The amendment to the Banking Bill seeks to allow the RBI to supersede the board of a banking company for a total period not exceeding 12 months. It also exempts mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector from the scrutiny of the Competition Commission of India
New Delhi: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is likely to issue the final guidelines for granting bank licences to corporates only after Parliament approves the Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2011, reports PTI.
The final guidelines on new banking licences would be released only after the necessary amendments to the Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill, which seeks to give more power to the regulatory powers of the RBI, sources said.
The central bank had last month issued the draft guidelines which pegged the minimum capital needed to set up a commercial bank by a corporate house having successful track record of 10 years at Rs500 crore.
It is to be noted that the Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill was introduced in Parliament in March this year.
Sources added that empowering the RBI is essential for obtaining information about the other businesses of the corporate houses seeking banking licences in order to protect depositors’ interests.
Banking companies are engaged in multifarious activities through the medium of associate enterprises. It has, therefore, become necessary for the RBI, as the regulator of the banking companies, to be aware of the financial impact of the business of such enterprises on the financial position of the banking companies, sources said.
It is, therefore, proposed to confer power upon the RBI to call for information and returns from the associate enterprises of banking companies also and to inspect the same, sources added.
The amendment seeks to allow the RBI to supersede the board of a banking company for a total period not exceeding 12 months.
The proposed amendment moved by the government also exempts mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector from the scrutiny of the Competition Commission of India.
According to the draft guidelines, companies which are primarily engaged in the real estate or stock broking will not be eligible for promoting bank.
“Entities or groups having significant (10% or more) income or assets or both from real estate, construction and broking activities individually or taken together in the last three years will not be eligible to set up new banks,” the draft said.
On foreign holding, it said the aggregate non-resident shareholding in the new bank should not exceed 49% for the first five years.
At present, the foreign shareholding in private sector banks is allowed up to 74% of the paid-up capital.
To make the IDFs more effective, the RBI agreed to reduce the risk weights for such institutions to 50% from the earlier proposed 100%. It would mean that the IDFs would have to set aside less capital towards meeting the solvency norms
New Delhi: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has indicated to the government that it will not provide any hedging support to the infrastructure development funds (IDFs) from the country’s foreign exchange reserves, reports PTI.
“The Reserve Bank as a policy will not provide any kind of foreign exchange hedging or support from the country’s foreign exchange reserve for the forex risk of the IDFs,” according to a note prepared by the central bank.
India’s forex reserves stood at $285 billion as on 2 September 2011.
To facilitate investment in the infrastructure sector, the government had proposed to set up IDFs which could be in the form of a mutual fund or non-banking financial company (NBFC).
While the IDF-Mutual Fund would be regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the RBI will be in-charge of the IDF-NBFC.
The requirement for funding of infrastructure during the 12th Plan (2012-17) has been pegged at $1 trillion, up from $500 million in the current plan.
The issues concerning setting up of IDFs were recently discussed at the high-level meeting of the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC).
To make the IDFs more effective, the RBI agreed to reduce the risk weights for such institutions to 50% from the earlier proposed 100%. It would mean that the IDFs would have to set aside less capital towards meeting the solvency norms.
“This (decision) would enable IDFs to lend twice as much to infrastructure without impacting intermediation costs,” said the RBI’s note.
RBI, however, insisted on a minimum entry capital for IDF-NBFC at Rs300 crore, three times over Rs100 crore proposed by the government initially.
Higher entry capital would ensure that the IDFs remained well capitalised.
Although the market regulator SEBI had notified the norms for IDF-Mutual Fund, RBI is yet to come out with the guidelines for IDF-NBFC.
The decision to set up IDFs follows an announcement by finance minister Pranab Mukherjee for 2011-12, with a view to accelerating and enhancing flow of long-term debt for funding the ambitious programme of infrastructure development in the country.
Farmer suicides are a tragic indication of the seriousness of the widespread indebtedness caused by imperfections in the agricultural sector that must be corrected urgently. Good recommendations and well-meaning schemes are available on paper. But making them work for a large majority of the poor and marginal farmers is critical
"On average, one farmer commits suicide every 30 minutes in India," says Smita Narula, faculty director, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ). "It's simply unacceptable to ignore a tragedy of such epic proportions and go on with business as usual. The … limited interventions have failed to adequately assess or address this deepening crisis. …Over the past two decades, economic reforms-which included the removal of agricultural subsidies and the opening of Indian agriculture to an increasingly volatile global market-have increased costs, while reducing yields and profits for many farmers, creating widespread financial distress. As a result, smallholder farmers are often trapped in a cycle of insurmountable debt, leading many to take their lives. And according to a report by CHRGJ, which looks critically at India's farmer suicide epidemic, an estimated 250,000 farmers have committed suicide since 1995"i. Without question, India continues to be in the midst of an agrarian crisis, of huge proportions.
