MCX-SX is currently present only in currency derivatives segment, with about 750 members while the BSE and NSE have 1,083 and 1,400 members, respectively
New Delhi: Gearing up to start full-fledged stock exchange, MCX Stock Exchange (MCX-SX) on Wednesday launched a membership drive to sign-up entities to trade on its platform, while offering competitive rates to take on its rivals National Stock Exchange (NSE) and BSE, reports PTI.
MCX-SX said that it would follow a 'integrated India model' for its operations, under which it would have special focus on smaller cities to help create an equity culture across the country.
MCX-SX is currently present only in currency derivatives segment, with about 750 members. It recently got market regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)'s nod to deal in stocks, equity futures and options, interest rate derivatives and wholesale debt markets.
BSE has listed out a total of 1,083 members on its website, while NSE has more than 1,400 members.
Under an introductory offer valid till 18th October, MCX-SX would provide entry-level membership at Rs25 lakh (Rs5 lakh of membership fee and Rs20 lakh deposits).
While NSE has new membership fee of Rs5 lakh, the same at BSE is Rs2.5 lakh. NSE and BSE seek deposits worth up to Rs1.25 crore and Rs30 lakh, respectively from their members.
Besides, the members at MCX-SX would have to maintain a networth of Rs30 lakh, which is similar at BSE but higher at a minimum of Rs1 crore at NSE.
Experts say that market might see some course-correction in the membership charges, given the competitive price offered by MCX-SX, although charges have already come down at BSE in the past couple of years.
The membership cost structure of an exchange typically includes membership fee, deposits and members' networth.
MCX-SX would seek to attract people from smaller cities through its competitive cost-structure. Currently, the market participation and liquidity is limited to less than 2% of population and is heavily dominated by top metro cities.
As per latest data available with SEBI, the top four cities accounted for 82.9% of total cash segment turnover at NSE in July 2012. At the BSE, the top-four cities accounted for about 64% of total turnover.
MCX-SX said that its introductory entry-level membership offer of Rs25 lakhs, which includes a rebate given against transaction charge during the offer and which would rise to Rs50 lakh after 18th October.
It is designed to bring in cost optimisation as it frees up huge capital for members and brokers that would otherwise be blocked in exchanges, it said.
Brokers and members would be be able to utilise this fund towards client acquisition, training of staff and business expansion, MCX-SX said, while announcing two new categories of memberships for Indian markets -- professionally qualified members and rural entrepreneur members.
Besides, MCX-SX would have a third category of composite members for all eligible entities.
The exchange said the two newly introduced special categories will help towards the larger goal of financial inclusion and market development.
In its 'Professionally Qualified Members' category, the exchange would seek to attract professionals with an experience of capital market ecosystem such as investment banking, private equity, venture capital, broking and financial intermediation industry.
Other professionals like MBAs, lawyers, engineers, Chartered Accountants, doctors too would be eligible for this category. MCX-SX will provide training, covering all asset classes and market segments for the members' staff, besides other benefits including a 10% discount on on composite membership charges.
The 'Rural Entrepreneur Membership' category would target persons in those 5,924 sub-districts and talukas, beyond the existing 2,000, where there is capital no market penetration.
MCX-SX would provide various capacity building services, including training programmes, to this category as well.
Commenting on the membership drive, MCX-SX Managing Director and CEO Joseph Massey said: "We have implemented an integrated India model, which will foster balanced participation from foreign institutional investors, domestic financial institutions and new members from Tier II and Tier III centres."
"Our aim is to drive financial inclusion by optimising the cost structure of membership and innovating two unique categories for MCX-SX membership," he said.
The exchange would offer membership in categories of Trading Member, Self Clearing Member, Trading-cum-Clearing Member and Professional Clearing Member (PCM.)
The membership road-shows will be held in multiple centres across the country, starting in Mumbai on 10 September 2012. The other cities where these road-shows would be held include Ahmedabad, New Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad and Indore.
