in India!
Thank you sir!
With best wishes
Ramesh S Arunachalam
“The impact of the base effect will be seen as food prices generally come down in winter season... so I do believe inflation will come down sharply and that might provide the correct environment in which the RBI can act further in the direction of easing action,” PMEAC chairman C Rangarajan said
New Delhi: Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council (PMEAC) chairman C Rangarajan today said the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) move to keep all the key policy rates unchanged in its mid-quarterly policy review is on expected lines and the central bank might start revising downwards its monetary stance only if inflation continues to decline further, reports PTI.
“...the move is on expected lines...if inflation continues to show a declining trend, then perhaps the RBI will start reversing its policy. Therefore, it is predicated only on one assumption and that is the inflation going down,” Mr Rangarajan said.
He added that inflation will start declining, “particularly food prices will come down more sharply as we have indicated, not only in December but in January as well”.
“The impact of the base effect will be seen as food prices generally come down in winter season... so I do believe inflation will come down sharply and that might provide the correct environment in which the RBI can act further in the direction of easing action,” he said.
In its policy review today, the RBI maintained repo (rate at which banks borrow from RBI) at 8.5%, and reverse repo (rate at which the RBI borrows from banks) at 7.5%.
The halt to increase in interest rates comes after the RBI hiked the rates 13 times since March 2010.
The RBI has also decided to retain the cash reserve ratio (CRR), the amount banks need to park with the RBI, at 6%. Industry was expecting a marginal cut in the CRR to induce liquidity in the system to promote investments.
Meanwhile, Planning Commission deputy chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia declined to comment on the RBI’s policy stance.
“If there is no change (in policy rates), then what is there to comment on. I don’t want to speculate (on the impact of the pause),” he said.
The RBI will make an assessment of its growth and inflation projections for 2011-12 in the third quarter review next month, the policy statement said.