And every time the agrarian crisis rears its head, we cite a new programme as a potential solution, and the latest is the National Rural Livelihood Mission (NRLM). One seems to have lost track of the number of programmes for solving various such problems, but the time is now ripe to ask the question, "How to make these programmes really effective in terms of actual problem solving on the ground, with regard to agricultural and rural livelihoods?" Let's look at specific actions to begin with, that can perhaps make these so-called 'high-powered programmes' more effective, by ensuring that they (1) tackle the root causes of problems, rather than the symptoms; (2) recommend actions/solutions that can work on the ground, with a clear plan for implementation along with a time frame and accountability.
As noted earlier, the burning issue in rural livelihoods, especially over the past few years, has been suicides by farmers in various parts of the country. While theories abound with regard to reasons, several basic aspects need attention. India is one of the few countries that has consistently and continues to ignore agriculture and farmers, despite them forming a significant majority. There are very few products in India, a unit of which can perhaps be bought for less than a rupee (especially from farmers) and this clearly shows that we, as a country, have only paid lip service to farmers, whether it be the quality of agricultural credit support, market support, minimum price support, insurance, watershed linkages and the like.
While several schemes exist for small/marginal/poor farmers, they are there only on paper and, often times, are misused by better-off farmers/others. Drip/sprinkler irrigation schemes are a case in point. While the number of farmers supposedly benefited by such schemes that have a significant subsidy component, is increasing year after year, an analysis of whether these are used on the ground will reveal that very few poor/small/marginal farmers are actually using them.
The reality is that many of them sell these off for survival, while others report that the material supplied is itself poor quality and does not work. And contractors argue that when they have to give special sums to various stakeholders (local officials) to get the contracts in the first place, they can only make sub-standard products. The net result is that these schemes really add very little value on the ground to the work of farmers, and are better scrapped as the prime beneficiaries are either rich contractors and/or hierarchy of officials, often with local level political patronage.
Walk into the Ottanchattiram vegetable market in Tamil Nadu (one of the largest vegetable markets in India, or for that matter even Asia), and you will see the tragic scenes of farmers dumping and trashing their produce rather than sell at rock-bottom prices foisted on them by a cartel of exploitative middlemen. (Some times it is as low as 50 paise for a basket of tomatoes of 12kg-15kg.) One is not sure whether anything else can be bought so cheaply. I have been seeing this regularly with my own eyes for several seasons.
Go to Chintappali (Paderu ITDA), in Visakhapatnam district in Andhra Pradesh, and you will see tribals selling organic rajma (grown from podu, or slash and burn cultivation) for Rs2-Rs3 a kg to the saukar or even at the GCC (Girijan Cooperative Corporation) stall at the shandy, whereas we buy the same at even as high as Rs50-Rs55 a kg in the metros. And please do remember that this is organic rajma and for that we would have to pay as much as Rs60-Rs65 a kg. That the tribals prefer to sell to the saukar for Rs2-Rs3 a kg is a different story as the GCC and similar government market enabling mechanisms grade products and pay only for the supposedly high-grade rajma/agriculture produce-farmers argue that they would rather sell to the saukar who gives them an advance than the GCC which pays them very little and often too late.
Talk to onion farmers and they will tell you what the middlemen at the mandis say. 'Truck or shiploads of onions have come in today and so, our price has to be lower than expected'. Likewise for rice, the traders argue, 'the government has removed the restrictions for movement between districts and so the prices have fallen'. Similarly, sugarcane farmers will relate their woes.ii They will tell you about the poor quality sets that have hardly 30% germination; lack of timely inputs like fertiliser despite a bank loan for which the interest clock is ticking away; inadequacy of cutting labour on time, as a result of which the sugarcane over-matures and has less weight, on the basis of which farmers are compensated; complacency on the part of sugar mills, whose corrupt cane assistants (referred to with dignity as 'cane supervisors' in villages by farmers) bypass farmers and issue cutting orders for those who have obliged them; the irresponsible behaviour of sugar mills, whose lorry contractors demand a special bata (some times as high as Rs500-Rs1000 per load) for every load lifted, and refuse to upload 'cut cane' of those farmers who do not oblige them with bata-the net impact is that 'cut cane' looses weight by the hour, drying in the hot sun, thereby depriving farmers of a good return; and, last but not the least, the irregular and untimely payment schedule of sugar mills, which not only enhances the interest burden of the farmers, as the principal can be repaid only with the proceeds obtained from sugar mills.