Irrespective of wherever the fund or fund managers get investment from, regulating/supervising MIVs at the place of incorporation and/or where their establishment exists would be most appropriate
Micro-finance investment vehicles (MIVs) have been a topic of recent discussion, courtesy the recent book by Hugh Sinclairi . Currently, as has been noted in my previous articlesii , given the state of the MIVs, it is highly unlikely that they undergo any meaningful regulation/supervision. However, as the recent debate has shown, there is indeed a critical need to regulate/supervise the MIVs. This is because MIVs-apart from being investment companies and/or financial intermediaries-have very diverse operations in terms of innovative products, geographies and so on. And most importantly, they are able to provide crucial capital to microfinance institutions (MFIs), which then leverage the same (from commercial banks/others)-manifold-and enhance outreach of their services.
Readers may want to recall that much of the impetus for devastating growth of the MFI sector in Andhra Pradesh (AP), which then led to the 2010 crisis, came from: a) MIVs/other investors (irresponsibly?) who pumped in huge amounts of money (in relatively shorter amounts of time) into MFIs after the 2005-2006 Krishna crisis; and b) riding on the back of these investments, MFIs were able to leverage huge amounts of commercial bank lending and growiii (using multiple lending, ghost lending and over lending) at phenomenal rates. This, in short, resulted in the 2010 AP microfinance crisis which is still unprecedented (as of today) in terms of its sheer enormity, scale, and impact.
Please see the kind of investment that some Indian MFIs received during the years preceding the 2010 AP microfinance crisis and the kind of growth they experienced. You will understand what I am saying. And, several salient points deserve mention here:
a) "First, with no causality being implied, all I can say is that the period of very rapid growth in Indian microfinance (April, 2008-March, 2010iv ) is associated with significant equity investments into Indian microfinance ($486.58 million).
For example, almost 75% of the total portfolio of the top 14 Indian MFIs (with six AP headquartered MFIs), as of end March 2010, had been accumulated during the period April 2008-March 2010. In numerical terms, this is approximately $2.791 billion, which is huge by any standards. During the same period, the big six AP headquartered MFIs also increased their gross loan portfolio by almost $2.077 billion .In other words, the six AP headquartered MFIs accounted for almost 74.41% of the total portfolio ($2.791 billion) increase for the top 14 MFIs during April 2008-March 2010. 13 of the 14 MFIs were NBFCs.
b) Further, it is in the same period of April 2008-March 2010, that the top 14 Indian MFIS (with six AP headquartered MFIs) added nearly 14.27 million active borrowers. And interestingly, the big six AP headquartered MFIs accounted for almost 9.76 million of these active borrowers (about 68.34%).
c) Thus, irrespective of whether growth of active borrowers or gross loan portfolio is considered as a measure, the period April 2008 to March 2010, is clearly "The Period" of burgeoning growth in Indian microfinance. What is noteworthy here is that this period is also associated with significant equity investments of $486.58 million.
d) The period, April 2009-July 2010, which is part of the fastest growth period (of April 2008-March 2010), shows the highest equity investment in a single year in Indian microfinance (approximately, $387.30 million).
Based on the above, the assertion that equity investment perhaps induced faster growth in Indian microfinance would not (perhaps) be a mis-statement. Equity investment by MIVs/others is what turbo-charged Indian microfinance, after the Krishna crisis of 2005-2006. This, in turn, seems to have led to more and more investment into MFIs and caused further (very) rapid growthv and thereby, attracted more equity investments at very high valuations. This is one possible explanation for the association of rapid growth (of Indian MFIs during April 2008-March 2010) and burgeoning equity investments (in Indian MFIs during the same period and thereafter)."vi
Therefore, given the above, I think that it is imperative that any kind of MIV (irrespective of its legal form, geography of incorporation, countries of investment etc) should be subject-under its extant laws-to some minimum regulation/supervision as is required for any form of organization involved in making investments (often collected from investors) and engaging in financial intermediation. Looking at the assets that MIVs control (Table 1) and keeping in mind the potential damage that they could cause by their irresponsible investments (as was done in India), the case for minimum regulation/supervision becomes very strong indeed.
Therefore, given the above background, regulation/supervision of MIVs in (at least) these three countries (Luxembourg, The Netherlands and US) becomes the imperative need of the day. Let us be clear on that! However, it is certainly not an easy task because the issue of regulation across diversely incorporated MIVs (see Table 1) operating in multiple countries would require complex arrangements with a great deal of co-ordination between regulators across countries. And while that certainly can be a long term goal, let us make a start first and pluck a low hanging fruit here-the supervision of MIVs by existing regulators/supervisors. Hence, what I am proposing is sort of an immediate solution (or quick win). In other words, what I am saying-in effect-is that let us first make a beginning by creating a framework for enhancing supervision of MIVs by existing regulator's in these three countries! And regulators in other countries could follow, as dictated by their strategic situation and requirements.
While there are many facets that regulators would have to consider when looking at ways to supervise MIVs, in my opinion, an important aspect to look at is the level of analysis and the issues that are relevant at each of these various levels. Typically, four levels of analysis are usually relevant with regard to MIVs:
While supervision of MIVs should concern levels 1, 2 and 3 primarily, levels 1 and 2 would be most important from a regulatory/supervisory stand point in the home (parent) country. As levels 3 and 4 would require significant coordination with regulator/supervisors in the host country so as to understand the nature of the investee and their operations, these levels are dealt with, separately, in forthcoming articles.
And before we get into the levels of analysis issue, one critical point must be made—for all practical purposes, irrespective of wherever the fund or fund managers get investment from, regulating/supervising them at the place of incorporation and/or place at which their establishment exists would be most appropriate. Sometimes, even these could be in multiple countries (as noted earlier) and that needs to be appropriately handled.
Having set the context here, a sequential article (Part II) looks at the above levels of analysis and offers starter questions that regulators/supervisors need to ask at each level with regard to MIVs and their operations...
(Ramesh S Arunachalam has over two decades of strong grass-roots and institutional experience in rural finance, MSME development, agriculture and rural livelihood systems, rural and urban development and urban poverty alleviation across Asia, Africa, North America and Europe. He has worked with national and state governments and multilateral agencies. His book—Indian Microfinance, The Way Forward—is the first authentic compendium on the history of microfinance in India and its possible future.)
i Confessions Of A Microfinance Heretic: How Microlending Lost Its Way And Betrayed the Poor by Hugh Sinclair (http://www.microfinancetransparency.com/)
ii Why not regulate and supervise microfinance investment vehicles in their country of incorporation?; Triple Jump’s Response to Hugh Sinclair’s Book: Does It Raise More Questions than Provide Credible Answers?; Why blame the MFIs alone?; Should not microfinance investment vehicles be judged by the same standards set for retail MFIs?; and Does Sinclair’s Open Challenge (to the Global Micro-Finance Industry) Make His Claims True?
iii See Mix Market http://www.mixmarket.org/ - ‘MFIs, unlike before, were able to deploy funds as micro-finance assets’. In my opinion they did so using multiple lending, ghost lending and over lending and primarily consumption/loans.
iv Mix Market data and please see technical appendix 9 in the book - The Journey of Indian Micro-Finance: Lessons For The Future - for the structure and calibration of the Mix Market database
v This issue is almost similar to the aspect of which came first, the Chicken or the Egg?
vi Source: Quoted from The Journey Of Indian Micro-Finance: Lessons For The Future by Ramesh S.Arunachalam and disclaimers given the book apply with regard to the data!
vii Regulation is essentially about making rules and/or principles and influencing behaviour and enforcement. Supervision concerns continuous or specific verification of the application of these principles/rules through various mechanisms.