Likewise, a trip to villages like Bodlanka in Rampachoodavaram ITDA, in the East Godavari district in Andhra Pradesh, exposes how the poor neither have access to financial services nor fair market mechanisms. Nonetheless, they still borrow at very high effective rates of interest (some as high as 100%-200%, when one takes into account various conditions) and sell their produce at captive and unduly exploitative prices-in some ways, the exact opposite of economic arbitrage, where you buy low and sell high. That the poor women cannot even pay back the saukar because of the low and captive price for their produce is a fact, as is their continued bondage.
Add to the above issues the fact that a very significant proportion of farmers are dependent on rain-fed agriculture, and you will understand that farmers have really no options and are often caught in a hopeless, no-win situation, their plight deteriorating day after day.
While the list of problems in the agriculture sector can go on endlessly, the key point to note is that they are exacerbated by the fact that, as a country, we have shown the least regard to strengthen a 'critical occupation' that is pursued by a vast majority of the people (over 600 million people are employed in agriculture in some sense) many of them poor. An occupation, without which, most of us will simply starve and cannot survive.
Thus, farmer indebtedness arises primarily because of long-existing imperfections in the market for agriculture and related aspects mentioned above. Lack of access to timely credit for farmers is certainly a problem and commercial and other banks are still viewed as distant by many farmers. The transaction cost of borrowing from these banks is still enormous for farmers and the livelihood loss is extremely high, especially for those dependent on rain-fed agriculture. Most MFIs do not work with farmers and yet, they are supposed to espouse the cause of financial inclusion. And where farmers are financially included like in sectors such as sugarcane, the financial services are inappropriate and more often than not, it leads to their ultimate exclusion. Furthermore, the issue of credit at the post-harvest stage that is critical for farmers is still lacking and this is another area where a strong intervention can help.
Thus, undeniably, a majority of the small and marginal farmers who are engaged in agriculture/allied activities, are enmeshed in a multi-pronged web of imperfect markets, exploitative middlemen, lack of access to a range of appropriate (vulnerability reducing) financial services apart from other enabling infrastructure such as warehouses.
In fact, in holistic terms, the establishment of warehouses nationally and availability of warehouse receipt financing can go a long way in alleviating the plight and indebtedness of farmers. This would give them the much-needed staying power, in the wake of exploitative mandis and middlemen, who usurp the profits taking advantage of the perishability of agricultural produce, even while farmers consistently have a negative return. Even here, replacing middlemen is perhaps not the solution-creating competition for them and attempting to bring in alternative channels that address existing imperfections, is perhaps one solution, as is the establishment of warehouses and availability of warehouse receipt financing on a large scale.
Finally, while well-meaning schemes and good recommendations are available on paper, making them work for a large majority of the poor/small/marginal farmers is very critical. This would require a thorough and honest analysis to understand which of these work on the ground, to what extent and why and what else can be done to make them more effective to reach the intended target group. A good starting point would be for the so-called 'high-power' programmes like NRLM to become grassroots oriented and hold national/state public hearings, conducted in cooperation with Civil Society institutions, in several places across the country where small and marginal farmers can come and relate their problem/issues. Practical solutions to tackling large-scale farmer indebtedness and suicides are possible only if these programmes go to the grassroots and are more 'small farmer-led' in their orientation. Otherwise, they will become one more centralised programme with great sounding reports, waiting to bite the dust.
iSource: Every 30 Minutes: Farmer Suicides and the Agrarian Crisis in India, by Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, (May 12, 2011)
ii<a data-cke-saved-href="" href="" http:="" www.moneylife.in="" article="" financial-inclusion-of-sugarcane-farmers-in-modern-day-india="" 19425.html"="">Financial inclusion of sugarcane farmers in modern-day India by Ramesh S Arunachalam, (September 03, 2011)
(The writer has over two decades of grassroots and institutional experience in rural finance, MSME development, agriculture and rural livelihood systems, rural/urban development and urban poverty alleviation/governance. He has worked extensively in Asia, Africa, North America and Europe with a wide range of stakeholders, from the private sector and academia to governments.)