Cold calculations show that such is the draconian charges SEBI plans to introduce for fund investors, that even the horrible practice of entry load would have been a cheaper option for investors. The new charges also perversely penalise committed investors
Exactly three years ago the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) abolished entry load in order to reduce costs for the investors and induce investments. However, investors didn’t seem too keen and instead of inflows, we have seen a total net outflow of nearly Rs20,000 crore from equity funds till July 2012. Sometime later the regulator also brought in a transaction charge for investments above Rs10,000 to incentivise distributors. However, a majority of distributors opted out from the transaction charge. Now, in order to increase penetration into cities other than the top 15, SEBI has allowed the asset management companies (AMCs) to charge up to a maximum 30 basis points (bps) extra in the total expense ratio (TER) on the total corpus of the scheme.
Here is the strange fallout that bureaucrats in SEBI either overlooked or knew about. The proposed regulation will actually be more expensive than the highly controversial entry load that was abolished! This move may help increase penetration (we feel will it will only encourage unethical practices) but at whose cost? The additional TER will be charged to the entire corpus and investors would have to forego a part of their returns for the benefit of the AMCs. And SEBI not only is asking existing fund investors to subsidise the marketing efforts of fund companies but is hitting where it hurts most—long-term holding.
Let us analyse how the additional TER will affect the performance of a scheme which most analysts have kept quiet about, possibly because of vested interests.
We will look at three different scenarios, one is the present scenario where there is no entry load charged, the second is where an entry load of 2% is charged and the third is where there is an additional TER of 30 bps is charged. We have assumed the schemes deliver a return of 10% in all scenarios before deducting costs.
In the present scenario, ignoring the transaction fee (as it is not applicable to all distributors), if one invests say Rs1 lakh in an equity mutual fund scheme which charges the maximum TER of 2.50% and makes a return of 10% pre-expenses, the investor would have a corpus of Rs4.06 lakh after 20 years. This would mean that post expenses the investor earns a return of just 7.25% compounded annually. Not at all attractive for investors to give up the safety of bank deposits.
In the earlier regime, when entry load was applicable, the invested corpus would get reduced by 2% at the start. Therefore if an investor puts in Rs1 lakh, the amount invested would be Rs98,000. If this grows by 10% and if the expense ratio is 2.5%, the investor would be left with Rs3.97 lakhs after 20 years, working out to an annual compounded rate of 7.14% post-expenses. Note that the entry load made a dent on the return, but a small one.
Now if SEBI goes ahead and allows fund companies to charge the additional TER, the TER would go up to 2.80%. At that expense ratio, after 20 years, Rs1 lakh at 10% return before expenses would grow to Rs3.81 lakhs at a compounded rate of 6.92%. This is lower than 7.14% return that comes from 2.5% expense ratio and 2% entry load. Returns work out better when entry load is charged! In fact, with a 2.8% expense ratio, approximately just after six years, the total returns post-expenses, starts falling behind scenario 2 (2% entry load plus 2.5% expense ratio). The lesson: if you are a long-term investor, you will be penalised, even as SEBI and fund companies preach at every breath the benefits of long-term investing.
In order to negate the additional TER, SEBI has asked AMCs to create a separate plan for direct investors with a lower expense ratio. Seeing the practices of AMCs in the past, they may just reduce the TER by 30 bps which they would be charging to reach smaller cities.
Clearly, the great mutual fund experts, who are in the SEBI board and SEBI’s mutual advisory committee, have either not applied their mind or decided to be the mouthpiece of the fund industry to the detriment of investors’ interests. Some critics have said that SEBI has just managed to complicate the industry even further. Why is there a need to charge an additional TER to the entire corpus? In order to compensate the AMCs for reaching smaller towns and cities, SEBI could have just reverted back to the “entry load” for just these cities. It would have benefited the investors of these cities in the long run, as well. The AMCs too would have made their cut for reaching smaller investors. This would reduce costs for the AMCs as well as they would not have to put in resources for creating a separate plan for the direct mode. But the fact that these simple and commonsensical ideas are not in the proposal indicates mal-intent and not incompetence.